



'GRADIVA'

THE STANDARD EDITION  
OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF

# SIGMUND FREUD

*Translated from the German under the General Editorship of*

JAMES STRACHEY

*In Collaboration with*

ANNA FREUD

*Assisted by*

ALIX STRACHEY and ALAN TYSON

VOLUME IX

(1906-1908)

Jensen's 'Gradiva'

*and*

Other Works

LONDON

THE HOGARTH PRESS

AND THE INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

PUBLISHED BY  
THE HOGARTH PRESS LIMITED

'JENSEN'S "GRADIVA"'  
INCLUDED BY ARRANGEMENT WITH  
GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN LTD.  
LONDON

\*

CLARKE, IRWIN AND CO. LTD.  
TORONTO

*This Edition first Published in*  
1959

*Reprinted 1962, 1964, 1968, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1978 and 1981*

ISBN 0 7012 0067 7

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of The Hogarth Press Ltd.

TRANSLATION AND EDITORIAL MATTER  
© THE INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS  
AND ANGELA RICHARDS 1959

PRINTED AND BOUND IN GREAT BRITAIN  
BY BUTLER AND TANNER LTD., FROME

# CONTENTS

## VOLUME NINE

### DELUSIONS AND DREAMS IN JENSEN'S *GRADIVA* (1907 [1906])

Editor's Note	page 3
Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's <i>Gradiva</i>	7
Postscript to the Second Edition (1912)	94
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS (1906)	97
Editor's Note	99
Psycho-Analysis and the Establishment of the Facts in Legal Proceedings	103
OBSESSIVE ACTIONS AND RELIGIOUS PRAC- TICES (1907)	115
THE SEXUAL ENLIGHTENMENT OF CHILDREN (1907)	129
CREATIVE WRITERS AND DAY-DREAMING (1908 [1907])	141
HYSTERICAL PHANTASIES AND THEIR RELA- TION TO BISEXUALITY (1908)	155
Editor's Note	157
Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality	159
CHARACTER AND ANAL EROTISM (1908)	167



	<i>page</i>
'CIVILIZED' SEXUAL MORALITY AND MODERN NERVOUS ILLNESS (1908)	177
Editor's Note	179
'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness	181
ON THE SEXUAL THEORIES OF CHILDREN (1908)	205
Editor's Note	207
On the Sexual Theories of Children	209
SOME GENERAL REMARKS ON HYSTERICAL ATTACKS (1909 [1908])	227
FAMILY ROMANCES (1909 [1908])	235
SHORTER WRITINGS (1903-1909)	
Contribution to a Questionnaire on Reading	245
Prospectus or <i>Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde</i>	248
Preface to Wilhelm Stekel's <i>Nervous Anxiety-States and their Treatment</i>	250
Preface to Sándor Ferenczi's <i>Psycho-Analysis: Essays in the Field of Psycho-Analysis</i>	252
Contributions to the <i>Neue Freie Presse</i>	253
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND AUTHOR INDEX	257
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	267
GENERAL INDEX	269

# FRONTISPIECE 'Gradiva'

*Vatican Museum (Museo Chiaramonti, Section VII/2, No. 1284).*

DELUSIONS AND DREAMS IN  
JENSEN'S *GRADIVA*  
(1907 [1906])



## EDITOR'S NOTE

### DER WAHN UND DIE TRÄUME IN W. JENSENS *GRADIVA*

#### (a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1907 Leipzig and Vienna: Heller. Pp. 81. (*Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde*, Heft 1) (Re-issued unchanged with the same title page but a new paper outer cover: Leipzig and Vienna: Deuticke, 1908.)
- 1912 2nd ed. Leipzig and Vienna: Deuticke. With 'Postscript'. Pp. 87.
- 1924 3rd ed. Same publishers. Unchanged.
- 1925 *G.S.*, 9, 273-367.
- 1941 *G.W.*, 7, 31-125.

#### (b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

##### *Delusion and Dream*

- 1917 New York: Moffat, Yard. Pp. 243. (Tr. H. M. Downey.) (With an introduction by G. Stanley Hall. Omits Freud's 'Postscript'. Includes translation of Jensen's story.)
- 1921 London: George Allen & Unwin. Pp. 213. (A reprint of the above.)

The present translation is an entirely new one, with a modified title, by James Strachey. The 'Postscript' appears in English for the first time.

This was Freud's first published analysis of a work of literature, apart, of course, from his comments on *Oedipus Rex* and *Hamlet* in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 4, 261-6. At an earlier date, however, he had written a short analysis of Conrad Ferdinand Meyer's story, 'Die Richterin' ['The Woman Judge'], and had sent it to

Fliess, enclosed in a letter dated June 20, 1898 (Freud, 1950a, Letter 91).

It was Jung, as we learn from Ernest Jones (1955, 382), who brought Jensen's<sup>1</sup> book to Freud's notice, and Freud is reported to have written the present work especially to please Jung. This was in the summer of 1906, several months before the two men had met each other, and the episode was thus the herald of their five or six years of cordial relations. Freud's study was published in May, 1907 and soon afterwards he sent a copy of it to Jensen. A short correspondence followed, which is referred to in the 'Post-script' to the second edition (p. 94); Jensen's side of this correspondence (three shortish letters, dated May 13, May 25 and December 14, 1907) has since been published in the *Psychoanalytische Bewegung*, 1 (1929), 207-211. The letters are most friendly in tone and give the impression that Jensen was flattered by Freud's analysis of his story. He appears even to have accepted the main lines of the interpretation. In particular, he declares that he has no recollection of having replied 'somewhat brusquely' when, as reported below on p. 91, he was asked (apparently by Jung) whether he knew anything of Freud's theories.

Apart from the deeper significance which Freud saw in Jensen's work, there is no doubt that he must have been specially attracted by the scene in which it was laid. His interest in Pompeii was an old-established one. It appears more than once in his correspondence with Fliess. Thus, as an association to the word '*via*' in one of his dreams<sup>2</sup>, he gives 'the streets of Pompeii which I am studying'. This was on April 28, 1897 (Freud, 1950a, Letter 60), several years before he actually visited Pompeii, in September, 1902. Above all, Freud was fascinated by the analogy between the

<sup>1</sup> Wilhelm Jensen (1837-1911) was a North German playwright and novelist, respected but not regarded as of very great distinction.

<sup>2</sup> The 'Villa Secerno' dream. It is also reported in *The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Ed.*, 4, 317; but the Pompeii association is not mentioned there.

historical fate of Pompeii (its burial and subsequent excavation) and the mental events with which he was so familiar—burial by repression and excavation by analysis. Something of this analogy was suggested by Jensen himself (p. 51), and Freud enjoyed elaborating it here as well as in later contexts.

In reading Freud's study, it is worth bearing in mind its chronological place in his writings as one of his earliest psycho-analytic works. It was written only a year after the first publication of the 'Dora' case history and the *Three Essays on Sexuality*. Embedded in the discussion of *Gradiva*, indeed, there lies not only a summary of Freud's explanation of dreams but also what is perhaps the first of his semi-popular accounts of his theory of the neuroses and of the therapeutic action of psycho-analysis. It is impossible not to admire the almost prestidigital skill with which he extracts this wealth of material from what is at first sight no more than an ingenious anecdote.<sup>1</sup> But it would be wrong to minimize the part played in the outcome, however unconsciously, by Jensen himself.

<sup>1</sup> In his *Autobiographical Study* (1925d), *Standard Ed.*, 20, 65, Freud spoke a little contemptuously of *Gradiva* as a work 'which has no particular merit in itself'.



## DELUSIONS AND DREAMS IN JENSEN'S *GRADIVA*

### I

A GROUP of men who regarded it as a settled fact that the essential riddles of dreaming have been solved by the efforts of the author of the present work<sup>1</sup> found their curiosity aroused one day by the question of the class of dreams that have never been dreamt at all—dreams created by imaginative writers and ascribed to invented characters in the course of a story. The notion of submitting this class of dreams to an investigation might seem a waste of energy and a strange thing to undertake; but from one point of view it could be considered justifiable. It is far from being generally believed that dreams have a meaning and can be interpreted. Science and the majority of educated people smile if they are set the task of interpreting a dream. Only the common people, who cling to superstitions and who on this point are carrying on the convictions of antiquity, continue to insist that dreams can be interpreted. The author of *The Interpretation of Dreams* has ventured, in the face of the reproaches of strict science, to become a partisan of antiquity and superstition. He is, it is true, far from believing that dreams foretell the future, for the unveiling of which men have vainly striven from time immemorial by every forbidden means. But even he has not been able entirely to reject the relation of dreams to the future. For the dream, when the laborious work of translating it had been accomplished, revealed itself to him as a wish of the dreamer's represented as fulfilled; and who could deny that wishes are predominantly turned towards the future?

I have just said that dreams are fulfilled wishes. Anyone who is not afraid of making his way through an abstruse book, and who does not insist on a complicated problem being

<sup>1</sup> See Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a).



represented to him as easy and simple in order to save him trouble and at the cost of honesty and truth, may find the detailed proof of this thesis in the work I have mentioned. Meanwhile, he may set on one side the objections which will undoubtedly occur to him against equating dreams and wish-fulfilments.

But we have gone a long way ahead. It is not a question yet of establishing whether the meaning of a dream can always be rendered by a fulfilled wish, or whether it may not just as often stand for an anxious expectation, an intention, a reflection, and so on. On the contrary, the question that first arises is whether dreams have a meaning at all, whether they ought to be assessed as mental events. Science answers 'no': it explains dreaming as a purely physiological process, behind which, accordingly, there is no need to look for sense, meaning or purpose. Somatic stimuli, so it says, play upon the mental instrument during sleep and thus bring to consciousness now one idea and now another, robbed of all mental content: dreams are comparable only to twitchings, not to expressive movements, of the mind.

Now in this dispute as to the estimation in which dreams should be held, imaginative writers seem to be on the same side as the ancients, as the superstitious public and as the author of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. For when an author makes the characters constructed by his imagination dream, he follows the everyday experience that people's thoughts and feelings are continued in sleep and he aims at nothing else than to depict his heroes' states of mind by their dreams. But creative writers are valuable allies and their evidence is to be prized highly, for they are apt to know a whole host of things between heaven and earth of which our philosophy has not yet let us dream. In their knowledge of the mind they are far in advance of us everyday people, for they draw upon sources which we have not yet opened up for science. If only this support given by writers in favour of dreams having a meaning were less ambiguous! A strictly critical eye might object that writers take their stand neither for nor

against particular dreams having a psychical meaning; they are content to show how the sleeping mind twitches under the excitations which have remained active in it as off-shoots of waking life.

But even this sobering thought does not damp our interest in the fashion in which writers make use of dreams. Even if this enquiry should teach us nothing new about the nature of dreams, it may perhaps enable us from this angle to gain some small insight into the nature of creative writing. Real dreams were already regarded as unrestrained and unregulated structures—and now we are confronted by unfettered imitations of these dreams! There is far less freedom and arbitrariness in mental life, however, than we are inclined to assume—there may even be none at all. What we call chance in the world outside can, as is well known, be resolved into laws. So, too, what we call arbitrariness in the mind rests upon laws, which we are only now beginning dimly to suspect. Let us, then, see what we find!

There are two methods that we might adopt for this enquiry. One would be to enter deeply into a particular case, into the dream-creations of one author in one of his works. The other would be to bring together and contrast all the examples that could be found of the use of dreams in the works of different authors. The second method would seem to be far the more effective and perhaps the only justifiable one, for it frees us at once from the difficulties involved in adopting the artificial concept of 'writers' as a class. On investigation this class falls apart into individual writers of the most various worth—among them some whom we are accustomed to honour as the deepest observers of the human mind. In spite of this, however, these pages will be devoted to an enquiry of the first sort. It happened that in the group of men among whom the notion first arose there was one<sup>1</sup> who recalled that in the work of fiction that had last caught his fancy there were several dreams which had, as it were, looked at him with familiar faces and invited him to attempt

<sup>1</sup> [This was Jung. See the Editor's Note above, p. 4.]

to apply to them the method of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. He confessed that the subject-matter of the little work and the scene in which it was laid may no doubt have played the chief part in creating his enjoyment. For the story was set in the frame of Pompeii and dealt with a young archaeologist who had surrendered his interest in life in exchange for an interest in the remains of classical antiquity and who was now brought back to real life by a roundabout path which was strange but perfectly logical. During the treatment of this genuinely poetic material the reader had been stirred by all kinds of thoughts akin to it and in harmony with it. The work was a short tale by Wilhelm Jensen—*Gradiva*—which its author himself described as a 'Pompeian phantasy'.

And now I ought properly to ask all my readers to put aside this little essay and instead to spend some time in acquainting themselves with *Gradiva* (which first appeared in the bookshops in 1903), so that what I refer to in the following pages may be familiar to them. But for the benefit of those who have already read *Gradiva* I will recall the substance of the story in a brief summary; and I shall count upon their memory to restore to it all the charm of which this treatment will deprive it.

A young archaeologist, Norbert Hanold, had discovered in a museum of antiquities in Rome a relief which had so immensely attracted him that he was greatly pleased at obtaining an excellent plaster cast of it which he could hang in his study in a German university town and gaze at with interest. The sculpture represented a fully-grown girl stepping along, with her flowing dress a little pulled up so as to reveal her sandalled feet. One foot rested squarely on the ground; the other, lifted from the ground in the act of following after, touched it only with the tips of the toes, while the sole and heel rose almost perpendicularly.<sup>1</sup> It was probably the unusual and peculiarly charming gait thus presented that attracted the sculptor's notice and that still, after so many centuries, riveted the eyes of its archaeological admirer.

<sup>1</sup> [See the frontispiece of this volume.]

The interest taken by the hero of the story in this relief is the basic psychological fact in the narrative. It was not immediately explicable. 'Dr. Norbert Hanold, Lecturer in Archaeology, did not in fact find in the relief anything calling for special notice from the point of view of his branch of science.' (3.)<sup>1</sup> 'He could not explain to himself what there was in it that had provoked his attention. He only knew that he had been attracted by something and that the effect had continued unchanged ever since.' But his imagination was occupied with the sculpture without ceasing. He found something 'of to-day' about it, as though the artist had had a glimpse in the street and captured it 'from the life'. He gave the girl thus pictured as she stepped along the name of 'Gradiva'—'the girl who steps along'.<sup>2</sup> He made up a story that she was no doubt the daughter of an aristocratic family, perhaps 'of a patrician aedile,'<sup>3</sup> who carried out his office in the service of Ceres', and that she was on her way to the goddess's temple. Then he found it hard to fit her quiet, calm nature into the busy life of a capital city. He convinced himself, rather, that she must be transported to Pompeii, and that somewhere there she was stepping across the curious stepping-stones which have been dug up and which made it possible to cross dry-foot from one side of the street to the other in rainy weather, though allowing carriage-wheels to pass between them as well. Her features struck him as having a *Greek* look and he had no doubt that she was of Hellenic origin. Little by little he brought the whole of his archaeological learning into the service of these and other phantasies relating to the original who had been the model for the relief.

But now he found himself confronted by an ostensibly scientific problem which called for a solution. It was a question of his arriving at a critical judgement as to 'whether Gradiva's gait as she stepped along had been reproduced by

<sup>1</sup> [Plain numbers in brackets in the present translation are page references to Jensen, *Gradiva*, 1903.]

<sup>2</sup> [The derivation of the name is further explained below, on p. 50.]

<sup>3</sup> [A magistrate in charge of public buildings.]

the sculptor in a life-like manner'. He found that he himself was not capable of imitating it, and in his quest for the 'reality' of this gait he was led 'to make observations of his own from the life in order to clear the matter up'. (9.) This, however, forced him into a course of behaviour that was quite foreign to him. 'Hitherto, the female sex had been to him no more than the concept of something made of marble or bronze, and he had never paid the slightest attention to its contemporary representatives.' Social duties had always seemed to him an unavoidable nuisance; he saw and heard young ladies whom he came across in society so little that when he next met them he would pass them by without a sign; and this, of course, made no favourable impression on them. Now, however, the scientific task which he had taken on compelled him, in dry, but more especially in wet, weather, to look eagerly in the street at women's and girls' feet as they came into view—an activity which brought him some angry, and some encouraging, glances from those who came under his observation; 'but he was aware of neither the one nor the other.' (10.) As an outcome of these careful studies he was forced to the conclusion that Gradiva's gait was not discoverable in reality; and this filled him with regret and vexation.

Soon afterwards he had a terrifying dream, in which he found himself in ancient Pompeii on the day of the eruption of Vesuvius and witnessed the city's destruction. 'As he was standing at the edge of the forum beside the Temple of Jupiter, he suddenly saw Gradiva at no great distance from him. Till then he had had no thought of her presence, but now it occurred to him all at once and as though it was something natural that, since she was a Pompeian, she was living in her native town, and, *without his having suspected it, living as his contemporary.*' (12.) Fear of the fate that lay before her provoked him to utter a warning cry, whereupon the figure, as she calmly stepped along, turned her face towards him. But she then proceeded on her way untroubled, till she reached the portico of the temple;<sup>1</sup> there she took her seat on one of

<sup>1</sup> [The Temple of Apollo.]

the steps and slowly laid her head down on it, while her face grew paler and paler, as though it were turning into marble. When he hurried after her, he found her stretched out on the broad step with a peaceful expression, like someone asleep, till the rain of ashes buried her form.

When he awoke, the confused shouts of the inhabitants of Pompeii calling for help still seemed to echo in his ears, and the dull muttering of the breakers in the agitated sea. But even after his returning reflection recognized the sounds as the awakening signs of noisy life in a great city, he retained his belief for a long time in the reality of what he had dreamt. When at length he had freed himself of the notion that he himself had been present at the destruction of Pompeii almost two thousand years earlier, he was nevertheless left with what seemed a true conviction that *Gradiva* had lived in Pompeii and been buried there with the others in the year 79 A.D. The dream had as its result that now for the first time in his phantasies about *Gradiva* he mourned for her as someone who was lost.

While he was leaning out of the window, absorbed in these thoughts, his attention was caught by a canary warbling its song from a cage in the open window of the house opposite. Suddenly something passed with a start through the mind of the young man, who seems not yet to have fully woken from his dream. He thought he saw in the street a form like his *Gradiva*, and thought he even recognized her characteristic gait. Without thinking, he hurried into the street so as to catch up with her; and it was only the laughter and jeers of the passers-by at his early-morning attire that quickly drove him back into his house. When he was in his room again, the singing of the canary in its cage once more caught his attention and suggested a comparison with himself. He too, so it seemed to him, was like someone sitting in a cage, though it was easier for him to escape from it. As though as a further aftermath of his dream, and perhaps, too, under the influence of the mild air of spring, a resolve took shape in him to make a spring-time journey to Italy. A scientific excuse

for it soon presented itself, even though 'the impulse to make this journey had arisen from a feeling he could not name.' (24.)

Let us pause for a moment at this journey, planned for such remarkably uncogent reasons, and take a closer look at our hero's personality and behaviour. He still appears to us as incomprehensible and foolish; we have no idea how his peculiar folly will be linked to human feeling and so arouse our sympathy. It is an author's privilege to be allowed to leave us in such uncertainty. The charm of his language and the ingenuity of his ideas offer us a provisional reward for the reliance we place in him and for the still unearned sympathy which we are ready to feel for his hero. Of this hero we are further told that he was pre-ordained by family tradition to become an archaeologist, that in his later isolation and independence he was wholly absorbed in his studies and had turned completely away from life and its pleasures. Marble and bronze alone were truly alive for him; they alone expressed the purpose and value of human life. But nature, perhaps with benevolent intent, had infused into his blood a corrective of an entirely unscientific sort—an extremely lively imagination, which could show itself not only in his dreams but often in his waking life as well. This division between imagination and intellect destined him to become an artist or a neurotic; he was one of those whose kingdom is not of this world. Thus it was that it could come about that his interest was attached to a relief representing a girl stepping along in a peculiar fashion, that he wove his phantasies around her, imagined a name and origin for her, placed the figure he had created in the setting of the Pompeii that was buried more than eighteen hundred years before, and finally, after a strange anxiety-dream, magnified his phantasy of the existence and death of this girl named *Gradiva* into a delusion, which gained an influence over his actions. Such products of the imagination would seem to us astonishing and inexplicable if we met them in someone in real life. Since our

hero, Norbert Hanold, is a fictitious person, we may perhaps put a timid question to his author, and ask whether his imagination was determined by forces other than its own arbitrary choice.

We had left our hero at the moment when he was apparently being led by the song of a canary to decide on a journey to Italy, the purpose of which was evidently not clear to him. We learn further that he had no fixed plan or goal for his journey. An inner restlessness and dissatisfaction drove him from Rome to Naples and from thence further still. He found himself among the swarm of honeymooners and was forced to notice the loving couples of 'Edwins' and 'Angelinas',<sup>1</sup> but was quite unable to understand their goings-on. He came to the conclusion that of all the follies of mankind 'getting married takes first place, as the greatest and most incomprehensible, and the senseless honeymoon trips to Italy are, in a way, the crowning touch of this idiocy'. (27.) Having been disturbed in his sleep by the proximity of a loving couple in Rome, he hurriedly fled to Naples, only to find other 'Edwins' and 'Angelinas' there. Having gathered from their conversation that the majority of these pairs of birds had no intention of nesting among the ruins of Pompeii, but were flying towards Capri, he determined to do what they did not, and only a few days after his departure found himself 'contrary to his expectation and intentions' in Pompeii.

But without finding there the repose he was in search of. The part which had so far been played by the honeymoon couples, who had troubled his spirits and harassed his thoughts, was now taken over by the house-flies, which he was inclined to regard as the incarnation of all that is absolutely evil and unnecessary. The two sorts of tormenting spirits

<sup>1</sup> ['August' and 'Grete' in the original. The names recur frequently in the course of the story and it has seemed best to replace them by those conventionally applied to English honeymoon couples of the late Victorian age.]



melted into a unity: some of the pairs of flies reminded him of the honeymooners, and he suspected that they too were addressing each other in their language as 'dearest Edwin' and 'darling Angelina'. Eventually, he could not but realize that 'his dissatisfaction was not caused only by his surroundings but that its source was in part derived from within himself'. (42.) He felt that 'he was discontented because he lacked something, though it was not clear to him what'.

Next morning he passed through the '*Ingresso*' into Pompeii, and, after getting rid of the guide, strolled aimlessly through the town, without, strangely enough, remembering that only a short time before he had been present in his dream at its burial. When later on, at the 'hot and holy'<sup>1</sup> mid-day hour, which the ancients regarded as the hour of ghosts, the other visitors had taken flight and the heaps of ruins lay before him desolate and bathed in sunlight, he found that he was able to carry himself back into the life that had been buried—but not by the help of science. 'What it taught was a lifeless, archaeological way of looking at things, and what came from its mouth was a dead, philological language. These were of no help to an understanding through the spirit, the feelings, the heart—put it as you please. Whoever had a longing for that must stand here alone, the only living creature, in the hot silence of mid-day, among the relics of the past, and look, but not with bodily eyes, and listen, but not with physical ears. And then . . . the dead wakened and Pompeii began to live once more.' (55.)

While he was thus animating the past with his imagination, he suddenly saw the unmistakable *Gradiva* of his relief come out of a house and step trippingly over the lava stepping-stones to the other side of the street, just as he had seen her do in his dream the other night, when she had lain down as though to sleep, on the steps of the Temple of Apollo. 'And together with his memory something else came into his consciousness for the first time: without being aware himself of the impulse within him, he had come to Italy and had

<sup>1</sup> [*Gradiva*, 51.]

travelled on to Pompeii, without stopping in Rome or Naples, in order to see whether he could find any traces of her. And "traces" literally; for with her peculiar gait she must have left behind an imprint of her toes in the ashes distinct from all the rest.' (58.)

At this point the tension in which the author has hitherto held us grows for a moment into a painful sense of bewilderment. It is not only our hero who has evidently lost his balance; we too have lost our bearings in the face of the apparition of Gradiva, who was first a marble figure and then an imaginary one. Is she a hallucination of our hero, led astray by his delusions? Is she a 'real' ghost? or a living person? Not that we need believe in ghosts when we draw up this list. The author, who has called his story a 'phantasy', has found no occasion so far for informing us whether he intends to leave us in our world, decried for being prosaic and governed by the laws of science, or whether he wishes to transport us into another and imaginary world, in which spirits and ghosts are given reality. As we know from the examples of *Hamlet* and *Macbeth*, we are prepared to follow him there without hesitation. If so, the imaginative archaeologist's delusion would have to be measured by another standard. Indeed, when we consider how improbable it must be that a real person could exist who bore an exact resemblance to the antique sculpture, our list of alternatives shrinks to two: a hallucination or a mid-day ghost. A small detail in the account soon cancels the first possibility. A large lizard was lying motionless, stretched out in the sunshine, but fled at the approach of Gradiva's foot and darted away across the lava paving-stones. So it was no hallucination, but something outside our dreamer's mind. But could the reality of a *rediviva* startle a lizard?

Gradiva disappeared in front of the House of Meleager. We shall not be surprised to hear that Norbert Hanold pursued his delusion that Pompeii had come to life around him

at the mid-day hour of ghosts and supposed that Gradiva too had come to life again and had entered the house in which she had lived before the fatal August day in 79 A.D. Ingenious speculations upon the personality of its owner (after whom the house was probably named), and upon Gradiva's relationship to him, shot through his head, and proved that his science was now completely in the service of his imagination. He entered the house, and suddenly found the apparition once more, sitting on some low steps between two yellow columns. 'There was something white stretched out across her knees; he could not clearly discern what it was; it seemed to be a sheet of papyrus . . .' On the basis of his latest theories of her origin he addressed her in Greek, and waited with trepidation to learn whether, in her phantom presence she possessed the power of speech. Since she made no reply, he addressed her instead in Latin. Then, with a smile on her lips: 'If you want to speak to me', she said, 'you must do it in German.'

What a humiliation for us readers! So the author has been making fun of us, and, with the help, as it were, of a reflection of the Pompeian sunshine, has inveigled *us* into a delusion on a small scale, so that we may be forced to pass a milder judgement on the poor wretch on whom the mid-day sun was really shining. Now, however, that we have been cured of our brief confusion, we know that Gradiva was a German girl of flesh and blood—a solution which we were inclined to reject as the most improbable one. And now, with a quiet sense of superiority, we may wait to learn what the relation was between the girl and her marble image, and how our young archaeologist arrived at the phantasies which pointed towards her real personality.

But our hero was not torn from his delusion as quickly as we have been, for, as the author tells us, 'though his belief made him happy, he had to take the acceptance of quite a considerable number of mysteries into the bargain'. (140.)

Moreover, this delusion probably had internal roots in him of which we know nothing and which do not exist in ourselves. In his case, no doubt, energetic treatment would seem necessary before he could be brought back to reality. Meanwhile all he could do was to fit his delusion into the wonderful experience he had just had. Gradiva, who had perished with the rest in the destruction of Pompeii, could be nothing other than a mid-day ghost who had returned to life for the brief ghostly hour. But why was it that, after hearing her reply delivered in German, he exclaimed 'I knew your voice sounded like that'? Not only we, but the girl herself was bound to ask the question, and Hanold had to admit that he had never heard it, though he had expected to in his dream, when he called to her as she lay down to sleep on the temple steps. He begged her to do the same thing again as she had then; but now she rose, gave him a strange look, and in a few paces disappeared between the columns of the court. A pretty butterfly had shortly before fluttered round her for a while; and he interpreted it as a messenger from Hades reminding the dead girl that she must return, since the mid-day hour of ghosts was at an end. Hanold still had time to call after the girl as she vanished: 'Will you return here tomorrow at the mid-day hour?' To us, however, who can now venture upon more sober interpretations, it looks as though the young lady had seen something improper in the remark addressed to her by Hanold and had left him with a sense of having been insulted; for after all she could have known nothing of his dream. May not her sensibility have detected the erotic nature of his request, whose motive in Hanold's eyes lay in its relation to his dream?

After Gradiva's disappearance our hero had a careful look at all the guests congregated for their mid-day meal at the Hotel Diomède and went on to do the same at the Hotel Suisse, and he was then able to feel assured that in neither of the only two hotels known to him in Pompeii was there anyone bearing the remotest resemblance to Gradiva. He would of course have rejected as nonsensical the idea that he

might actually meet Gradiva in one of the two inns. And presently the wine pressed from the hot soil of Vesuvius helped to intensify the whirl of feeling in which he spent the day.

For the following day one thing only was fixed: that Hanold must once more be in the House of Meleager at mid-day; and, in expectation of that moment, he made his way into Pompeii by an irregular route—over the ancient city wall. A sprig of asphodel, hung about with its white bell-shaped blossoms, seemed to him significant enough, as the flower of the underworld, for him to pluck it and carry it with him. But as he waited, the whole science of archaeology seemed to him the most pointless and indifferent thing in the world, for another interest had taken possession of him: the problem of 'what could be the nature of the bodily apparition of a being like Gradiva, who was at once dead and, even though only at the mid-day hour, alive'. (80.) He was fearful, too, that he might not meet her that day, for perhaps her return could be permitted only at long intervals; and when he perceived her once again between the columns, he thought her apparition was only a trick of his imagination, and in his pain exclaimed: 'Oh! if only you still existed and lived!' This time, however, he had evidently been too critical, for the apparition possessed a voice, which asked him if he was meaning to bring her the white flower, and engaged him, disconcerted once again, in a long conversation.

To his readers, however, to whom Gradiva has already grown of interest as a living person, the author explains that the displeased and repelling look which she had given him the day before had yielded to an expression of searching interest and curiosity. And indeed she now proceeded to question him, asked for an explanation of his remark on the previous day and enquired when it was that he had stood beside her as she lay down to sleep. In this way she learnt of his dream, in which she had perished along with her native city, and then of the marble relief and the posture of the foot which had so much attracted the archaeologist. And now she

showed herself ready to demonstrate her gait, and this proved that the only divergence from the original portrait of *Gradiva* was that her sandals were replaced by light sand-coloured shoes of fine leather—which she explained as being an adaptation to the present day. She was evidently entering into his delusion, the whole compass of which she elicited from him, without ever contradicting it. Only once did she seem to be distracted from the part she was playing, by an emotion of her own; and this was when, with his thoughts on the relief, he declared that he had recognized her at the first glance. Since at this stage of their conversation she still knew nothing about the relief, it was natural for her to misunderstand Hanold's words; but she quickly recovered herself, and it is only to us that some of her remarks sound as though they had a double sense, as though besides their meaning in the context of the delusion they also meant something real and present-day—for instance, when she regretted that he had not succeeded in confirming the *Gradiva* gait in his experiments in the streets: 'What a pity! perhaps you would not have had to make the long journey here!' (89.) She also learned that he had given her portrait on the relief the name of 'Gradiva', and told him her real name, 'Zoe'. 'The name suits you beautifully, but it sounds to me like a bitter mockery, for Zoe means life.' 'One must bow to the inevitable', was her reply, 'and I have long grown used to being dead.' Promising to be at the same place again at the mid-day hour next day, she bade him farewell after once more asking him for the sprig of asphodel: 'to those who are more fortunate people give roses in the spring; but to me it is right that you should give the flower of forgetfulness.' No doubt melancholy suited some one who had been so long dead and had returned to life again for a few short hours.

We are beginning to understand now, and to feel some hope. If the young lady in whose form *Gradiva* had come to life again accepted Hanold's delusion so fully, she was probably doing so in order to set him free from it. There was no

other way of doing so; to contradict it would have put an end to any such possibility. Even the serious treatment of a real case of illness of the kind could proceed in no other way than to begin by taking up the same ground as the delusional structure and then investigating it as completely as possible. If Zoe was the right person for the job, we shall soon learn, no doubt, how to cure a delusion like our hero's. We should also be glad to know how such delusions arise. It would be a strange coincidence—but, nevertheless, not without an example or parallel—if the treatment of the delusion were to coincide with its investigation and if the explanation of its origin were to be revealed precisely while it was being dissected. We may suspect, of course, that, if so, our case of illness might end up as a 'commonplace' love-story. But the healing power of love against a delusion is not to be despised—and was not our hero's infatuation for his *Gradiva* sculpture a complete instance of being in love, though of being in love with something past and lifeless?

After *Gradiva's* disappearance, there was only a distant sound, like the laughing call of a bird flying over the ruined city. The young man, now by himself, picked up a white object that had been left behind by *Gradiva*: not a sheet of papyrus, but a sketch-book with pencil drawings of various scenes in Pompeii. We should be inclined to regard her having forgotten the book there as a pledge of her return, for it is our belief that no one forgets anything without some secret reason or hidden motive.

The remainder of the day brought Hanold all manner of strange discoveries and confirmations, which he failed to synthesize into a whole. He perceived to-day in the wall of the portico where *Gradiva* had vanished a narrow gap, which was wide enough, however, to allow someone unusually slim to pass through it. He recognized that Zoe-*Gradiva* need not have sunk into the earth here—an idea which now seemed to him so unreasonable that he felt ashamed of having once believed in it; she might well have used the gap as a way

of reaching her grave. A slight shadow seemed to him to melt away at the end of the Street of the Tombs in front of what is known as the Villa of Diomedes.

In the same whirl of feeling as on the previous day, and deep in the same problems, he now strolled round the environs of Pompeii. What, he wondered, might be the bodily nature of Zoe-Gradiva? Would one feel anything if one touched her hand? A strange urge drove him to a determination to put this experiment to the test. Yet an equally strong reluctance held him back even from the very idea.

On a sun-bathed slope he met an elderly gentleman who, from his accoutrements, must be a zoologist or botanist and who seemed to be engaged in a hunt. This individual turned towards him and said: 'Are you interested in *faraglionensis* as well? I should hardly have suspected it, but it seems to be quite probable that it occurs not only on the Faraglioni Islands off Capri, but has established itself on the mainland too. The method prescribed by our colleague Eimer<sup>1</sup> is a really good one; I have made use of it many times already with excellent results. Please keep quite still . . .' (96.) Here the speaker broke off and placed a snare made of a long blade of grass in front of a crack in the rocks out of which the small iridescent blue head of a lizard was peering. Hanold left the lizard-hunter with a critical feeling that it was scarcely credible what foolish and strange purposes could lead people to make the long journey to Pompeii—without, needless to say, including in his criticism himself and his intention of searching in the ashes of Pompeii for Gradiva's footprints. Moreover, the gentleman's face seemed familiar, as though he had had a glimpse of it in one of the two hotels; his manner of address, too, had been as though he were speaking to an acquaintance.

In the course of his further walk, he arrived by a side-road at a house which he had not yet discovered and which turned out to be a third hotel, the 'Albergo del Sole'.<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> [A well-known zoologist of the second half of the nineteenth century.]

<sup>2</sup> [The 'Hotel of the Sun'.]



landlord, with nothing else to do, took the opportunity of showing off his house and the excavated treasures it contained to their best advantage. He asserted that he had been present when the pair of young lovers had been found in the neighbourhood of the Forum, who, in the knowledge of their inevitable doom, had awaited death closely embraced in each other's arms. Hanold had heard of this before, and had shrugged his shoulders over it as a fabulous tale invented by some imaginative story-teller; but to-day the landlord's words aroused his belief and this was increased when a metal clasp was produced, covered with a green patina, which was said to have been retrieved from the ashes beside the girl's remains. He purchased this clasp without any further critical doubts, and when, as he left the *albergo*, he saw in an open window a nodding sprig of asphodel covered with white blossoms, the sight of the funeral flowers came over him as a confirmation of the genuineness of his new possession.

But with the clasp a new delusion took possession of him, or rather the old one had a small piece added to it—no very good augury, it would seem, for the treatment that had been begun. A pair of young lovers in an embrace had been dug out not far from the Forum, and it was in that very neighbourhood, by the Temple of Apollo, that in his dream he had seen Gradiva lie down to sleep [p. 12 f.]. Was it not possible that in fact she had gone further along from the Forum and had met someone and that they had then died together? A tormenting feeling, which we might perhaps liken to jealousy, arose out of this suspicion. He appeased it by reflecting on the uncertainty of the construction, and brought himself to his senses far enough to be able to take his evening meal at the Hotel Diomède. There his attention was drawn by two newly-arrived visitors, a He and a She, whom he was obliged to regard as a brother and sister on account of a certain resemblance between them—in spite of the difference in the colour of their hair. They were the first people he had met on his journey who made a sympathetic impression on him. A red Sorrento rose worn by the girl aroused some

kind of memory in him, but he could not think what. At last he went to bed and had a dream. It was a remarkably senseless affair, but was obviously hashed up from his day's experiences. 'Somewhere in the sun Gradiva was sitting, making a snare out of a blade of grass to catch a lizard in, and said: "Please keep quite still. Our lady colleague is right; the method is a really good one and she has made use of it with excellent results."' He fended off this dream while he was still asleep, with the critical thought that it was utter madness, and he succeeded in freeing himself from it with the help of an invisible bird which uttered a short laughing call and carried off the lizard in its beak.

In spite of all this turmoil, he woke up in a rather clearer and steadier frame of mind. A branch of a rose-tree bearing flowers of the sort he had seen the day before on the young lady's breast reminded him that during the night someone had said that people give roses in the spring. Without thinking, he picked a few of the roses, and there must have been something connected with them that had a relaxing effect on his mind. He felt relieved of his unsociable feelings, and went by the usual way to Pompeii, burdened with the roses, the metal clasp and the sketch-book, and occupied with a number of problems concerning Gradiva. The old delusion had begun to show cracks: he was beginning to wonder whether she might be in Pompeii, not at the mid-day hour only, but at other times as well. The stress had shifted, however, to the latest addition, and the jealousy attaching to it tormented him in all sorts of disguises. He could almost have wished that the apparition might remain visible to his eyes alone, and elude the perception of others: then, in spite of everything, he could look on her as his own exclusive property. While he was strolling about, waiting for the mid-day hour, he had an unexpected encounter. In the *Casa del Fauno* he came upon two figures in a corner in which they must have thought themselves out of sight, for they were embraced in each other's arms and their lips were pressed together. He was astonished to recognize in them the

sympathetic couple from the previous evening. But their behaviour now did not seem to fit a brother and sister: their embrace and their kiss seemed to him to last too long. So after all they were a pair of lovers, presumably a young honeymoon couple—yet another Edwin and Angelina. Curiously enough, however, this time the sight of them caused him only satisfaction; and with a sense of awe, as though he had interrupted some secret act of devotion, he withdrew unobserved. An attitude of respectfulness, which he had long been without, had returned to him.

When he reached the House of Meleager, he was once more overcome by such a violent dread of finding Gradiva in someone else's company that when she appeared the only words he found to greet her with were: 'Are you alone?' It was with difficulty that he allowed her to bring him to realize that he had picked the roses for her. He confessed his latest delusion to her—that she was the girl who had been found in the forum in a lover's embrace and who had owned the green clasp. She enquired, not without a touch of mockery, whether he had found the thing in the sun perhaps: the sun (and she used the [Italian] word '*sole*') produced all kinds of things like that. He admitted that he was feeling dizzy in his head, and she suggested as a cure that he should share her small picnic meal with her. She offered him half of a roll wrapped up in tissue paper and ate the other half herself with an obviously good appetite. At the same time her perfect teeth flashed between her lips and made a slight crunching sound as they bit through the crust. 'I feel as though we had shared a meal like this once before, two thousand years ago', she said; 'can't you remember?' (118.) He could think of no reply, but the improvement in his head brought about by the food, and the many indications she gave of her actual presence, were not without their effect on him. Reason began to rise in him and to throw doubt on the whole delusion of Gradiva's being no more than a mid-day ghost—though no doubt it might be argued on the other hand that she herself had just said that she had shared a meal with him two

thousand years ago. As a means of settling the conflict an experiment suggested itself: and this he carried out craftily and with regained courage. Her left hand, with its delicate fingers, was resting on her knees, and one of the house-flies whose impertinence and uselessness had so much roused his indignation alighted on it. Suddenly Hanold's hand was raised in the air and descended with a vigorous slap on the fly and Gradiva's hand.

This bold experiment had two results: first, a joyful conviction that he had without any doubt touched a real, living, warm human hand, but afterwards a reproof that made him jump up in a fright from his seat on the steps. For, from Gradiva's lips, when she had recovered from her astonishment, there rang out these words: 'There's no doubt you're out of your mind, Norbert Hanold!' As everyone knows, the best method of waking a sleeper or a sleep-walker is to call him by his own name. But unluckily there was no chance of observing the effects produced on Norbert Hanold by Gradiva's calling him by his name (which he had told no one in Pompeii). For at this critical moment the sympathetic pair of lovers from the *Casa del Fauno* appeared, and the young lady exclaimed in a tone of joyful surprise: 'Zoe! Are you here too? And on your honeymoon like us? You never wrote me a word about it!' In face of this new evidence of Gradiva's living reality, Hanold took flight.

Nor was Zoe-Gradiva very agreeably surprised by this unexpected visit, which interrupted her in what was apparently an important task. But she quickly pulled herself together and made a fluent reply to the question, in which she explained the situation to her friend—and even more to us—and which enabled her to get rid of the young couple. She congratulated them; but she was not on her honeymoon. 'The young man who's just gone off is labouring, like you, under a remarkable aberration. He seems to think there's a fly buzzing in his head. Well, I expect everyone has some sort of insect there. It's my duty to know something about entomology, so I can help a little in cases like that. My

father and I are staying at the Sole. Something got into *his* head too, and the brilliant idea occurred to him besides of bringing me here with him on condition that I amused myself on my own at Pompeii and made no demands of any kind on him. I told myself I should dig out something interesting here even by myself. Of course I hadn't counted on making the find that I have—I mean my luck in meeting you, Gisa.' (124.) But now, she added, she must hurry off, so as to be company for her father at his lunch in the 'Sun'. And she departed, after having introduced herself to us as the daughter of the zoologist and lizard-catcher and after having, by all kinds of ambiguous remarks, admitted her therapeutic intention and other secret designs as well.

The direction she took, however, was not towards the Hotel of the Sun, where her father was waiting for her. But it seemed to her too as though a shadowy form was seeking its grave near the Villa of Diomedes, and was vanishing beneath one of the monuments. And for that reason she directed her steps towards the Street of the Tombs, with her foot lifted almost perpendicularly at each step. It was to this same place that Hanold had fled in his shame and confusion. He wandered ceaselessly up and down in the portico of the garden, engaged in the task of disposing of the remains of his problem by an intellectual effort. One thing had become undeniably clear to him: that he had been totally without sense or reason in believing that he had been associating with a young Pompeian woman who had come to life again in a more or less physical shape. It could not be disputed that this clear insight into his delusion was an essential step forward on his road back to a sound understanding. But, on the other hand, this living woman, with whom other people communicated as though she were as physically real as themselves, was *Gradiva*, and she knew his name; and his scarcely awakened reason was not strong enough to solve this riddle. He was hardly calm enough emotionally, either, to show himself capable of facing so hard a task, for he would have preferred to have been buried along with the

rest two thousand years before in the Villa of Diomedes, so as to be quite certain of not meeting Zoe-Gradiva again.

Nevertheless, a violent desire to see her again struggled against what was left of the inclination to flight still lingering in him.

As he turned one of the four corners of the colonnade, he suddenly recoiled. On a broken fragment of masonry was sitting one of the girls who had perished here in the Villa of Diomedes. This, however, was a last attempt, quickly rejected, at taking flight into the realm of delusion. No, it was Gradiva, who had evidently come to give him the final portion of her treatment. She quite correctly interpreted his first instinctive movement as an attempt to leave the building, and showed him that it was impossible for him to run away, for a terrific downpour of rain had begun outside. She was ruthless, and began her examination by asking him what he had been trying to do with the fly on her hand. He had not the courage to make use of a particular pronoun,<sup>1</sup> but he did have the courage for something more important—for asking her the decisive question:

'As someone said, I was rather confused in my head, and I must apologize for treating the hand . . . I can't understand how I could be so senseless . . . but I can't understand either how its owner could point out my . . . my unreasonableness to me by my own name.' (134.)

'So your understanding has not got as far as that, Norbert Hanold. But I can't say I'm surprised at it, you've accustomed me to it so long. I needn't have come to Pompeii to discover it again, and you could have confirmed it a good hundred miles nearer home.

<sup>1</sup> [The pronoun of the second person singular. The point of some of what follows is necessarily lost in English. In all his remarks to Gradiva hitherto, Hanold had used the second person singular, partly, no doubt, because that would be the classical usage. Now, however, that he was beginning to realize that he was talking to a modern German girl, he felt that the second person singular was far too familiar and affectionate. Gradiva, on the other hand, has used the second person singular throughout in speaking to him.]

'A hundred miles nearer', she explained, as he still failed to understand, 'diagonally across the street from where you live—in the house at the corner. There's a cage in my window with a canary in it.'

These last words, as he heard them, affected him like a distant memory: that must have been the same bird whose song had given him the idea of his journey to Italy.

'My father lives in that house: the Professor of Zoology, Richard Bertgang.'

So, since she was his neighbour, she knew him by sight and by name. We feel a sense of disillusionment: the solution falls flat and seems unworthy of our expectations.

Norbert Hanold showed that he had not yet regained his independence of thought when he replied: 'So you<sup>1</sup> . . . you are Fräulein Zoe Bertgang? But she looked quite different . . .'

Fräulein Bertgang's answer shows us that all the same there had been other relations between the two of them besides their simply being neighbours. She could argue in favour of the familiar '*du*', which he had used naturally to the mid-day ghost but had drawn back from in speaking to the live girl, but on behalf of which she claimed ancient rights: 'If you find this formal mode of address more suitable, I can use it too. But I find the other comes to my lips more naturally. I don't know if I looked different in the early days when we used to run about together in a friendly way or sometimes, by way of a change, used to bump and thump each other. But if you<sup>2</sup> had even once looked at me attentively in recent years, it might have dawned on you that I've looked like this for quite a time.'

So there had been a childhood friendship between them—

<sup>1</sup> [*Sie*', the German pronoun of the third person plural, which is always used in formal speech instead of the '*du*' of the second person singular.]

<sup>2</sup> [From this point to the middle of her next speech, when, as will be seen, she finally rebels, Zoe makes a valiant attempt to use the formal '*Sie*'.]

perhaps a childhood love—which justified the ‘*du*’. This solution, it may be, falls just as flat as the one we first suspected. We are brought to a much deeper level, however, when we realize that this childhood relationship unexpectedly explains a number of details in what had happened in their contemporary contact. Consider, for instance, the slapping of Zoe-Gradiva’s hand. Norbert Hanold found a most convincing reason for it in the necessity for reaching an experimental answer to the problem of the apparition’s physical reality. But was it not at the same time remarkably like a revival of the impulse for the ‘bumping and thumping’ whose dominance in their childhood was shown by Zoe’s words? And think, again, of how Gradiva asked the archaeologist whether it did not seem to him that they had shared a meal like this two thousand years before. This unintelligible question suddenly seems to have a sense, if we once more replace the historical past by the personal one—childhood—, of which the girl still had lively memories but which the young man appeared to have forgotten. And now the discovery dawns upon us that the young archaeologist’s phantasies about his Gradiva may have been an echo of his forgotten childhood memories. If so, they were not capricious products of his imagination, but determined, without his knowing it, by the store of childhood impressions which he had forgotten, but which were still at work in him. It should be possible for us to show the origin of the phantasies in detail, even though we can only guess at them. He imagined, for instance, that Gradiva must be of *Greek* origin and that she was the daughter of a respected personage—a priest of Ceres, perhaps. This seems to fit in pretty well with his knowing that she bore the Greek name of Zoe and that she belonged to the family of a Professor of Zoology. But if Hanold’s phantasies were transformed memories, we may expect to find an indication of the source of those phantasies in the information given us by Zoe Bertgang. Let us listen to what she has to say. She has told us of their intimate friendship in their childhood, and we shall now



hear of the further course taken by this childhood relationship.

'At that time, as a matter of fact, up to about the age when, I don't know why, people begin to call us "*Backfisch*",<sup>1</sup> I had got accustomed to being remarkably dependent on you and believed I could never in the world find a more agreeable friend. I had no mother or sister or brother, my father found a slow-worm in spirits considerably more interesting than me; and everyone (and I include girls) must have *something* to occupy their thoughts and whatever goes along with them. That was what you were then. But when archaeology took hold of you I discovered—you must forgive me, but really your polite innovation sounds to me *too* ridiculous and, besides, it doesn't fit in with what I want to express—as I was saying, it turned out that you'd<sup>2</sup> become an unbearable person who (at any rate so far as I was concerned) no longer had any eyes in his head or tongue in his mouth, or any memory, where my memory had stuck, of our friendship when we were children. No doubt that was why I looked different from before. For when from time to time I met you in society—it happened once as recently as last winter—you didn't see me, still less did I hear you say a word. Not that there was any distinction for me in that, for you treated everyone else alike. I was thin air for you, and you—with your tuft of fair hair that I'd rumped for you often enough in the past—you were as dull, as dried-up, and as tongue-tied as a stuffed cockatoo, and at the same time as grandiose as an —*archaeopteryx*—yes, that's right, that's what they call the antediluvian bird-monstrosity they've dug up. Only there was one thing I hadn't suspected: that there was an equally grandiose phantasy lodged in your head of looking on me too, here in Pompeii, as something that had been dug up and come to life again. And when all at once there you were

<sup>1</sup> [Literally 'fish for frying'. The common German slang term equivalent to 'flapper' or 'teenager'.]

<sup>2</sup> [From this point onwards she finally reverts to 'du'.]

standing in front of me quite unexpectedly, it took me quite a lot of trouble at first to make out what an incredible cobweb your imagination had spun in your brain. After that, it amused me and quite pleased me in spite of its lunacy. For, as I told you, I hadn't suspected it of you.'

Thus she tells us plainly enough what with the years had become of their childhood friendship. In her it grew until she was thoroughly in love, for a girl must have something to which she can give her heart. Fräulein Zoe, the embodiment of cleverness and clarity, makes her own mind quite transparent to us. While it is in any case the general rule for a normally constituted girl to turn her affection towards her father in the first instance, Zoe, who had no one in her family but her father, was especially ready to do so. But her father had nothing left over for her; all his interest was engrossed by the objects of his science. So she was obliged to cast her eyes around upon other people, and became especially attached to her young playmate. When he too ceased to have any eyes for her, her love was not shaken by it but rather increased, for he had become like her father, was, like him, absorbed by science and held apart by it from life and from Zoe. Thus it was made possible for her to remain faithful in her unfaithfulness—to find her father once more in her loved one, to include both of them with the same emotion, or, as we may say, to identify both of them in her feeling. What is our justification for this piece of psychological analysis, which might well seem arbitrary? The author has presented us with it in a single, but highly characteristic, detail. When Zoe described the transformation in her former playmate which had so greatly disturbed her, she abused him by comparing him to an *archaeopteryx*, the bird-like monstrosity which belongs to the archaeology of zoology. In that way she found a single concrete expression of the identity of the two figures. Her complaint applies with the same word to the man she loved and to her father. The *archaeopteryx*

is, we might say, a compromise idea or an intermediate idea<sup>1</sup> in which her thought about the folly of the man she loved coincided with the analogous thought about her father.

With the young man, things had taken a different turn. Archaeology took hold of him and left him with an interest only in women of marble and bronze. His childhood friendship, instead of being strengthened into a passion, was dissolved, and his memories of it passed into such profound forgetfulness that he did not recognize or notice his early playmate when he met her in society. It is true that when we look further we may doubt whether 'forgetfulness' is the correct psychological description of the fate of these memories in our young archaeologist. There is a kind of forgetting which is distinguished by the difficulty with which the memory is awakened even by a powerful external summons, as though some internal resistance were struggling against its revival. A forgetting of this kind has been given the name of 'repression' in psychopathology; and the case which our author has put before us seems to be an example of this repression. Now we do not know in general whether the forgetting of an impression is linked with the dissolution of its memory-trace in the mind; but we can assert quite definitely of 'repression' that it does not coincide with the dissolution or extinction of the memory. What is repressed cannot, it is true, as a rule make its way into memory without more ado; but it retains a capacity for effective action, and, under the influence of some external event, it may one day bring about psychical consequences which can be regarded as products of a modification of the forgotten memory and as derivatives of it and which remain unintelligible unless we take this view of them. We have already seemed to recognize in Norbert Hanold's phantasies about Gradiva derivatives of his repressed memories of his childhood friendship with Zoe

<sup>1</sup> [Ideas of this kind play an important part in dreams and, indeed, wherever the primary psychical process is dominant. See *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a) *Standard Ed.*, 5, 596. Some good examples are given in Chapter IV of *On Dreams* (1901a), *ibid.*, 648 ff.]

Bertgang. A return like this of what has been repressed is to be expected with particular regularity when a person's erotic feelings are attached to the repressed impressions—when his erotic life has been attacked by repression. In such cases the old Latin saying holds true, though it may have been coined first to apply to expulsion by external influences and not to internal conflicts: 'Naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret.'<sup>1</sup> But it does not tell us everything. It only informs us of the *fact* of the return of the piece of nature that has been repressed; it does not describe the highly remarkable *manner* of that return, which is accomplished by what seems like a piece of malicious treachery. It is precisely what was chosen as the instrument of repression—like the '*furca*' of the Latin saying—that becomes the vehicle for the return: in and behind the repressing force, what is repressed proves itself victor in the end. This fact, which has been so little noticed and deserves so much consideration, is illustrated—more impressively than it could be by many examples—in a well-known etching by Félicien Rops; and it is illustrated in the typical case of repression in the life of saints and penitents. An ascetic monk has fled, no doubt from the temptations of the world, to the image of the crucified Saviour. And now the cross sinks down like a shadow, and in its place, radiant, there rises instead the image of a voluptuous, naked woman, in the same crucified attitude. Other artists with less psychological insight have, in similar representations of temptation, shown Sin, insolent and triumphant, in some position alongside of the Saviour on the cross. Only Rops has placed Sin in the very place of the Saviour on the cross. He seems to have known that, when what has been repressed returns, it emerges from the repressing force itself.

It is worth while pausing in order to convince oneself from pathological cases how sensitive a human mind becomes in states of repression to any approach by what has been

<sup>1</sup> ['You may drive out Nature with a pitchfork, but she will always return.' This is actually a line of Horace (*Epistles*, I, 10, 24). It is misquoted in the German editions.]

repressed, and how even trivial similarities suffice for the repressed to emerge behind the repressing force and take effect by means of it. I once had under medical treatment a young man—he was still almost a boy—who, after he had first unwillingly become acquainted with the processes of sex, had taken flight from every sexual desire that arose in him. For that purpose he made use of various methods of repression: he intensified his zeal in learning, exaggerated his dependence on his mother, and in general assumed a childish character. I will not here enter into the manner in which his repressed sexuality broke through once more precisely in his relation to his mother; but I will describe a rarer and stranger instance of how another of his bulwarks collapsed on an occasion which could scarcely be regarded as sufficient. Mathematics enjoys the greatest reputation as a diversion from sexuality. This had been the very advice to which Jean-Jacques Rousseau was obliged to listen from a lady who was dissatisfied with him: 'Lascia le donne e studia la matematica!'<sup>1</sup> So too our fugitive threw himself with special eagerness into the mathematics and geometry which he was taught at school, till suddenly one day his powers of comprehension were paralysed in the face of some apparently innocent problems. It was possible to establish two of these problems: 'Two bodies come together, one with a speed of . . . etc.' and 'On a cylinder, the diameter of whose surface is  $m$ , describe a cone . . . etc.' Other people would certainly not have regarded these as very striking allusions to sexual events; but he felt that he had been betrayed by mathematics as well, and took flight from it too.

If Norbert Hanold were someone in real life who had in this way banished love and his childhood friendship with the help of archaeology, it would have been logical and according to rule that what revived in him the forgotten memory of the girl he had loved in his childhood should be precisely an antique sculpture. It would have been his well-deserved fate to fall in love with the marble portrait of Gradiva, behind

<sup>1</sup> ['Give up women and study mathematics!']

which, owing to an unexplained similarity, the living Zoe whom he had neglected made her influence felt.

Fräulein Zoe seems herself to have shared our view of the young archaeologist's delusion, for the satisfaction she expressed at the end of her 'frank, detailed and instructive speech of castigation' could scarcely have been based on anything but a recognition that from the very first his interest in *Gradiva* had related to herself. It was *this* which she had not expected of him, but which, in spite of all its delusional disguise, she saw for what it was. The psychical treatment she had carried out, however, had now accomplished its beneficent effect on him. He felt free, for his delusion had now been replaced by the thing of which it could only have been a distorted and inadequate copy. Nor did he any longer hesitate to remember her and to recognize her as the kind, cheerful, clever playmate who in essentials was not in any way changed. But he found something else very strange—

'You mean', said the girl, 'the fact of someone having to die so as to come alive; but no doubt that must be so for archaeologists.' (141.) Evidently she had not forgiven him yet for the roundabout path by way of archaeology which he had followed from their childhood friendship to the new relation that was forming.

'No, I mean your name . . . Because "Bertgang" means the same as "Gradiva" and describes someone "who steps along brilliantly".'<sup>1</sup> (142.)

We ourselves were unprepared for this. Our hero was beginning to cast off his humility and to play an active part. Evidently he was completely cured of his delusion and had risen above it; and he proved this by himself tearing the last threads of the cobweb of his delusion. This, too, is just how patients behave when one has loosened the compulsion of their delusional thoughts by revealing the repressed material

<sup>1</sup> [The German root '*bert*' or '*brecht*' is akin to the English 'bright'; similarly '*gang*' is akin to 'go' (in Scotland 'gang').]

lying behind them. Once they have understood, they themselves bring forward the solutions of the final and most important riddles of their strange condition in a number of ideas that suddenly occur to them. We had already guessed that the Greek origin of the imaginary *Gradiva* was an obscure result of the Greek name 'Zoe'; but we had not ventured to approach the name '*Gradiva*' itself, and had let it pass as the untrammelled creation of Norbert Hanold's imagination. But, lo and behold! that very name now turns out to have been a derivative—indeed a translation—of the repressed surname of the girl he had loved in the childhood which he was supposed to have forgotten.

The tracing back of the delusion and its resolution were now complete. What the author now adds is no doubt designed to serve as a harmonious end to his story. We cannot but feel reassured about the future when we hear that the young man, who had earlier been obliged to play the pitiable part of a person in urgent need of treatment, advanced still further on the road to recovery and succeeded in arousing in her some of the feelings under which he himself had suffered before. Thus it was that he made her jealous by mentioning the sympathetic young lady who had previously interrupted their tête-à-tête in the House of Meleager, and by confessing that she had been the first woman for whom he had felt a very great liking. Whereupon Zoe prepared to take a chilly leave of him, remarking that everything had now returned to reason—she herself not least; he could look up Gisa Hartleben (or whatever she was now called) again and give her some scientific assistance over the purpose of her visit to Pompeii; she herself, however, must go back to the Albergo del Sole where her father was expecting her for lunch; perhaps they would meet again some time at a party in Germany or in the moon. But once more he was able to make the troublesome fly an excuse for taking possession first of her cheek and then of her lips, and to set in motion the aggressiveness which is a man's inevitable duty in love-making. Once only a shadow seemed to fall on their

happiness, when Zoe declared that now she really must go back to her father or he will starve at the Sole. 'Your father? . . . what will happen? . . .' (147.) But the clever girl was able swiftly to quiet his concern. 'Probably nothing will happen. I'm not an indispensable part of his zoological collection. If I had been, perhaps I shouldn't have been so foolish as to give my heart to you.' In the exceptional event, however, of her father taking a different view from hers, there was a safe expedient. Hanold need only cross to Capri, catch a *Lacerta faraglionensis* there (he could practise the technique on her little finger), set the creature free over here, catch it again before the zoologist's eyes, and let him choose between a *faraglionensis* on the mainland and his daughter. The scheme, it is easy to see, was one in which the mockery was tinged with bitterness; it was a warning, as it were, to her fiancé not to keep too closely to the model on which she had chosen him. Here again Norbert Hanold reassures us, by showing by all sorts of apparently small signs the great transformation that had taken place in him. He proposed that he and his Zoe should come for their honeymoon to Italy and Pompeii, just as though he had never been indignant with the honeymooning Edwins and Angelinas. He had completely lost from his memory all his feelings against those happy pairs, who had so unnecessarily travelled more than a hundred miles from their German home. The author is certainly right in bringing forward a loss of memory like this as the most trustworthy sign of a change of attitude. Zoe's reply to the plan for the scene of their honeymoon suggested by 'her childhood friend who had also in a sense been dug out of the ruins again' (150) was that she did not feel quite alive enough yet to make a geographical decision of that sort.

The delusion had now been conquered by a beautiful reality; but before the two lovers left Pompeii it was still to be honoured once again. When they reached the Herculanean Gate, where, at the entrance to the Via Consolare, the street is crossed by some ancient stepping-stones, Norbert



Hanold paused and asked the girl to go ahead of him. She understood him 'and, pulling up her dress a little with her left hand, Zoe Bertgang, *Gradiva rediviva*, walked past, held in his eyes, which seemed to gaze as though in a dream; so, with her quietly tripping gait, she stepped through the sunlight over the stepping-stones to the other side of the street.' With the triumph of love, what was beautiful and precious in the delusion found recognition as well.

In his last simile, however,—of the 'childhood friend who had been dug out of the ruins'—the author has presented us with the key to the symbolism of which the hero's delusion made use in disguising his repressed memory. There is, in fact, no better analogy for repression, by which something in the mind is at once made inaccessible and preserved, than burial of the sort to which Pompeii fell a victim and from which it could emerge once more through the work of spades. Thus it was that the young archaeologist was obliged in his phantasy to transport to Pompeii the original of the relief which reminded him of the object of his youthful love. The author was well justified, indeed, in lingering over the valuable similarity which his delicate sense had perceived between a particular mental process in the individual and an isolated historical event in the history of mankind.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [Freud himself adopted the fate of Pompeii as a simile for repression in more than one later passage. See, for instance, the 'Rat Man, case history (1909*d*), written not long after the present work, *Standard Ed.*, 10, 176-7.]

## II

BUT after all, what we really intended to do originally was only to investigate two or three dreams that are to be found here and there in *Gradiva* with the help of certain analytic methods. How has it come about, then, that we have been led into dissecting the whole story and examining the mental processes in the two chief characters? This has not in fact been an unnecessary piece of work; it was an essential preliminary. It is equally the case that when we try to understand the real dreams of a real person we have to concern ourselves intensively with his character and his career, and we must get to know not only his experiences shortly before the dream but also those dating far back into the past. It is even my view that we are still not free to turn to our proper task, but that we must linger a little more over the story itself and carry out some further preliminary work.

My readers will no doubt have been puzzled to notice that so far I have treated Norbert Hanold and Zoe Bertgang, in all their mental manifestations and activities, as though they were real people and not the author's creations, as though the author's mind were an absolutely transparent medium and not a refractive or obscuring one. And my procedure must seem all the more puzzling since the author has expressly renounced the portrayal of reality by calling his story a 'phantasy'. We have found, however, that all his descriptions are so faithfully copied from reality that we should not object if *Gradiva* were described not as a phantasy but as a psychiatric study. Only at two points has the author availed himself of the licence open to him of laying down premisses which do not seem to have their roots in the laws of reality. The first time is where he makes the young archaeologist come upon what is undoubtedly an ancient relief but which so closely resembles a person living long

afterwards, not only in the peculiarity of the posture of the foot as it steps along but in every detail of facial structure and bodily attitude, that the young man is able to take the physical appearance of that person to be the sculpture come to life. And the second time is where he makes the young man meet the living woman precisely in Pompeii; for the dead woman had been placed there only by his imagination, and the journey to Pompeii had in fact carried him away from the living woman, whom he had just seen in the street of the town in which he lived. This second provision of the author's, however, involves no violent departure from actual possibility; it merely makes use of chance, which unquestionably plays a part in many human histories; and furthermore he uses it to good purpose, for this chance reflects the fatal truth that has laid it down that flight is precisely an instrument that delivers one over to what one is fleeing from. The first premiss seems to lean more towards phantasy and to spring entirely from the author's arbitrary decision—the premiss on which all that follows depends, the far-reaching resemblance between the sculpture and the live girl, which a more sober choice might have restricted to the single feature of the posture of the foot as it steps along. We might be tempted here to allow the play of our own phantasy to forge a link with reality. The name of 'Bertgang' might point to the fact that the women of that family had already been distinguished in ancient days by the peculiarity of their graceful gait; and we might suppose that the Germanic Bertgangs were descended from a Roman family one member of which was the woman who had led the artist to perpetuate the peculiarity of her gait in the sculpture. Since, however, the different variations of the human form are not independent of one another, and since in fact even among ourselves the ancient types re-appear again and again (as we can see in art collections), it would not be totally impossible that a modern Bertgang might reproduce the shape of her ancient ancestress in all the other features of her bodily structure as well. But it would no doubt be wiser, instead of such speculations,

to enquire from the author himself what were the sources from which this part of his creation was derived; we should then have a good prospect of showing once again how what was ostensibly an arbitrary decision rested in fact upon law. But since access to the sources in the author's mind is not open to us,<sup>1</sup> we will leave him with an undiminished right to construct a development that is wholly true to life upon an improbable premiss—a right of which Shakespeare, for instance, availed himself in *King Lear*.<sup>2</sup>

Apart from this, it must be repeated, the author has presented us with a perfectly correct psychiatric study, on which we may measure our understanding of the workings of the mind—a case history and the history of a cure which might have been designed to emphasize certain fundamental theories of medical psychology. It is strange enough that the author should have done this. But how if, on being questioned, he were completely to deny any such purpose? It is so easy to draw analogies and to read meanings into things. Is it not rather we who have slipped into this charming poetic story a secret meaning very far from its author's intentions? Possibly. We shall come back to the question later. For the moment, however, we have tried to save ourselves from making any such tendentious interpretation by giving the story almost entirely in the author's own words. Anyone who compares our reproduction with the actual text of *Gradiva* will have to concede us that much.

Perhaps, too, in most people's eyes we are doing our author a poor service in declaring his work to be a psychiatric study. An author, we hear them say, should keep out of the way of any contact with psychiatry and should leave the description of pathological mental states to the doctors. The truth is that no truly creative writer has ever obeyed this injunction. The description of the human mind is indeed the

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. the 'Postscript' to this work, p. 94 below.]

<sup>2</sup> [Some further comment on the 'improbable premiss' to *King Lear* will be found at the end of Freud's paper on 'The Theme of the Three Caskets' (1913f), *Standard Ed.*, 12, 301.]

domain which is most his own; he has from time immemorial been the precursor of science, and so too of scientific psychology. But the frontier between states of mind described as normal and pathological is in part a conventional one and in part so fluctuating that each of us probably crosses it many times in the course of a day. On the other hand, psychiatry would be doing wrong if it tried to restrict itself permanently to the study of the severe and gloomy illnesses that arise from gross injuries to the delicate apparatus of the mind. Deviations from health which are slighter and capable of correction, and which to-day we can trace back no further than to disturbances in the interplay of mental forces, arouse its interest no less. Indeed, only through the medium of these can it understand either normal states or the phenomena of severe illness. Thus the creative writer cannot evade the psychiatrist nor the psychiatrist the creative writer, and the poetic treatment of a psychiatric theme can turn out to be correct without any sacrifice of its beauty.<sup>1</sup>

And it is really correct—this imaginative picture of the history of a case and its treatment. Now that we have finished telling the story and satisfied our own suspense, we can get a better view of it, and we shall now reproduce it with the technical terminology of our science, and in doing so we shall not feel disconcerted at the necessity for repeating what we have said before.

Norbert Hanold's condition is often spoken of by the author as a 'delusion', and we have no reason to reject that designation. We can state two chief characteristics of a 'delusion', which do not, it is true, describe it exhaustively, but which distinguish it recognizably from other disorders. In the first place it is one of the group of pathological states which do not produce a direct effect upon the body but are manifested only by mental indications. And secondly it is

<sup>1</sup> [Another discussion by Freud of the use of psychopathological material by creative writers will be found in a posthumously published essay, 'Psychopathic Characters on the Stage' (1942a), probably written a year or two before the present work.]

characterized by the fact that in it 'phantasies' have gained the upper hand—that is, have obtained belief and have acquired an influence on action. If we recall Hanold's journey to Pompeii in order to look for Gradiva's peculiarly formed footprints in the ashes, we shall have a fine example of an action under the dominance of a delusion. A psychiatrist would perhaps place Norbert Hanold's delusion in the great group of 'paranoia' and possibly describe it as 'fetishistic erotomania', because the most striking thing about it was his being in love with the piece of sculpture and because in the psychiatrist's view, with its tendency to coarsen everything, the young archaeologist's interest in feet and the postures of feet would be bound to suggest 'fetishism'. Nevertheless all such systems of nomenclature and classification of the different kinds of delusion according to their subject-matter have something precarious and barren about them.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, since our hero was a person capable of developing a delusion on the basis of such a strange preference, a strict psychiatrist would at once stamp him as a *dégénéré* and would investigate the heredity which had remorselessly driven him to this fate. But here the author does not follow the psychiatrist, and with good reason. He wishes to bring the hero closer to us so as to make 'empathy' easier; the diagnosis of '*dégénéré*', whether it is right or wrong, at once puts the young archaeologist at a distance from us, for we readers are the normal people and the standard of humanity. Nor is the author greatly concerned with the hereditary and constitutional preconditions of the state, but on the other hand he plunges deep into the personal mental make-up which can give rise to such a delusion.

In one important respect Norbert Hanold behaved quite differently from an ordinary human being. He took no interest in living women; the science of which he was the servant had taken that interest away from him and displaced

<sup>1</sup> In point of fact, the case of N. H. would have to be described as a *hysterical* delusion, not a *paranoic* one. The indications of *paranoia* are absent from it.

it on to women of marble or bronze. This is not to be regarded as a trivial peculiarity; on the contrary, it was the basic precondition of the events to be described. For one day it came about that one particular sculpture of that kind laid claim to the whole of the interest which is ordinarily directed only to a living woman, and with that his delusion was there. We then see unrolled before our eyes the manner in which his delusion is cured through a happy turn of events, and his interest displaced back from the marble to a living woman. The author does not let us follow the influences which led our hero to turn away from women; he only informs us that his attitude was not explained by his innate disposition, which, on the contrary, included some amount of imaginative (and, we might add, erotic) needs. And, as we learn later in the story, he did not avoid other children in his childhood: he had a friendship at that age with a little girl, was her inseparable companion, shared his little meals with her, used to thump her too and let her rumple his hair. It is in attachments such as this, in combinations like this of affection and aggressiveness, that the immature eroticism of childhood finds its expression; its consequences only emerge later, but then they are irresistible, and during childhood itself it is as a rule recognized as eroticism only by doctors and creative writers. Our own writer shows us clearly that he too is of the same opinion; for he makes his hero suddenly develop a lively interest in women's feet and their way of placing them. This interest was bound to bring him a bad reputation both among scientists and among the women of the town he lived in, a reputation of being a foot-fetishist; but *we* cannot avoid tracing the interest back to the memory of his childhood playmate. For there can be no doubt that even in her childhood the girl showed the same peculiarity of a graceful gait, with her toes almost perpendicularly raised as she stepped along; and it was because it represented that same gait that an ancient marble relief acquired such great importance for Norbert Hanold. Incidentally we may add that in his derivation of the remarkable phenomenon of fetishism the

author is in complete agreement with science. Ever since Binet [1888] we have in fact tried to trace fetishism back to erotic impressions in childhood.<sup>1</sup>

The state of permanently turning away from women produces a personal susceptibility, or, as we are accustomed to say, a 'disposition' to the formation of a delusion. The development of the mental disorder sets in at the moment when a chance impression arouses the childhood experiences which have been forgotten and which have traces, at least, of an erotic colouring. 'Arouses', however, is certainly not the right description, if we take into account what follows. We must repeat the author's accurate account in correct psychological technical terms. When Norbert Hanold saw the relief, he did not remember that he had already seen a similar posture of the foot in his childhood friend; he remembered nothing at all, but all the effects brought about by the relief originated from this link that was made with the impression of his childhood. Thus the childhood impression was stirred up, it became active, so that it began to produce effects, but it did not come into consciousness—it remained 'unconscious', to use a term which has to-day become unavoidable in psychopathology. We are anxious that this unconscious shall not be involved in any of the disputes of philosophers and natural philosophers, which have often no more than an etymological importance. For the time being we possess no better name for psychical processes which behave actively but nevertheless do not reach the consciousness of the person concerned, and that is all we mean by our 'unconsciousness'. When some thinkers try to dispute the existence of an unconscious of this kind, on the ground that it is nonsensical, we can only suppose that they have never had to do with the corresponding mental phenomena, that they are under the

<sup>1</sup> [Binet's views on fetishism were described in Freud's *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905*d*), to which however he added a footnote in 1920 casting doubts on their adequacy. A number of references to other discussions of fetishism in Freud's own writings are given in another footnote to the same passage (*Standard Ed.*, 7, 154-5).]



spell of the regular experience that everything mental that becomes active and intense becomes at the same time conscious as well, and that they have still to learn (what our author knows very well) that there are most certainly mental processes which, in spite of being intense and producing effects, none the less remain apart from consciousness.

We said a little earlier [p. 34 ff.] that Norbert Hanold's memories of his childhood relations with Zoe were in a state of 'repression'; and here we have called them 'unconscious' memories. So we must now pay a little attention to the relation between these two technical terms, which, indeed, appear to coincide in their meaning. It is not difficult to make the matter plain. 'Unconscious' is the wider concept; 'repressed' is the narrower one. Everything that is repressed is unconscious; but we cannot assert that everything unconscious is repressed. If when Hanold saw the relief he had remembered his Zoe's gait, what had earlier been an unconscious memory of his would have become simultaneously active and conscious, and this would have shown that it had not earlier been repressed. 'Unconscious' is a purely descriptive term, one that is indefinite in some respects and, as we might say, static. 'Repressed' is a dynamic expression, which takes account of the interplay of mental forces; it implies that there is a force present which is seeking to bring about all kinds of psychical effects, including that of becoming conscious, but that there is also an opposing force which is able to obstruct some of these psychical effects, once more including that of becoming conscious. The mark of something repressed is precisely that in spite of its intensity it is unable to enter consciousness. In Hanold's case, therefore, from the moment of the appearance of the relief onwards, we are concerned with something unconscious that is repressed, or, more briefly, with something repressed.

Norbert Hanold's memories of his childhood relations with the girl with the graceful gait were repressed; but this is not yet the correct view of the psychological situation. We remain on the surface so long as we are dealing only with

memories and ideas. What is alone of value in mental life is rather the feelings. No mental forces are significant unless they possess the characteristic of arousing feelings. Ideas are only repressed because they are associated with the release of feelings which ought not to occur. It would be more correct to say that repression acts upon feelings, but we can only be aware of these in their association with ideas.<sup>1</sup> So that it was Norbert Hanold's erotic feelings that were repressed; and since his erotism knew and had known no other object than Zoe Bertgang in his childhood, his memories of her were forgotten. The ancient relief aroused the slumbering erotism in him, and made his childhood memories active. On account of a resistance to erotism that was present in him, these memories could only become operative as unconscious ones. What now took place in him was a struggle between the power of erotism and that of the forces that were repressing it; the manifestation of this struggle was a delusion.

Our author has omitted to give the reasons which led to the repression of the erotic life of his hero; for of course Hanold's concern with science was only the instrument which the repression employed. A doctor would have to dig deeper here, but perhaps without hitting upon the reason in this case. But, as we have insisted with admiration, the author has not failed to show us how the arousing of the repressed erotism came precisely from the field of the instruments that served to bring about the repression. It was right that an antique, the marble sculpture of a woman, should have been what tore our archaeologist away from his retreat from love and warned him to pay off the debt to life with which we are burdened from our birth.

The first manifestations of the process that had been set going in Hanold by the relief were phantasies, which played around the figure represented in it. The figure seemed to

<sup>1</sup> [Some of this would need to be expressed differently in order to fit in with Freud's later and more elaborate discussions of repression, which are to be found, for instance, in Sections III and IV of his paper on 'The Unconscious' (1915e).]

him to have something 'of to-day' about her, in the best sense of the words, and it was as though the artist had captured her 'from the life' stepping along the street. He gave the girl in the ancient relief the name of 'Gradiva', which he constructed on the model of an epithet of the war-god striding into battle—'Mars Gradivus'. He endowed her personality with more and more characteristics. She may have been the daughter of a respected personage, of a patrician, perhaps, who was connected with the temple-service of a deity. He thought he could trace a Greek origin in her features; and finally he felt compelled to remove her from the busy life of a capital and to transport her to the more peaceful Pompeii, and there he made her step across the lava stepping-stones which made it possible to cross from one side of the street to the other. [P. 11.] These products of his phantasy seem arbitrary enough, but at the same time innocently unsuspecting. And, indeed, even when for the first time they gave rise to an incitement to action—when the archaeologist, obsessed by the problem of whether this posture of the feet corresponded to reality, began to make observations from life in order to examine the feet of contemporary women and girls—even this action was screened by conscious scientific motives, as though all his interest in the sculpture of Gradiva had sprung from the soil of his professional concern with archaeology. [P. 12.] The women and girls in the street, whom he chose as the subjects of his investigation, must, of course, have taken another, crudely erotic view of his behaviour, and we cannot but think them right. We ourselves can be in no doubt that Hanold was as much in ignorance of the motives of his researches as he was of the origin of his phantasies about Gradiva. These, as we learned later, were echoes of his memories of his youthful love, derivatives of those memories, transformations and distortions of them, after they had failed to make their way into his consciousness in an unmodified form. The ostensibly aesthetic judgement that the sculpture had something 'of to-day' about it took the place of his knowledge that a gait of

that kind belonged to a girl whom he knew and who stepped across the street *at the present time*. Behind the impression of the sculpture being 'from the life' and the phantasy of its subject being Greek lay his memory of the name Zoe, which means 'life' in Greek. 'Gradiva', as we learn from our hero himself at the end of the story, after he has been cured of his delusion, is a good translation of the surname 'Bertgang' which means something like 'someone who steps along brilliantly or splendidly'. [P. 37.] The details about Gradiva's father originated from Hanold's knowledge that Zoe Bertgang was the daughter of a respected teacher at the University, which can well be translated into classical terms as 'temple-service'. Finally, his phantasy transported her to Pompeii, not 'because her quiet, calm nature seemed to demand it', but because no other or better analogy could be found in his science for his remarkable state, in which he became aware of his memories of his childhood friendship through obscure channels of information. Once he had made his own childhood coincide with the classical past (which it was so easy for him to do), there was a perfect similarity between the burial of Pompeii—the disappearance of the past combined with its preservation—and repression, of which he possessed a knowledge through what might be described as 'endopsychic' perception. In this he was employing the same symbolism that the author makes the girl use consciously towards the conclusion of the story: 'I told myself I should be able to dig out something interesting here even by myself. Of course I hadn't counted on making the find that I have . . .' (124 [p. 28].) And at the very end she replied to Hanold's plan for their honeymoon with a reference to 'her childhood friend who had also in a sense been dug out of the ruins again'. (150 [p. 39].)

Thus in the very first products of Hanold's delusional phantasies and actions we already find a double set of determinants, a derivation from two different sources. One of these is the one that was manifest to Hanold himself, the other is the one which is revealed to us when we examine his

mental processes. One of them, looked at from Hanold's point of view, was conscious to him, the other was completely unconscious to him. One of them was derived wholly from the circle of ideas of the science of archaeology, the other arose from the repressed childhood memories that had become active in him and from the emotional instincts attached to them. One might be described as lying on the surface and covering the other, which was, as it were, concealed behind it. The scientific motivation might be said to serve as a pretext for the unconscious erotic one, and science had put itself completely at the service of the delusion. It should not be forgotten, however, that the unconscious determinants could not effect anything that did not simultaneously satisfy the conscious, scientific ones. The symptoms of a delusion—phantasies and actions alike—are in fact the products of compromise between the two mental currents, and in a compromise account is taken of the demands of each of the two parties to it; but each side must also renounce a part of what it wanted to achieve. Where a compromise comes about it must have been preceded by a struggle—in this case it was the conflict we have assumed between suppressed eroticism and the forces that were keeping it in repression. In the formation of a delusion this struggle is in fact unending. Assault and resistance are renewed after the construction of each compromise, which is never, so to speak, entirely satisfying. Our author too is aware of this, and that is why he makes a peculiar unrest dominate this stage of his hero's disorder, as a precursor and guarantee of further developments.

These significant peculiarities—the double motivation of phantasies and decisions, and the construction of conscious pretexts for actions to whose motivation the repressed has made the major contribution—will meet us often, and perhaps more clearly, in the further course of the story. And this is just as it should be, for the author has thus grasped and represented the unfailing chief characteristic of pathological mental processes.

The development of Norbert Hanold's delusion proceeded

with a dream which, since it was not occasioned by any new event, seems to have arisen entirely out of his mind, filled as it was by a conflict. But let us pause before we enquire whether, in the construction of his dreams, too, the author meets our expectation that he possesses a deep understanding. Let us ask first what psychiatric science has to say to his hypotheses about the origin of a delusion and what attitude it takes to the part played by repression and the unconscious, to conflict and to the formation of compromises. In short, let us ask whether this imaginative representation of the genesis of a delusion can hold its own before the judgement of science.

And here we must give what will perhaps be an unexpected answer. In fact the situation is quite the reverse: it is science that cannot hold its own before the achievement of the author. Science allows a gulf to yawn between the hereditary and constitutional preconditions of a delusion and its creations, which seem to emerge ready-made—a gulf which we find that our author has filled. Science does not as yet suspect the importance of repression, it does not recognize that in order to explain the world of psychopathological phenomena the unconscious is absolutely essential, it does not look for the basis of delusions in a psychical conflict, and it does not regard their symptoms as compromises. Does our author stand alone, then, in the face of united science? No, that is not the case (if, that is, I may count my own works as part of science), since for a number of years—and, until recently more or less alone<sup>1</sup>—I myself have supported all the views that I have here extracted from Jensen's *Gradiva* and stated in technical terms. I indicated, in most detail in connection with the states known as hysteria and obsessions, that the individual determinant<sup>2</sup> of these psychical disorders is the

<sup>1</sup> See Bleuler's important work, *Affektivität, Suggestibilität, Paranoia* and C. G. Jung's *Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien*, both published in Zurich in 1906.—[Added 1912:] To-day, in 1912, I am able to retract what is said above as being no longer true. Since it was written, the 'psycho-analytic movement' started by me has become widely extended, and it is constantly growing.

<sup>2</sup> [As contrasted, presumably, with a more general, inherited factor.]

suppression of a part of instinctual life and the repression of the ideas by which the suppressed instinct is represented, and soon afterwards I repeated the same views in relation to some forms of delusion.<sup>1</sup> The question whether the instincts concerned in this causation are always components of the sexual instinct or may be of another kind as well is a problem which may be regarded as a matter of indifference in the particular case of the analysis of *Gradiva*; for in the instance chosen by our author what was at issue was quite certainly nothing other than the suppression of erotic feelings. The validity of the hypotheses of psychical conflict and of the formation of symptoms by means of compromises between the two mental currents struggling against each other has been demonstrated by me in the case of patients observed and medically treated in real life, just as I have been able to in the imaginary case of Norbert Hanold.<sup>2</sup> Even before me, Pierre Janet, a pupil of the great Charcot, and Josef Breuer, in collaboration with me, had traced back the products of neurotic, and especially of hysterical, illness to the power of unconscious thoughts.<sup>3</sup>

When, from the year 1893 onwards, I plunged into investigations such as these of the origin of mental disturbances, it would certainly never have occurred to me to look for a confirmation of my findings in imaginative writings. I was thus more than a little surprised to find that the author of *Gradiva*, which was published in 1903, had taken as the basis of its creation the very thing that I believed myself to have freshly discovered from the sources of my medical experience. How was it that the author arrived at the same knowledge as the doctor—or at least behaved as though he possessed the same knowledge?

Norbert Hanold's delusion, as I was saying, was carried a step further by a dream which occurred in the middle of

<sup>1</sup> See the author's *Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre*, 1906 [in particular the second paper on 'The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence' (1896b)].

<sup>2</sup> Cf. 'Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria' (1905e).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Studies on Hysteria* (Freud, 1895d, with Breuer).

his efforts to discover a gait like Gradiva's in the streets of the town where he lived. It is easy to give the content of this dream in brief. The dreamer found himself in Pompeii on the day on which that unhappy city was destroyed, and experienced its horrors without being in danger himself; he suddenly saw Gradiva stepping along there, and understood all at once, as though it was something quite natural, that since she was a Pompeian, she was living in her native town, and 'without his having suspected it, living as his contemporary' [p. 12]. He was seized with fear on her account and gave a warning cry, whereupon she turned her face towards him for a moment. But she proceeded on her way without paying any attention to him, lay down on the steps of the Temple of Apollo, and was buried in the rain of ashes after her face had lost its colour, as though it were turning into white marble, until it had become just like a piece of sculpture. As he was waking up, he interpreted the noises of a big city penetrating into his bedroom as the cries for help of the despairing inhabitants of Pompeii and the thunder of the wildly agitated sea. The feeling that what he had dreamt had really happened to him would not leave him for some time after he had awoken, and a conviction that Gradiva had lived in Pompeii and had perished there on the fatal day was left over with him by the dream as a fresh starting-point for his delusion.

It is not so easy for us to say what the author intended with this dream and what caused him to link the development of the delusion precisely to a dream. Zealous investigators, it is true, have collected plenty of examples of the way in which mental disturbances are linked to dreams and arise out of dreams.<sup>1</sup> It appears, too, that in the lives of a few eminent men impulses to important actions and decisions have originated from dreams. But these analogies are not of much help to our understanding; so let us keep to our present case, our author's imaginary case of Norbert Hanold

<sup>1</sup> Sante de Sanctis (1899). [Cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), Chapter I, Section H, *Standard Ed.*, 4, 88 ff.]



the archaeologist. By which end are we to take hold of a dream like this so as to fit it into the whole context, if it is not to remain no more than an unnecessary decoration of the story?

I can well imagine that at this point a reader may exclaim: 'The dream is quite easily explained—it is a simple anxiety-dream, occasioned by the noises of the city, which were misinterpreted into the destruction of Pompeii by the archaeologist, whose mind was occupied with his Pompeian girl.' In view of the low opinion generally prevailing of the performances of dreams, all that is usually asked from an explanation of one is that some external stimulus shall be found that more or less coincides with a piece of the dream's content. This external stimulus to dreaming would be supplied by the noise which woke the sleeper; and with this, interest in the dream would be exhausted. If only we had some reason for supposing that the town was noisier than usual that morning! If only, for instance, the author had not omitted to tell us that Hanold, against his usual practice, had slept that night with his windows open! What a pity the author did not take the trouble to do that! And if only anxiety-dreams were as simple as that! But no, interest in the dream is not so easily exhausted.

There is nothing essential for the construction of a dream in a link with an external sensory stimulus. A sleeper can disregard a stimulus of this kind from the external world, or he can allow himself to be awakened by it without constructing a dream, or, as happened here, he can weave it into his dream if that suits him for some other reason; and there are numerous dreams of which it is impossible to show that their content was determined in this way by a stimulus impinging on the sleeper's senses.<sup>1</sup> No, we must try another path.

We may perhaps find a starting-point in the after-effects left by the dream in Hanold's waking life. Up to then he had had a phantasy that Gradiva had been a Pompeian. This hypothesis now became a certainty for him, and a second

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Standard Ed., 4, 224.]

certainty followed—that she was buried along with the rest in the year 79 A.D.<sup>1</sup> Melancholy feelings accompanied this extension of the delusional structure, like an echo of the anxiety which had filled the dream. This fresh pain about *Gradiva* does not seem very intelligible to us; *Gradiva* would have been dead for many centuries even if she had been saved from destruction in the year 79 A.D. Or ought we not to argue in this kind of way either with Norbert Hanold or with the author himself? Here again there seems no path to an understanding. Nevertheless it is worth remarking that the increment which the delusion acquired from this dream was accompanied by a feeling with a highly painful colouring.

Apart from that, however, we are as much at a loss as before. This dream is not self-explanatory, and we must resolve to borrow from my *Interpretation of Dreams* and apply to the present example a few of the rules to be found in it for the solution of dreams.

One of these rules is to the effect that a dream is invariably related to the events of the day before the dream.<sup>2</sup> Our author seems to be wishing to show that he has followed this rule, for he attaches the dream immediately to Hanold's 'pedestrian researches'. Now these had no meaning other than a search for *Gradiva*, whose characteristic gait he was trying to recognize. So the dream ought to have contained an indication of where *Gradiva* was to be found. And it does so, by showing her in Pompeii; but that is no novelty to us.

Another rule tells us that, if a belief in the reality of the dream-images persists unusually long, so that one cannot tear oneself out of the dream, this is not a mistaken judgement provoked by the vividness of the dream-images, but is a psychical act on its own: it is an assurance, relating to the content of the dream, that something in it is really as one has dreamt it;<sup>3</sup> and it is right to have faith in this assurance.

<sup>1</sup> See the text of *Gradiva* (15).

<sup>2</sup> [*The Interpretation of Dreams*, Chapter V, Section A, *Standard Ed.*, 4, 165 ff.]

<sup>3</sup> [*Ibid.*, 4, 187 and 5, 372.]

If we keep to these two rules, we must conclude that the dream gave some information as to the whereabouts of the Gradiva he was in search of, and that that information tallied with the real state of things. We know Hanold's dream: does the application of these two rules to it yield any reasonable sense?

Strange to say, it does. The sense is merely disguised in a particular way so that it is not immediately recognizable. Hanold learned in the dream that the girl he was looking for was living in a town and contemporaneously with him. Now this was true of Zoe Bertgang; only in the dream the town was not the German university town but Pompeii, and the time was not the present but the year 79 A.D. It is, as it were, a distortion by displacement: what we have is not Gradiva in the present but the dreamer transported into the past. Nevertheless, in this manner, the essential and new fact is stated: *he is in the same place and time as the girl he is looking for*. But whence come this displacement and disguise which were bound to deceive both us and the dreamer over the true meaning and content of the dream? Well, we already have the means at our disposal for giving a satisfactory answer to that question.

Let us recall all that we have heard about the nature and origin of the phantasies which are the precursors of delusions [p. 44ff.]. They are substitutes for and derivatives of repressed memories which a resistance will not allow to enter consciousness unaltered, but which can purchase the possibility of becoming conscious by taking account, by means of changes and distortions, of the resistance's censorship. When this compromise has been accomplished, the memories have turned into the phantasies, which can easily be misunderstood by the conscious personality—that is, understood so as to fit in with the dominant psychical current. Now let us suppose that dream-images are what might be described as the creations of people's physiological [i.e. non-pathological] delusions—the products of the compromise in the struggle between what is repressed and what is dominant which is

probably present in every human being, including those who in the day-time are perfectly sound in mind. We shall then understand that dream-images have to be regarded as something distorted, behind which something else must be looked for, something *not* distorted, but in some sense objectionable, like Hanold's repressed memories behind his phantasies. We can give expression to the contrast which we have thus recognized, by distinguishing what the dreamer remembers when he wakes up as the *manifest content of the dream* from what constituted the basis of the dream before the distortion imposed by the censorship—namely, the *latent dream-thoughts*. Thus, interpreting a dream consists in translating the manifest content of the dream into the latent dream-thoughts, in undoing the distortion which the dream-thoughts have had to submit to from the censorship of the resistance. If we apply these notions to the dream we are concerned with, we shall find that its latent dream-thoughts can only have been: 'the girl you are looking for with the graceful gait is really living in this town with you.' But in that form the thought could not become conscious. It was obstructed by the fact that a phantasy had laid it down, as the result of an earlier compromise, that Gradiva was a Pompeian; consequently, if the real fact that she was living in the same place and at the same time was to be affirmed, there was no choice but to adopt the distortion: 'You are living at Pompeii at the time of Gradiva.' This then was the idea which was realized by the manifest content of the dream, and was represented as a present event actually being experienced.

It is only rarely that a dream represents, or, as we might say, 'stages', a single thought: there are usually a number of them, a tissue of thoughts. Another component of the content of Hanold's dream can be detached, the distortion of which can easily be got rid of, so that the latent idea represented by it can be detected. This is a piece of the dream to which once again it is possible to extend the assurance of reality with which the dream ended. In the dream Gradiva as she steps along is transformed into a marble sculpture. This is

no more than an ingenious and poetical representation of the real event. Hanold had in fact transferred his interest from the living girl to the sculpture: the girl he loved had been transformed for him into a marble relief. The latent dream-thoughts, which were bound to remain unconscious, sought to change the sculpture back into the living girl; what they were saying to him accordingly was something like: 'After all, you're only interested in the statue of Gradiva because it reminds you of Zoe, who is living here and now.' But if this discovery could have become conscious, it would have meant the end of the delusion.

Are we perhaps under an obligation to replace in this way each separate piece of the manifest content of the dream by unconscious thoughts? Strictly speaking, yes; if we were interpreting a dream that had really been dreamt, we could not avoid that duty. But in that case, too, the dreamer would have to give us the most copious explanations. Clearly we cannot carry out this requirement in the case of the author's creation; nevertheless, we shall not overlook the fact that we have not yet submitted the main content of the dream to the process of interpretation or translation.

For Hanold's dream was an anxiety-dream. Its content was frightening, the dreamer felt anxiety while he slept and he was left with painful feelings afterwards. Now this is far from convenient for our attempt at an explanation; and we must once again borrow heavily from the theory of dream-interpretation. We are warned by that theory not to fall into the error of tracing the anxiety that may be felt in a dream to the content of the dream, and not to treat the content of the dream as though it were the content of an idea occurring in waking life. It points out to us how often we dream the most ghastly things without feeling a trace of anxiety. The true situation, we learn, is quite a different one, which cannot be easily guessed, but which can be proved with certainty. The anxiety in anxiety-dreams, like neurotic anxiety in general, corresponds to a sexual affect, a libidinal

feeling, and arises out of libido by the process of repression.<sup>1</sup> When we interpret a dream, therefore, we must replace anxiety by sexual excitement. The anxiety that originates in this way has—not invariably, but frequently—a selective influence on the content of the dream and introduces into it ideational elements which seem, when the dream is looked at from a conscious and mistaken point of view, to be appropriate to the affect of anxiety. As I have said, this is not invariably so, for there are plenty of anxiety-dreams in which the content is not in the least frightening and where it is therefore impossible to give an explanation on conscious lines of the anxiety that is felt.

I am aware that this explanation of anxiety in dreams sounds very strange and is not easy to credit; but I can only advise the reader to come to terms with it. Moreover it would be a very remarkable thing if Norbert Hanold's dream could be reconciled with this view of anxiety and could be explained in that way. On that basis, we should say that the dreamer's erotic longings were stirred up during the night and made a powerful effort to make conscious his memory of the girl he loved and so to tear him out of his delusion, but that those longings met with a fresh repudiation and were transformed into anxiety, which in its turn introduced into the content of the dream the terrifying pictures from the memories of his schooldays. In this manner the true unconscious content of the dream, his passionate longing for the Zoe he had once known, became transformed into its manifest content of the destruction of Pompeii and the loss of Gradiva.

So far, I think, it sounds plausible. But it might justly be insisted that, if erotic wishes constitute the undistorted content of the dream, it ought also to be possible to point at least to some recognizable residue of those wishes concealed

<sup>1</sup> Cf. my first paper on the anxiety neurosis (1895b) and *The Interpretation of Dreams*. [Standard Ed., 4, 160–2, and 5, 582 ff.—In his *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926d), Freud put forward an amended view of the origin of anxiety.]

somewhere in the transformed dream. Well, even that may be possible, with the help of a hint from a later part of the story. When Hanold had his first meeting with the supposed Gradiva, he recollected the dream and begged the apparition to lie down again as he had seen her do then [p. 19].<sup>1</sup> Thereupon, however, the young lady rose indignantly and left her strange companion, for she had detected the improper erotic wish behind what he had said under the domination of his delusion. We must, I think, accept Gradiva's interpretation; even in a real dream we cannot always expect to find a more definite expression of an erotic wish.

The application of a few of the rules of dream-interpretation to Hanold's first dream has thus resulted in making it intelligible to us in its main features and in inserting it into the nexus of the story. Surely, then, the author must have observed these rules in creating it? We might ask another question, too: why did the author introduce a dream at all to bring about the further development of the delusion? In my opinion it was an ingenious notion and once again true to reality. We have already heard [p. 55] that in real illnesses a delusion very often arises in connection with a dream, and, after what we have learnt about the nature of dreams, there is no need to see a fresh riddle in this fact. Dreams and delusions arise from the same source—from what is repressed. Dreams are, as one might say, the physiological delusions of normal people. [Cf. p. 58] Before what is repressed has become strong enough to break through into waking life as a delusion, it may easily have achieved a first success, under the more favourable conditions of the state of sleep, in the form of a dream with persisting effects. For during sleep, along with a general lowering of mental activity, there is a relaxation in the strength of the resistance with which the dominant psychical forces oppose what is

<sup>1</sup> 'No, I didn't hear you speak. But I called to you when you lay down to sleep, and I stood beside you then—your face was as peaceful and beautiful as marble. May I beg of you—lie down once more on the step as you did then.' (70.)

repressed. It is this relaxation that makes the formation of dreams possible, and that is why dreams give us our best access to a knowledge of the unconscious part of the mind—except that, as a rule, with the re-establishment of the psychical cathexes of waking life, the dream once more takes to flight and the ground that had been won by the unconscious is evacuated once again.



### III

IN the further course of the story there is yet another dream, which may perhaps tempt us even more than the first to try to translate it and insert it into the train of events in the hero's mind.<sup>1</sup> But we should save very little by diverging from the author's account and hurrying on immediately to this second dream; for no one who wishes to analyse someone else's dream can avoid turning his attention in the greatest detail to all the dreamer's experiences, both external and internal. It will probably be best, therefore, to keep close to the thread of the story and to intersperse it with our glosses as we proceed.

The construction of the fresh delusion about Gradiva's death during the destruction of Pompeii in the year 79 A.D. was not the only result of the first dream, which we have already analysed. Immediately after it Hanold decided on his journey to Italy, which eventually brought him to Pompeii. But, before that, something else happened to him. As he was leaning out of the window, he thought he saw a figure in the street with the bearing and gait of his Gradiva. In spite of being insufficiently dressed, he hurried after her, but failed to overtake her, and was driven back into the house by the jeers of the passers-by. When he was in his room once more, the song of a canary from its cage in the window of a house opposite stirred up in him a mood in which he too seemed to be a prisoner longing for freedom; and his spring-time journey was no sooner decided on than it was carried out.

The author has thrown a particularly clear light on this journey of Hanold's and has allowed him to have a partial

<sup>1</sup> [The last phrase in this sentence, which, in a slightly different form, has already appeared in the preceding paragraph (p. 62), is an echo of the opening sentence of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Standard Ed., 4, 1).]

insight into his own internal processes. Hanold of course found himself a scientific pretext for his journey, but this did not last long. After all, he was in fact aware that 'the impulse to make this journey had arisen from a feeling he could not name'. A strange restlessness made him dissatisfied with everything he came across, and drove him from Rome to Naples and from there to Pompeii; but even at this last halting-place he was still uneasy in his mood. He was annoyed at the folly of the honeymooners, and enraged at the impertinence of the house-flies which inhabit Pompeii's hotels. But at last he could no longer disguise from himself 'that his dissatisfaction could not be caused solely by what was around him but that there was something that sprang from himself as well'. He thought he was over-excited, felt 'that he was discontented because he lacked something, but he had no idea what. And this ill-humour followed him about everywhere.' In this frame of mind he was even furious with his mistress—with Science. When in the heat of the mid-day sun he wandered for the first time through Pompeii, 'the whole of his science had not merely abandoned him, but had left him without the slightest desire to find her again. He remembered her only as something in the far distance, and he felt that she had been an old, dried-up, tedious aunt, the dullest and most unwanted creature in the world.' (55.)

And then, while he was in this disagreeable and confused state of feeling, one of the problems attaching to his journey was solved for him—at the moment when he first saw *Gradiva* stepping through Pompeii. Something 'came into his consciousness for the first time: without being aware himself of the impulse within him, he had come to Italy and had travelled on to Pompeii, without stopping in Rome or Naples, in order to see whether he could find any traces of her. And "traces" literally; for with her peculiar gait she must have left behind an imprint of her toes in the ashes distinct from all the rest.' (58 [p. 16 f.].)

Since the author has taken so much trouble over describing the journey, it must be worth while too to discuss its

relation to Hanold's delusion and its position in the chain of events. The journey was undertaken for reasons which its subject did not recognize at first and only admitted to himself later on, reasons which the author describes in so many words as 'unconscious'. This is certainly taken from the life. One does not need to be suffering from a delusion in order to behave like this. On the contrary, it is an event of daily occurrence for a person—even a healthy person—to deceive himself over the motives for an action and to become conscious of them only after the event, provided only that a conflict between several currents of feeling furnishes the necessary condition for such a confusion. Accordingly, Hanold's journey was from the first calculated to serve the delusion, and was intended to take him to Pompeii, where he could proceed further with his search for Gradiva. It will be recalled that his mind was occupied with that search both before and immediately after the dream, and that the dream itself was simply an answer to the question of Gradiva's whereabouts, though an answer which was stifled by his consciousness. Some power which we do not recognize was, however, also inhibiting him to begin with from becoming aware of his delusional intention; so that, for the conscious reasons for his journey, he was left only with insufficient pretexts which had to be renewed from place to place. The author presents us with a further puzzle by making the dream, the discovery of the supposed Gradiva in the street, and the decision to undertake the journey as a result of the singing canary succeed one another as a series of chance events without any internal connection with one another.

This obscure region of the story is made intelligible to us by some explanations which we derive from the later remarks of Zoe Bertgang. It was in fact the original of Gradiva, Fräulein Zoe herself, whom Hanold saw out of his window walking past in the street (89) and whom he nearly overtook. If this had happened, the information given him by the dream—that she was in fact living at the same time and in the same town as he was—would by a lucky chance have

received an irresistible confirmation, which would have brought about the collapse of his internal struggle. But the canary, whose singing sent Hanold off on his distant journey, belonged to Zoe, and its cage stood in her window diagonally across the street from Hanold's house. (135 [p. 30].) Hanold, who, according to the girl's accusation, had the gift of 'negative hallucination', who possessed the art of not seeing and not recognizing people who were actually present, must from the first have had an unconscious knowledge of what we only learned later. The indications of Zoe's proximity (her appearance in the street and her bird's singing so near his window) intensified the effect of the dream, and in this position, so perilous for his resistance to his erotic feelings, he took to flight. His journey was a result of his resistance gathering new strength after the surge forward of his erotic desires in the dream; it was an attempt at flight from the physical presence of the girl he loved. In a practical sense it meant a victory for repression, just as his earlier activity, his 'pedestrian researches' upon women and girls, had meant a victory for erotism. But everywhere in these oscillations in the struggle the compromise character of the outcome was preserved: the journey to Pompeii, which was supposed to lead him away from the living Zoe, led him at least to her surrogate, to Gradiva. The journey, which was undertaken in defiance of the latent dream-thoughts, was nevertheless following the path to Pompeii that was pointed out by the manifest content of the dream. Thus at every fresh struggle between erotism and resistance we find the delusion triumphant.

This view of Hanold's journey as a flight from his awakening erotic longing for the girl whom he loved and who was so close to him is the only one which will fit in with the description of his emotional states during his stay in Italy. The repudiation of erotism which dominated him was expressed there in his disgust at the honeymooners. A short dream which he had in his *albergo* in Rome, and which was occasioned by the proximity of a German loving couple,

'Edwin and Angelina', whose evening conversation he could not help hearing through the thin partition-wall, throws a retrospective light, as it were, on the erotic drift of his first major dream. In the new dream he was once again in Pompeii and Vesuvius was once again erupting, and it was thus linked to the earlier dream whose effects persisted during the journey. This time, however, among the people imperilled were—not, as on the former occasion, himself and Gradiva but—the Apollo Belvedere and the Capitoline Venus, no doubt by way of an ironical exaltation of the couple in the next room. Apollo lifted Venus up, carried her out, and laid her down on some object in the dark which seemed to be a carriage or cart, since it emitted 'a creaking noise'. Apart from this, the interpretation of the dream calls for no special skill. (31.)

Our author, who, as we have long since realized, never introduces a single idle or unintentional feature into his story, has given us another piece of evidence of the asexual current which dominated Hanold during his journey. As he roamed about for hours in Pompeii, 'strangely enough it never once recurred to his memory that a short time before he had dreamt of being present at the burial of Pompeii in the eruption of 79 A.D.' (47.) It was only when he caught sight of Gradiva that he suddenly remembered the dream and became conscious at the same time of the delusional reason for his puzzling journey. How could this forgetting of the dream, this barrier of repression between the dream and his mental state during the journey, be explained, except by supposing that the journey was undertaken not at the direct inspiration of the dream but as a revolt against it, as an emanation of a mental power that refused to know anything of the secret meaning of the dream?

But on the other hand Hanold did not enjoy this victory over his erotism. The suppressed mental impulse remained powerful enough to revenge itself on the suppressing one with discontent and inhibition. His longings turned into restlessness and dissatisfaction, which made his journey seem

pointless to him. His insight into his reasons for the journey at the bidding of the delusion was inhibited and his relations with his science, which in such a spot should have stirred all his interest, were interfered with. So the author shows us his hero after his flight from love in a kind of crisis, in a state of complete confusion and distraction, in a turmoil such as we usually find at the climax of an illness, when neither of the two conflicting powers has any longer a sufficiently superior strength over the other for the margin between them to make it possible to establish a vigorous mental régime. But here the author intervenes helpfully, and smoothes things out by making Gradiva appear at this juncture and undertake the cure of the delusion. By the power he possesses of guiding the people of his creation towards a happy destiny, in spite of all the laws of necessity which he makes them obey, he arranges that the girl, to avoid whom Hanold had fled to Pompeii, shall be transported to that very place. In this way he corrects the folly to which the young man was led by his delusion—the folly of exchanging the home of the living girl whom he loved for the burial-place of her imaginary substitute.

With the appearance of Zoe Bertgang as Gradiva, which marks the climax of tension in the story, our interest, too, soon takes a new direction. So far we have been assisting at the development of a delusion; now we are to witness its cure. And we may ask whether the author has given a purely fanciful account of the course of this cure or whether he has constructed it in accordance with possibilities actually present. Zoe's own words during her conversation with her newly-married friend give us a definite right to ascribe to her an intention to bring about the cure. (124 [p. 27].) But how did she set about it? When she had got over the indignation aroused in her by his suggestion that she should lie down to sleep again as she had 'then', she returned next day at the same mid-day hour to the same spot, and proceeded to entice out of Hanold all the secret knowledge her ignorance of which had prevented her from understanding his behaviour

the day before. She learnt about his dream, about the sculpture of *Gradiva*, and about the peculiarity of gait which she herself shared with it. She accepted the role of the ghost awakened to life for a brief hour, a role for which, as she perceived, his delusion had cast her, and, by accepting the flowers of the dead which he had brought without conscious purpose, and by expressing a regret that he had not given her roses, she gently hinted in ambiguous words at the possibility of his taking up a new position. (90 [p. 21].)

This unusually clever girl, then, was determined to win her childhood's friend for her husband, after she had recognized that the young man's love for her was the motive force behind the delusion. Our interest in her behaviour, however, will probably yield for the moment to the surprise which we may feel at the delusion itself. The last form taken by it was that *Gradiva*, who had been buried in 79 A.D., was now able, as a mid-day ghost, to exchange words with him for an hour, at the end of which she must sink into the ground or seek her grave once more. This mental cobweb, which was not brushed away either by his perceiving that the apparition was wearing modern shoes or by her ignorance of the ancient languages and her command of German, which was not in existence in her day, certainly seems to justify the author's description of his story as a 'Pompeian phantasy', but it seems also to exclude any possibility of measuring it by the standards of clinical reality.

Nevertheless, on closer consideration this delusion of Hanold's seems to me to lose the greater part of its improbability. The author, indeed, has made himself responsible for one part of it by basing his story on the premiss that Zoe was in every detail a duplicate of the relief. We must therefore avoid shifting the improbability of this premiss on to its consequence—that Hanold took the girl for *Gradiva* come to life. Greater value is given to the delusional explanation by the fact that the author has put no rational one at our disposal. Moreover the author has adduced contributory and mitigating circumstances on behalf of his hero's excesses in

the shape of the glare of the *campagna* sunlight and the intoxicating magic of the wine grown on the slopes of Vesuvius. But the most important of all the explanatory and exculpatory factors remains the ease with which our intellect is prepared to accept something absurd provided it satisfies powerful emotional impulses. It is an astonishing fact, and one that is too generally overlooked, how readily and frequently under these psychological conditions people of even the most powerful intelligence react as though they were feeble-minded; and anyone who is not too conceited may see this happening in himself as often as he pleases. And this is far more so if some of the mental processes concerned are linked with unconscious or repressed motives. In this connection I am happy to quote the words of a philosopher, who writes to me: 'I have been noting down the instances I myself experience of striking mistakes and unthinking actions, for which one finds motives afterwards (in a most unreasonable way). It is an alarming thing, but typical, to find how much folly this brings to light.' It must be remembered, too, that the belief in spirits and ghosts and the return of the dead, which finds so much support in the religions to which we have all been attached, at least in our childhood, is far from having disappeared among educated people, and that many who are sensible in other respects find it possible to combine spiritualism with reason. A man who has grown rational and sceptical, even, may be ashamed to discover how easily he may for a moment return to a belief in spirits under the combined impact of strong emotion and perplexity. I know of a doctor who had once lost one of his women patients suffering from Graves' disease<sup>1</sup>, and who could not get rid of a faint suspicion that he might perhaps have contributed to the unhappy outcome by a thoughtless prescription. One day, several years later, a girl entered his consulting-room, who, in spite of all his efforts, he could not help recognizing as the dead one. He could frame only a single thought: 'So after all it's true that the dead can come back to life.' His

<sup>1</sup> [Exophthalmic goitre.]



dread did not give way to shame till the girl introduced herself as the sister of the one who had died of the same disease as she herself was suffering from. The victims of Graves' disease, as has often been observed, have a marked facial resemblance to one another; and in this case this typical likeness was reinforced by a family one. The doctor to whom this occurred was, however, none other than myself; so I have a personal reason for not disputing the clinical possibility of Norbert Hanold's temporary delusion that *Gradiva* had come back to life. The fact, finally, is familiar to every psychiatrist that in severe cases of chronic delusions (in paranoia) the most extreme examples occur of ingeniously elaborated and well-supported absurdities.

After his first meeting with *Gradiva*, Norbert Hanold had drunk his wine first in one and then in the other of the two restaurants that he knew in Pompeii, while the other visitors were engaged in eating the main meal of the day. 'Of course it never came into his head to think of the non-sensical idea' that he was doing it in order to discover in which of the hotels *Gradiva* was living and taking her meals. But it is difficult to say what other sense his actions could have had. On the day after their second meeting in the House of Meleager, he had all kinds of strange and apparently unconnected experiences. He found a narrow gap in the wall of the portico, at the point where *Gradiva* had disappeared. He met a foolish lizard-catcher who addressed him as though he were an acquaintance. He discovered a third hotel, in an out-of-the-way situation, the '*Albergo del Sole*', whose proprietor palmed off on him a metal clasp with a green patina as a find from beside the remains of a Pompeian girl. And, lastly, in his own hotel he noticed a newly-arrived young couple whom he diagnosed as a brother and sister and whom he found sympathetic. All these impressions were afterwards woven together into a 'remarkably senseless' dream, which ran as follows:

'Somewhere in the sun *Gradiva* was sitting, making a snare out of a blade of grass to catch a lizard in, and said:

"Please keep quite still. Our lady colleague is right; the method is a really good one and she has made use of it with excellent results." ' [P. 25.]

He fended off this dream while he was still asleep, with the critical thought that it was utter madness, and cast around in all directions to get free from it. He succeeded in doing so with the help of an invisible bird, which uttered a short laughing call and carried off the lizard in its beak.

Are we to venture on an attempt at interpreting this dream too—that is, at replacing it by the latent thoughts from whose distortion it must have arisen? It is as senseless as only a dream can be expected to be; and this absurdity of dreams is the mainstay of the view which refuses to characterize dreams as completely valid psychical acts and maintains that they arise out of a purposeless excitation of the elements of the mind.

We are able to apply to this dream the technique which may be described as the regular procedure for interpreting dreams. It consists in paying no attention to the apparent connections in the manifest dream but in fixing our eyes upon each portion of its content independently, and in looking for its origin in the dreamer's impressions, memories, and free associations.<sup>1</sup> Since, however, we cannot question Hanold, we shall have to content ourselves with referring to his impressions, and we may very tentatively put our own associations in place of his.

'Somewhere in the sun Gradiva was sitting, catching lizards and speaking.' What impression of the previous day finds an echo in this part of the dream? Undoubtedly the encounter with the elderly gentleman, the lizard-catcher, who was thus replaced in the dream by Gradiva. He sat or lay 'on a sun-bathed slope' and he, too, spoke to Hanold. Furthermore, Gradiva's remarks in the dream were copied from this man's remarks: viz. 'The method prescribed by our colleague Eimer is a really good one; I have made use of

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Standard Ed., 4, 103-4.]

it many times already with excellent results. Please keep quite still.' [P. 23.] Gradiva used much the same words in the dream, except that 'our colleague Eimer' was replaced by an unnamed 'lady colleague'; moreover, the 'many times' in the zoologist's speech was omitted in the dream and the order of the sentences was somewhat altered. It seems, therefore, that this experience of the previous day was transformed into the dream with the help of a few changes and distortions. Why this particular experience? And what is the meaning of the changes—the replacement of the elderly gentleman by Gradiva and the introduction of the enigmatic 'lady colleague'?

There is a rule in interpreting dreams which runs as follows: 'A speech heard in a dream is always derived from one that has been heard or made by the dreamer in waking life.'<sup>1</sup> This rule seems to have been observed here: Gradiva's speech is only a modification of the old zoologist's speech which Hanold had heard the day before. Another rule in dream-interpretation would tell us that when one person is replaced by another or when two people are mixed up together (for instance, by one of them being shown in a situation that is characteristic of the other), it means that the two people are being equated, that there is a similarity between them.<sup>2</sup> If we venture to apply this rule too to our dream, we should arrive at this translation: 'Gradiva catches lizards just like the old man; she is skilled in lizard-catching just as he is.' This result cannot exactly be said to be intelligible as yet; but we have yet another puzzle to solve. To what impression of the previous day are we to relate the 'lady colleague' who in the dream replaces the famous zoologist Eimer? Fortunately we have very little choice here. A 'lady colleague' can only mean another girl—that is to say, the sympathetic young lady whom Hanold had taken for a sister travelling with her brother. 'She was wearing a red Sorrento rose in her dress, the sight of which reminded him

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Ed.*, 5, 418 ff.]

<sup>2</sup> [Ibid., 4, 320 ff.]

of something as he looked across from his corner of the dining-room, but he could not think what.' [P. 24f.] This remark of the author's gives us a right to regard her as the 'lady colleague' in the dream. What Hanold could not recall were, it cannot be doubted, the words spoken by the supposed Gradiva, who had told him, as she asked him for the white flowers of the dead, that in the spring people give happier girls roses. [P. 21.] But behind those words there had lain a hint of wooing. So what sort of lizard-catching was it that the happier 'lady colleague' had carried out so successfully?

Next day Hanold came upon the supposed brother and sister in an affectionate embrace, and was thus able to correct his earlier mistake. They were in fact a pair of lovers, and moreover on their honeymoon, as we discovered later when they so unexpectedly interrupted Hanold's third interview with Zoe. If now we are willing to assume that Hanold, though consciously taking them for a brother and sister, had immediately recognized their true relationship (which was unambiguously betrayed next day) in his unconscious, Gradiva's speech in the dream acquires a clear meaning. The red rose had become the symbol of a love-relation. Hanold understood that the couple were already what he and Gradiva had yet to become; the lizard-catching had come to signify man-catching; and Gradiva's speech meant something like: 'Only let me alone: I know how to win a man just as well as the other girl does.'

But why was it necessary for this penetration of Zoe's intentions to appear in the dream in the form of the old zoologist's speech? Why was Zoe's skill in man-catching represented by the old gentleman's skill in lizard-catching? Well, we can have no difficulty in answering that question. We guessed long ago that the lizard-catcher was none other than Bertgang, the professor of Zoology and Zoe's father, who, incidentally, must have known Hanold too—which explains how he came to address him as an acquaintance. Let us assume, once again, that in his unconscious Hanold

at once recognized the Professor. 'He had a vague notion that he had already had a passing glimpse of the lizard-hunter's face, probably in one of the two hotels.' This, then, is the explanation of the strange disguise under which the intention attributed to Zoe made its appearance: she was the lizard-catcher's daughter and had acquired her skill from him.

The replacement of the lizard-catcher by *Gradiva* in the content of the dream is accordingly a representation of the relation between the two figures which was known to Hanold in his unconscious; the introduction of the 'lady colleague' instead of 'our colleague Eimer' allowed the dream to express Hanold's realization that she was wooing a man. So far the dream welded together ('condensed', as we say) two experiences of the previous day into one situation, in order to bring to expression (in a very obscure way, it is true) two discoveries which were not allowed to become conscious. But we can go further, we can diminish the strangeness of the dream still more and we can demonstrate the influence of his other experiences of the previous day on the form taken by the manifest dream.

We may declare ourselves dissatisfied with the explanation that has hitherto been given of why it was that precisely the scene of the lizard-catching was made into the nucleus of the dream, and we may suspect that still other elements of the dream-thoughts were bringing their influence to bear in the emphasis that was laid on the 'lizard' in the manifest dream. Indeed, it may easily have been so. It will be recalled [p. 22] that Hanold had discovered a gap in the wall at the point where *Gradiva* had seemed to vanish—a gap 'which was nevertheless wide enough to allow a form that was unusually slim' to slip through. This observation led him in daytime to make an alteration in his delusion—an alteration to the effect that when *Gradiva* disappeared from his sight she did not sink into the earth but used the gap as a way of reaching her grave. In his unconscious thoughts he may have told himself that he had now discovered the natural explanation

of the girl's surprising disappearance. But must not the idea of slipping through narrow gaps and disappearing in them have recalled the behaviour of lizards? Was not *Gradiva* herself in this way behaving like an agile little lizard? In our view, then, the discovery of the gap in the wall contributed to determining the choice of the element 'lizard' in the manifest content of the dream. The lizard situation in the dream represented this impression of the previous day as well as the encounter with Zoe's father, the zoologist.

And what if now, growing bold, we were to try to find a representation in the content of the dream of the one experience of the previous day which has not yet been exploited—the discovery of the third inn, the *Albergo del Sole*? The author has treated this episode at such length and has linked so many things to it that it would surprise us if it alone had made no contribution to the construction of the dream. Hanold went into this inn, which, owing to its out-of-the-way situation and its distance from the railway station, had remained unknown to him, to purchase a bottle of soda-water to cool his heated blood. The landlord took the opportunity of displaying his antiquities, and showed him a clasp which he pretended had belonged to the Pompeian girl who had been found in the neighbourhood of the Forum closely embraced by her lover. Hanold, who had never hitherto believed this often-repeated tale, was now compelled by a power unknown to him to believe in the truth of this moving story and in the genuineness of the find; he purchased the brooch and left the inn with his acquisition. As he was going out, he saw, standing in a glass of water in a window, a nodding sprig of asphodel covered with white blossoms, and took the sight of it as a confirmation of the genuineness of his new possession. He now felt a positive conviction that the green clasp had belonged to *Gradiva* and that she had been the girl who had died in her lover's arms. He quieted the jealousy which thereupon seized him, by deciding that next day he would show the clasp to *Gradiva* herself and arrive at certainty about his suspicion. It cannot be denied that this

was a curious new piece of delusion; yet are we to suppose that no trace of it was to be found in his dream of the same night?

It will certainly be worth while to explain the origin of this addition to the delusion and to look for the fresh piece of unconscious discovery which was replaced by the fresh piece of delusion. The delusion appeared under the influence of the landlord of the 'Sun Hotel' to whom Hanold behaved in such a remarkably credulous fashion that it was almost as though he had been given a hypnotic suggestion by him. The landlord showed him a metal clasp for a garment, represented it as genuine and as having belonged to the girl who had been found buried in the arms of her lover; and Hanold, who was capable of being sufficiently critical to doubt both the truth of the story and the genuineness of the clasp, was at once taken in, and purchased the highly dubious antique. Why he should have behaved in this way is quite incomprehensible, and there is nothing to suggest that the landlord's personality might offer us a solution. But there is yet another riddle about the incident, and two riddles often solve each other. As he was leaving the *albergo* he saw a sprig of asphodel standing in a glass in a window and took it as a confirmation of the genuineness of the metal clasp. How could that have come about? But fortunately this last point is easy to solve. The white flower was no doubt the one which he had given to Gradiva at mid-day, and it is perfectly true that something was confirmed by the sight of it in the window of the inn. Not, it is true, the genuineness of the clasp, but something else that had already become clear to him when he discovered this *albergo* after having previously overlooked it. Already on the day before he had behaved as though he was searching in the two Pompeii hotels to find the person who appeared to him as Gradiva. And now, since he had so unexpectedly come upon a third one, he must have said to himself in his unconscious: 'So *this* is where she is staying!' And added, as he was going out: 'Yes, that's right! There's the asphodel that I gave her! So that's her window!'

This then was the new discovery which was replaced by the delusion, and which could not become conscious because its underlying postulate that *Gradiva* was a living person whom he had once known could not become conscious.

But how did the replacement of the new discovery by the delusion take place? What happened, I think, was that the sense of conviction attaching to the discovery was able to persist and was retained, while the discovery itself, which was inadmissible to consciousness, was replaced by another ideational content connected with it by associations of thought. Thus the sense of conviction became attached to a content which was in fact foreign to it and this, in the form of a delusion, won a recognition which did not apply to it. Hanold transferred his conviction that *Gradiva* lived in the house to other impressions which he had received in the house; this led to his credulity in regard to the landlord's remarks, the genuineness of the metal clasp and the truth of the anecdote about the discovery of the embracing lovers—but only through his linking what he heard in the house with *Gradiva*. The jealousy which was already latent in him seized upon this material and the consequence was the delusion (though it contradicted his first dream) that *Gradiva* was the girl who had died in her lover's arms and that the clasp he had bought had belonged to her.

It will be observed that his conversation with *Gradiva* and her hint at wooing him (her 'saying it with flowers') had already brought about important changes in Hanold. Traits of masculine desire—components of the libido—had awakened in him, though it is true that they could not yet dispense with the disguise of conscious pretexts. But the problem of the 'bodily nature' of *Gradiva*, which pursued him all that day [pp. 20 and 23], cannot disavow its origin in a young man's erotic curiosity about a woman's body, even if it is involved in a scientific question by the conscious insistence on *Gradiva*'s peculiar oscillation between death and life. His jealousy was a further sign of the increasingly active aspect of Hanold's love; he expressed this



jealousy at the beginning of their conversation the next day and with the help of a fresh pretext proceeded to touch the girl's body and, as he used to do in the far-off past, to hit her.

But it is now time to ask ourselves whether the method of constructing a delusion which we have inferred from our author's account is one that is known from other sources, or whether, indeed, it is possible at all. From our medical knowledge we can only reply that it is certainly the correct method, and perhaps the sole method, by which a delusion acquires the unshakable conviction which is one of its clinical characteristics. If a patient believes in his delusion so firmly, this is not because his faculty of judgement has been overturned and does not arise from what is false in the delusion. On the contrary, there is a grain of truth concealed in every delusion,<sup>1</sup> there is something in it that really deserves belief, and this is the source of the patient's conviction, which is therefore to that extent justified. This true element, however, has long been repressed. If eventually it is able to penetrate into consciousness, this time in a distorted form, the sense of conviction attaching to it is over-intensified as though by way of compensation and is now attached to the distorted substitute of the repressed truth, and protects it from any critical attacks. The conviction is displaced, as it were, from the unconscious truth on to the conscious error that is linked to it, and remains fixated there precisely as a result of this displacement. The instance of the formation of a delusion which arose from Hanold's first dream is no more than a similar, though not identical, example of such a displacement. Indeed, the method described here by which conviction arises in the case of a delusion does not differ fundamentally from the method by which a conviction is formed in normal cases,

<sup>1</sup> [Freud expressed this view at many points throughout the whole course of his writings. It appears, for instance, in the first edition of the *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901b), Chapter XII, Section C (a), and in *Moses and Monotheism* (1939a), Chapter III, Part II, Section G.]

where repression does not come into the picture. We all attach our conviction to thought-contents in which truth is combined with error, and let it extend from the former over the latter. It becomes diffused, as it were, from the truth over the error associated with it and protects the latter, though not so unalterably as in the case of a delusion, against deserved criticism. In normal psychology, too, being well-connected—'having influence', so to speak—can take the place of true worth.

I will now return to the dream and bring out a small but not uninteresting feature in it, which forms a connection between two of its provoking causes. Gradiva had drawn a kind of contrast between the white asphodel blossoms and the red rose. Seeing the asphodel again in the window of the *Albergo del Sole* became an important piece of evidence in support of Hanold's unconscious discovery, which was expressed in the new delusion; and alongside this was the fact that the red rose in the dress of the sympathetic girl helped Hanold in his unconscious to a correct view of her relation to her companion, so that he was able to make her appear in the dream as the 'lady colleague'.

But where in the manifest content of the dream, it will be asked, do we find anything to indicate and replace the discovery for which, as we have seen, Hanold's new delusion was a substitute—the discovery that Gradiva was staying with her father in the third, concealed Pompeii hotel, the *Albergo del Sole*? Nevertheless it is all there in the dream, and not even very much distorted, and I merely hesitate to point to it because I know that even those of my readers who have followed me patiently so far will begin to rebel strongly against my attempts at interpretation. Hanold's discovery, I repeat, is fully announced in the dream, but so cleverly concealed that it is bound to be overlooked. It is hidden behind a play upon words, an ambiguity. 'Somewhere in the sun Gradiva was sitting.' We have quite correctly related this to the spot where Hanold met her father, the zoologist. But

could it not also mean in the 'Sun'—that is, Gradiva is staying in the Albergo del Sole, the Sun Hotel? And was not the 'somewhere', which had no bearing on the encounter with her father, made to sound so hypocritically indefinite precisely because it introduced a definite piece of information about the place where Gradiva was staying? From my experience elsewhere of real dreams, I myself am perfectly certain that this is how the ambiguity is to be understood. But I should not in fact have ventured to present this piece of interpretative work to my readers, if the author had not at this point lent me his powerful assistance. He puts the very same play upon words into the girl's mouth when next day she saw the metal clasp: 'Did you find it in the sun, perhaps, which produces things of this kind?' [P. 26.] And since Hanold failed to understand what she had said, she explained that she meant the Sun Hotel, which they call 'Sole' here, and where she had already seen the supposititious antique.

And now let us make a bold attempt at replacing Hanold's 'remarkably senseless' dream by the unconscious thoughts that lay behind it and were as unlike it as possible. They ran, perhaps, as follows: 'She is staying in the "Sun" with her father. Why is she playing this game with me? Does she want to make fun of me? Or can it possibly be that she loves me and wants to have me as her husband?'—And no doubt while he was still asleep there came an answer dismissing this last possibility as 'the merest madness', a comment which was ostensibly directed against the whole manifest dream.

Critical readers will now justly enquire about the origin of the interpolation (for which I have so far given no grounds) of the reference to being ridiculed by Gradiva. The answer to this is given in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, which explains that if ridicule, derision, or embittered contradiction occurs in the dream-thoughts, this is expressed by the manifest dream being given a senseless form, by absurdity in the dream.<sup>1</sup> This absurdity does not mean, therefore, that there

<sup>1</sup> [*The Interpretation of Dreams*, Standard Ed., 5, 444-5.]

is any paralysis of psychical activity: it is a method of representation employed by the dream-work. As always happens at specially difficult points, the author once more comes to our help here. The senseless dream had a short epilogue, in which a bird uttered a laughing call and carried the lizard away in its beak. But Hanold had heard a similar laughing call after Gradiva's disappearance [p. 22]. It had in fact come from Zoe, who with this laugh was shaking off the gloomy seriousness of her underworld role. Gradiva had really laughed at him. But the dream-image of the bird carrying off the lizard may have been a recollection of the earlier dream, in which the Apollo Belvedere carried off the Capitoline Venus [p. 68].

There may still be some readers who feel that the translation of the situation of lizard-catching by the idea of wooing has not been sufficiently well established. Some further support for it may be afforded by the consideration that Zoe in her conversation with her newly-married friend admitted precisely what Hanold's thoughts about her suspected—when she told her she had felt sure that she would 'dig out' something interesting in Pompeii. Here she was trespassing into the field of archaeology, just as he had trespassed, with his simile of lizard-catching, into the field of zoology; it was as though they were struggling towards each other and each were trying to assume the other's character.

Here then we seem to have finished off the interpretation of this second dream as well. Both of them have been made intelligible to us on the presupposition that a dreamer knows in his unconscious thoughts all that he has forgotten in his conscious ones, and that in the former he judges correctly what in the latter he misunderstands in a delusion. In the course of our arguments we have no doubt been obliged to make some assertions which have seemed strange to the reader because of their unfamiliarity; and we have probably often roused a suspicion that what we pretended was the author's meaning was in fact only our own. I am anxious to

do all I can to dissipate this suspicion, and for that reason I will gladly enter into more detail over one of the most delicate points—I mean the use of ambiguous words and phrases, such as: 'Somewhere in the Sun Gradiva was sitting.'

Anyone who reads *Gradiva* must be struck by the frequency with which the author puts ambiguous remarks into the mouths of his two principal characters. In Hanold's case these remarks are intended by him unambiguously and it is only the heroine, Gradiva, who is struck by their second meaning. Thus, for instance, when in reply to her first answer he exclaimed 'I knew your voice sounded like that' [p. 19], Zoe, who was still in ignorance, could not but ask how that could be, since he had not heard her speak before. In their second conversation the girl was for a moment thrown into doubt about his delusion, when he told her that he had recognized her at once [p. 21]. She could not help taking these words in the sense (correct so far as his unconscious was concerned) of being a recognition that their acquaintance went back to their childhood; whereas he, of course, knew nothing of this implication of his remark and explained it only by reference to his dominant delusion. On the other hand, the remarks made by the girl, whose personality shows the most lucid clarity of mind in contrast to Hanold's delusion, exhibit an *intentional* ambiguity. One of their meanings chimes in with Hanold's delusion, so as to be able to penetrate into his conscious understanding, but the other rises above the delusion and gives us as a rule its translation into the unconscious truth for which it stands. It is a triumph of ingenuity and wit to be able to express the delusion and the truth in the same turn of words.

Zoe's speech in which she explains the situation to her friend and at the same time succeeds in getting rid of the interrupter [p. 27 f.] is full of ambiguities of this kind. It is in reality a speech made by the author and aimed more at the reader than at Zoe's newly-married 'colleague'. In her conversations with Hanold the ambiguity is usually effected by Zoe's using the same symbolism that we found in Hanold's

first dream—the equation of repression and burial, and of Pompeii and childhood. Thus she is able in her speeches on the one hand to remain in the role for which Hanold's delusion has cast her, and on the other hand to make contact with the real circumstances and awaken an understanding of them in Hanold's unconscious.

'I have long grown used to being dead.' (90 [p. 21].) 'To me it is right that you should give the flower of forgetfulness.' [Ibid.] In these sentences there was a faint foretaste of the reproaches which broke out clearly enough later on in her final lecture to him, in which she compared him to an archaeopteryx. [Pp. 32f.] 'The fact of someone having to die so as to come alive; but no doubt that must be so for archaeologists.' [P. 37.] She made this last remark after the delusion had been cleared up, as though to give a key to her ambiguous speeches. But she made her neatest use of her symbolism when she asked: 'I feel as though we had shared a meal like this once before, two thousand years ago; can't you remember?' (118 [p. 26].) Here the substitution of the historical past for childhood and the effort to awaken the memory of the latter are quite unmistakable.

But whence comes this striking preference for ambiguous speeches in *Gradiva*? It is no chance event, so it seems to us, but a necessary consequence of the premisses of the story. It is nothing other than a counterpart to the twofold determination of symptoms, in so far as speeches are themselves symptoms and, like them, arise from compromises between the conscious and the unconscious. It is simply that this double origin is more easily noticed in speeches than, for instance, in actions. And when, as is often made possible by the malleable nature of the material of speech, each of the two intentions lying behind the speech can be successfully expressed in the same turn of words, we have before us what we call an 'ambiguity'.

In the course of the psychotherapeutic treatment of a delusion or of an analogous disorder, ambiguous speeches of this kind are often produced by the patient, as new symptoms

of the briefest duration; and it can happen that the doctor finds himself too in the position of making use of them. In that way it not infrequently happens that with the meaning that is intended for the patient's conscious he stirs up an understanding of the meaning that applies to his unconscious. I know from experience that the part thus played by ambiguity is apt to raise the greatest objection in the uninitiated and to give rise to the greatest misunderstandings. But in any case our author was right in giving a place in his creation to a picture of this characteristic feature of what takes place in the formation of dreams and delusions.

#### IV

THE emergence of Zoe as a physician, as I have already remarked, arouses a new interest in us. We shall be anxious to learn whether a cure of the kind she performed upon Hanold is conceivable or even possible, and whether the author has taken as correct a view of the conditions for the disappearance of a delusion as he has of those for its genesis.

We shall unquestionably be met at this point by an opinion which denies that the case presented by the author possesses any such general interest and disputes the existence of any problem requiring solution. Hanold, it will be said, had no alternative but to abandon his delusion, after its subject, the supposed 'Gradiva' herself, had shown him that all his hypotheses were incorrect and after she had given him the most natural explanations of everything puzzling—for instance, of how it was that she had known his name. This would be the logical end of the matter; but since the girl had incidentally revealed her love to him, the author, no doubt to the satisfaction of his female readers, arranged that his story, a not uninteresting one otherwise, should have the usual happy ending in marriage. It would have been more consistent and equally possible, the argument will proceed, if the young scientist, after his error had been pointed out, had taken his leave of the lady with polite thanks and given as the reason for refusing her love the fact that he was able to feel an intense interest in antique women made of bronze or marble, and in their originals if they were accessible to contact, but that he did not know what to do with contemporary girls of flesh and blood. The author, in short, had quite arbitrarily tacked a love story on to his archaeological phantasy.

In rejecting this view as an impossible one, we observe in the first place that the beginnings of a change in Hanold were not shown only in his abandoning his delusion. Simultaneously, and indeed before his delusion was cleared up, an



unmistakable craving for love awakened in him, which found its outcome, naturally as it were, in his courting the girl who had freed him from his delusion. We have already laid emphasis on the pretexts and disguises under which his curiosity about her 'bodily nature', his jealousy, and his brutal masculine instinct for mastery were expressed in the midst of his delusion, after his repressed erotic desire had led to his first dream. As further evidence of this we may recall that on the evening after his second interview with *Gradiva* a live woman for the first time struck him as sympathetic, though he still made a concession to his earlier horror of honeymooning couples by not recognizing her as being newly-married. Next morning, however, he was a chance witness of an exchange of endearments between the girl and her supposed brother, and he withdrew with a sense of awe as though he had interrupted some sacred act [p. 26]. His derision of 'Edwin and Angelina' was forgotten, and he had acquired a sense of respect for the erotic side of life.

Thus the author has drawn the closest link between the clearing up of the delusion and the outbreak of a craving for love, and he has paved the way for the inevitable outcome in a courtship. He knows the essential nature of the delusion better than his critics: he knows that a component of loving desire had combined with a component of resistance to it in bringing about the delusion, and he makes the girl who undertakes the cure sensitive to the element in Hanold's delusion which is agreeable to her. It was only this knowledge which could decide her to devote herself to the treatment; it was only the certainty of being loved by him that could induce her to admit her love to him. The treatment consisted in giving him back from outside the repressed memories which he could not set free from inside; but it would have had no effect if in the course of it the therapist had not taken his feelings into account and if her ultimate translation of the delusion had not been: 'Look, all this only means that you love me.'

The procedure which the author makes his Zoe adopt for curing her childhood friend's delusion shows a far-reaching

similarity—no, a complete agreement in its essence—with a therapeutic method which was introduced into medical practice in 1895 by Dr. Josef Breuer and myself, and to the perfecting of which I have since then devoted myself. This method of treatment, to which Breuer first gave the name of 'cathartic' but which I prefer to describe as 'analytic', consists, as applied to patients suffering from disorders analogous to Hanold's delusion, in bringing to their consciousness, to some extent forcibly, the unconscious whose repression led to their falling ill—exactly as Gradiva did with the repressed memories of their childhood relations. Gradiva, it is true, could carry out this task more easily than a doctor: in several respects she was in what may be described as an ideal position for it. The doctor, who has no pre-existing knowledge of his patient and possesses no conscious memory of what is unconsciously at work in him, must call a complicated technique to his help in order to make up for this disadvantage. He must learn how to infer with great certainty from the conscious associations and communications of the patient what is repressed in him, how to discover his unconscious as it betrays itself behind his conscious words and acts. He then brings about something like what Norbert Hanold grasped at the end of the story when he translated back the name 'Gradiva' into 'Bertgang'. [P. 37.] The disorder vanishes while being traced back to its origin; analysis, too, brings simultaneous cure.

But the similarity between Gradiva's procedure and the analytic method of psychotherapy is not limited to these two points—the making conscious of what has been repressed and the coinciding of explanation with cure. It also extends to what turns out to be the essence of the whole change—to the awakening of feelings. Every disorder analogous to Hanold's delusion, what in scientific terms we are in the habit of calling 'psychoneuroses', has as its precondition the repression of a portion of instinctual life, or, as we can safely say, of the sexual instinct. At every attempt to introduce the unconscious and repressed causes of the illness into consciousness,

the instinctual component concerned is necessarily aroused to a renewed struggle with the repressing powers, only to come to terms with them in the final outcome, often to the accompaniment of violent manifestations of reaction. The process of cure is accomplished in a relapse into love, if we combine all the many components of the sexual instinct under the term 'love'; and such a relapse is indispensable, for the symptoms on account of which the treatment has been undertaken are nothing other than precipitates of earlier struggles connected with repression or the return of the repressed, and they can only be resolved and washed away by a fresh high tide of the same passions. Every psycho-analytic treatment is an attempt at liberating repressed love which has found a meagre outlet in the compromise of a symptom. Indeed, the agreement between such treatments and the process of cure described by the author of *Gradiva* reaches its climax in the further fact that in analytic psychotherapy too the re-awakened passion, whether it is love or hate, invariably chooses as its object the figure of the doctor.

It is here that the differences begin, which made the case of *Gradiva* an ideal one which medical technique cannot attain. *Gradiva* was able to return the love which was making its way from the unconscious into consciousness, but the doctor cannot. *Gradiva* had herself been the object of the earlier, repressed love; her figure at once offered the liberated current of love a desirable aim. The doctor has been a stranger, and must endeavour to become a stranger once more after the cure; he is often at a loss what advice to give the patients he has cured as to how in real life they can use their recovered capacity to love. To indicate the expedients and substitutes of which the doctor therefore makes use to help him to approximate with more or less success to the model of a cure by love which has been shown us by our author—all this would take us much too far away from the task before us.

And now for the final question, whose answer we have already evaded more than once. [Cf. pp. 43 and 54.] Our

views on repression, on the genesis of delusions and allied disorders, on the formation and solution of dreams, on the part played by erotic life, and on the method by which such disorders are cured, are far from being the common property of science, let alone the assured possession of educated people. If the insight which has enabled the author to construct his 'phantasy' in such a way that we have been able to dissect it like a real case history is in the nature of knowledge, we should be curious to learn what were the sources of that knowledge. One of our circle—the one who, as I said at the beginning, was interested in the dreams in *Gradiva* and their possible interpretation [cf. footnote, p. 9]—approached the author with the direct question whether he knew anything of such scientific theories as these. The author replied, as was to be expected, in the negative, and, indeed, somewhat brusquely.<sup>1</sup> His imagination, he said, had inspired *Gradiva*, and he had enjoyed it; if there was anyone whom it did not please, let him simply leave it alone. He had no suspicion of how greatly it had in fact pleased his readers.

It is quite possible that the author's disavowal does not stop at this. He may perhaps altogether deny any knowledge of the rules which we have shown that he has followed, and he may repudiate all the purposes we have recognized in his work. I do not regard this as improbable; but if it is so, there are only two possible explanations. It may be that we have produced a complete caricature of an interpretation by introducing into an innocent work of art purposes of which its creator had no notion, and by so doing have shown once more how easy it is to find what one is looking for and what is occupying one's own mind—a possibility of which the strangest examples are to be found in the history of literature. Let every reader now make up his mind whether he is able to accept this explanation. We ourselves, of course, hold to the other view, the remaining alternative. Our opinion is that the author need have known nothing of these rules and purposes, so that he could disavow them in good faith, but

<sup>1</sup> [See, however, the Editor's Note, p. 4.]

that nevertheless we have not discovered anything in his work that is not already in it. We probably draw from the same source and work upon the same object, each of us by another method. And the agreement of our results seems to guarantee that we have both worked correctly. Our procedure consists in the conscious observation of abnormal mental processes in other people so as to be able to elicit and announce their laws. The author no doubt proceeds differently. He directs his attention to the unconscious in his own mind, he listens to its possible developments and lends them artistic expression instead of suppressing them by conscious criticism. Thus he experiences from himself what we learn from others—the laws which the activities of this unconscious must obey. But he need not state these laws, nor even be clearly aware of them; as a result of the tolerance of his intelligence, they are incorporated within his creations. We discover these laws by analysing his writings just as we find them from cases of real illness; but the conclusion seems inescapable that either both of us, the writer and the doctor, have misunderstood the unconscious in the same way, or we have both understood it correctly. This conclusion is of great value to us, and it is on its account that it has been worth while to investigate by the methods of medical psychoanalysis the way in which the formation and the cure of the delusions as well as the dreams are represented in Jensen's *Gradiva*.

We would seem to have reached the end. But an attentive reader might remind us that at the beginning [p. 7.] we threw out an assertion that dreams are wishes represented as fulfilled and that we gave no proof of this. Well, is our reply, what we have described in these pages might show how little justification there is for trying to cover the explanations we have to give of dreams with the single formula that dreams are wish-fulfilments. Nevertheless the assertion stands and can easily be proved too for the dreams in *Gradiva*. The latent dream-thoughts—we know now what is meant by

them—may be of the most various kinds; in *Gradiva* they are 'days' residues', thoughts that have been left over unnoticed and undealt-with from the mental activities of waking life. But in order for a dream to develop out of them, the co-operation of a wish (usually an unconscious one) is required; this contributes the motive force for constructing the dream, while the day's residues provide the material. In Norbert Hanold's first dream two wishes competed with each other in making the dream; one of them was actually admissible to consciousness, while the other belonged to the unconscious and operated from out of repression. The first was a wish, understandable in any archaeologist, to have been present as an eye-witness at the catastrophe in the year 79 A.D. What sacrifice would an archaeologist think too great if this wish could be realized in any way other than in a dream! The other wish, the other constructor of the dream, was of an erotic nature: it might be crudely and also incompletely stated as a wish to be there when the girl he loved lay down to sleep. This was the wish the rejection of which caused the dream to become an anxiety-dream. The wishes that were the motive forces of the second dream are perhaps less conspicuous; but if we recall its translation we shall not hesitate to describe them too as erotic. The wish to be taken captive by the girl he loved, to fall in with her wishes and to be subjected to her—for so we may construe the wish behind the situation of the lizard-catching—was in fact of a passive, masochistic character. Next day the dreamer hit the girl, as though he was dominated by the contrary erotic current . . . But we must stop here, or we may really forget that Hanold and Gradiva are only creatures of their author's mind.

## POSTSCRIPT TO THE SECOND EDITION (1912)

IN the five years that have passed since this study was completed, psycho-analytic research has summoned up the courage to approach the creations of imaginative writers with yet another purpose in view. It no longer merely seeks in them for confirmations of the findings it has made from unpoetic, neurotic human beings; it also demands to know the material of impressions and memories from which the author has built the work, and the methods and processes by which he has converted this material into a work of art. It has turned out that these questions can be most easily answered in the case of writers who (like our Wilhelm Jensen, who died in 1911) were in the habit of giving themselves over to their imagination in a simple-minded joy in creating. Soon after the publication of my analytic examination of *Gradiva* I attempted to interest the elderly author in these new tasks of psycho-analytic research. But he refused his co-operation.

A friend of mine has since then drawn my attention to two other of the author's short stories, which might stand in a genetic relation to *Gradiva*, as preliminary studies or earlier attempts at a satisfactory poetical solution of the same problem in the psychology of love. The first of these stories, 'Der rote Schirm',<sup>1</sup> recalls *Gradiva* by the recurrence in it of a number of small *motifs*, such as white flowers of the dead, a forgotten object (*Gradiva*'s sketch-book), and a significant small animal (the butterfly and the lizard in *Gradiva*), but more especially by the repetition of the main situation—the apparition in the mid-day glare of a summer's day of a girl who had died (or was believed to have died). In 'Der rote Schirm' the scene of the apparition is a ruined castle, just

<sup>1</sup> ['The Red Parasol.']

as are the ruins of the excavated Pompeii in *Gradiva*. The other story, 'Im gotischen Hause',<sup>1</sup> shows no such resemblances either to *Gradiva* or to 'Der rote Schirm' in its manifest content. But the fact that it was given an external unity with the latter story by being published with it under a common title<sup>2</sup> points unmistakably to their having a closely related latent meaning. It is easy to see that all three stories treat of the same theme: the development of a love (in 'Der rote Schirm' the inhibition of a love) as an after-effect of an intimate association in childhood of a brother-and-sister kind. I gather further from a review by Eva, Countess Baudissin (in the Vienna daily paper *Die Zeit* of February 11, 1912) that Jensen's last novel *Fremdlinge unter den Menschen*,<sup>3</sup> which contains much material from the author's own childhood, describes the history of a man who 'sees a sister in the woman he loves'. In neither of the two earlier stories is there a trace of the main *motif* of *Gradiva*: the girl's peculiarly charming gait with the nearly perpendicular posture of her foot.

The relief of the girl who steps along in this way, which Jensen describes as being Roman, and to which he gives the name of 'Gradiva', is in fact derived from the zenith of Greek art. It is in the Museo Chiaramonti in the Vatican (No. 644), and has been restored and interpreted by Hauser [1903]. By the combination of 'Gradiva' and some other fragments, in Florence and Munich, two reliefs were obtained, each representing three figures, who seem to be identified as the Horae, the goddesses of vegetation, and the deities of the fertilizing dew who are allied to them.<sup>4</sup>


<sup>1</sup> ['In the Gothic House.']

<sup>2</sup> *Übermächte* [*Superior Powers*]. Two short stories by Wilhelm Jensen, Berlin, Emil Felber, 1892.

<sup>3</sup> [*Strangers among Men*, Dresden, C. Reissner, 1911.]

<sup>4</sup> [Hauser (loc. cit.) regards them as Roman copies of Greek originals of the latter part of the fourth century B.C. The 'Gradiva' relief is now (1959) in Section VII/2 of the Museo Chiaramonti and is numbered 1284.]





PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS IN  
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS  
(1906)



## EDITOR'S NOTE

### TATBESTANDSDIAGNOSTIK UND PSYCHOANALYSE

#### (a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1906 *Arch. Krim. Anthropol.*, **26** (1), 1-10.  
1909 *S.K.S.N.*, **2**, 111-21. (1912, 2nd ed.; 1921, 3rd ed.)  
1924 *G.S.*, **10**, 197-209.  
1941 *G.W.*, **7**, 3-15.

#### (b) ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS:

- 'The Testimony of Witnesses and Psychoanalysis'  
1920 *S.P.H.*, 216-25. (In 3rd ed. only.) (Tr. A. A. Brill.)  
'Psycho-Analysis and the Ascertaining of Truth  
in Courts of Law'  
1924 *C.P.*, **2**, 13-24. (Tr. E. B. M. Herford.)

The present translation, with a changed title, is based on the one published in 1924.

This was originally delivered in June 1906 as a lecture, at the request of Professor Löffler (Professor of Jurisprudence in Vienna), before his seminar at the University. There is some confusion as to the date of publication. The number of the periodical in which it appeared is stated on its front page to have been issued on 'December 21, 1907'. This, however, is certainly a misprint for '1906', since the following numbers are dated 'March 6, 1907' and 'April 29, 1907'.

The lecture is of some historical interest, since it contains Freud's first published mention of the name of Jung (p. 104).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It happens that Adler's name, too, makes its first appearance here (p. 105).

Freud had begun to correspond with Jung only a couple of months before he delivered this lecture, though their first meeting did not take place till the following February.

This work gives evidence of the immediate impact of Jung. Its whole purpose seemed to be to introduce the Zurich association experiments and the theory of complexes to Vienna students. The Zurich studies had begun to appear in periodical form two years earlier (Jung and Riklin, 1904) and Jung had himself published two or three studies on the application of his procedure to legal evidence only a few months before Freud gave his lecture (e.g. Jung, 1906, referred to on p. 104 below).

At a later date, after Jung's secession, Freud, in his notes 'On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement' (1914), discounted the importance both of the association experiments and of the theory of complexes (*Standard Ed.*, 14, 28-9). And even here his approval of them has a background of implied criticism. He is at pains to show that the Zurich findings are in fact only special applications of underlying psycho-analytic principles. And in the penultimate paragraph he indicates the danger of drawing too hasty conclusions from the results of association tests.

Since this is the *début* in Freud's published writings of the Zurich term 'complex', a few remarks on the subject may be appropriate here. Association experiments were first systematically made by Wundt, and later introduced into psychiatry by Kräpelin and, more especially, Aschaffenburg. Under the direction of Bleuler, then at the head of the Burghölzli public asylum in Zurich, and of Jung, his principal assistant, a series of similar experiments were carried out, of which the findings were published from 1904 onwards. They were later collected into two volumes (1906-1909) under Jung's editorship. Apart from a fresh classification of the forms taken by the verbal reactions to stimulus words, the Zurich findings were chiefly of interest for the stress they laid on the importance of one particular factor in influencing the reactions. This factor was described in the first of these

publications (Jung and Riklin, 1904) as an 'emotionally coloured ideational complex'. The authors explain this in a footnote (*ibid.*, 57) as meaning 'the totality of ideas relating to a particular emotionally coloured event'; and they add that in what follows they will use the single word 'complex' in this sense. It will be noticed that there is no direct reference in this to the ideas in question being unconscious or repressed, and it is clear from what follows (e.g. *ibid.*, 74) that a 'complex' may or may not consist of repressed material. Except for its convenience as an abbreviation there seems to be no particular virtue in the word 'complex' as thus defined; and it is unlikely that this was in fact its first introduction in this sense. As we learn from Ernest Jones (1955, 34 and 127), Ziehen, the well-known Berlin psychiatrist, claimed to have originated its use.<sup>1</sup> But in fact it occurs three times, with what appears to be exactly the same meaning, in an early work of Freud's own—the case of Frau Emmy von N. in the *Studies on Hysteria* (1895*d*), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 69 n.;<sup>2</sup> while Breuer, in the same work (*ibid.*, 231) seems actually to lay more stress than these early Zurich definitions on the factor of unconsciousness, when he writes that 'ideas that are aroused but do not enter consciousness . . . sometimes . . . accumulate and form complexes—mental strata withdrawn from consciousness'. When at a later period the term became a catchword not only in psychology but in popular usage, the feature of the group of ideas concerned being 'withdrawn

<sup>1</sup> Ziehen was a bitter opponent of psycho-analysis, though it is an odd fact that it was in a periodical under his joint editorship that both *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901*b*) and the 'Dora' case history (1905*e*) first saw the light.

<sup>2</sup> In early days Freud very frequently used the terms 'groups of ideas' or 'psychical groups' in what seems to be a very similar sense. See, for instance, *Studies on Hysteria* (1895*d*), *Standard Ed.*, 2, 12, 89, 166, and Draft G (dating probably from January, 1895) in the Fliess correspondence (Freud, 1950*a*). In the earlier editions of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901*b*) we find (Chapter VI, A) 'circles of thoughts [*Gedankenkreisen*]'. In the 1907 edition, and in all subsequent ones, this was changed into 'complexes'.

from consciousness'—that is to say 'repressed'—came to form an essential part of the word's connotation.

Freud's later contacts with jurisprudence were few and far between. The third of his studies on character-types (1916*d*) has a direct bearing on the psychology of crime. And on two later occasions he made reports in connection with criminal cases. In one of these (1931*d*) he was asked to comment on an expert opinion given in a murder case, and in the other he wrote a memorandum for the defence in a case of assault (Jones, 1957, 93). This memorandum (written in 1922) is not extant. In both these instances he wrote to deprecate any half-baked application of psycho-analytic theories in legal proceedings.

## PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

GENTLEMEN,—There is a growing recognition of the untrustworthiness of statements made by witnesses, on which, nevertheless, so many convictions are based to-day in court cases; and this has quickened in all of you, future judges and defending counsel, an interest in a new method of investigation, the aim of which is to compel the accused person himself to establish his own guilt or innocence by objective signs. This method consists in a psychological experiment and is based on psychological research. It is closely connected with certain views which have only recently come to the notice of medical psychology. I understand that you are already engaged in testing the use and possibilities of this new method by means of what might be called 'dummy exercises', and I have gladly accepted the invitation of your President, Professor Löffler, to explain to you more fully the relation of this method to psychology.

You are all acquainted with the game played at parties or among children in which a word is called out at random and someone has to add a second word, which, when it is added to the first, results in a compound word being formed. For instance, 'steam'—'ship', making 'steam-ship'. The 'association experiment' introduced into psychology by the school of Wundt is nothing more than a modification of this children's game, merely omitting one rule of the game.

The experiment is as follows: a word (termed the 'stimulus-word') is called out to the subject and he replies as quickly as possible with some other word that occurs to him (the so-called 'reaction'), his choice of this reaction not being restricted by anything. The points to be observed are the



*time* required for the reaction and the *relation*—which may be of many different kinds—between the stimulus-word and the reaction-word. It cannot be claimed that in the first instance very much came of these experiments. This was to be expected, however, since they were carried out without framing any definite question and without any guiding idea which could be brought to bear on the results. They only became significant and fruitful when Bleuler in Zurich and his pupils, especially Jung, began to turn their attention to these ‘association experiments’. The experiments which they carried out acquired their value from the fact that they assumed that the reaction to the stimulus-word could not be a chance one but must be determined by an ideational content present in the mind of the reacting subject.

It has become customary to speak of an ideational content of this kind, which is able to influence the reaction to the stimulus-word, as a ‘complex’.<sup>1</sup> This influence works either by the stimulus-word touching the complex directly or by the complex succeeding in making a connection with the word through intermediate links. Such a determination of the reaction is a very remarkable fact; you will find undisguised astonishment expressed at it in the literature of the subject. But its truth admits of no doubt. For as a rule you can lay bare the particular complex at work, and so explain reactions which could not otherwise be understood, by asking the subject himself to give the reasons for his reaction. Examples like those given by Jung (1906, 6 and 8–9) are well calculated to make us doubt the occurrence of chance or of what is alleged to be arbitrary in mental events.

Let us now glance at the earlier history of this view of Bleuler and Jung that the reaction of the subject under examination is determined by his complex. In 1901 I published a work<sup>2</sup> in which I demonstrated that a whole number of actions which were held to be unmotivated are

<sup>1</sup> [This is probably Freud’s first published use of the word in this specific sense. See Editor’s Note above, p. 100 ff.]

<sup>2</sup> *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*.

on the contrary strictly determined, and to that extent I contributed towards restricting the arbitrary factor in psychology. I took as examples slight failures of memory, slips of the tongue or pen, and the mislaying of objects. I showed that when someone makes a slip of the tongue it is not chance, nor simply difficulty in articulation or similarity in sound, that is responsible, but that in every case a disturbing ideational content—a complex—can be brought to light which has altered the sense of the intended speech under the apparent form of a slip of the tongue. Furthermore, I examined the small actions which are performed apparently by chance and without any purpose—habits of playing or fiddling with things, and so on—and revealed them as ‘symptomatic actions’ linked with a hidden meaning and intended to give unobtrusive expression to it. I found, moreover, that not even a first name<sup>1</sup> can occur arbitrarily to the mind, without having been determined by some powerful ideational complex. Even arithmetical numbers that one believes one has chosen at random can be traced to the influence of a hidden complex of this kind. A few years after this, a colleague of mine, Dr. Alfred Adler,<sup>2</sup> was able to substantiate this most astonishing of my assertions by some very striking examples (Adler, 1905).<sup>3</sup> Once one has accustomed oneself to this view of determinism in psychical life, one is justified in inferring from the findings in the psychopathology of everyday life that the ideas which occur to the subject in an association experiment may not be arbitrary either, but determined by an ideational content that is operative in him.

And now, Gentlemen, let us return to the association

<sup>1</sup> [It seems likely that Freud was thinking of his choice of the name ‘Dora’, discussed by him in the original edition of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901b), Chapter XII (A), Example 1, to which he added a paragraph in the edition of 1907.]

<sup>2</sup> [This was Freud’s earliest published mention of Adler.]

<sup>3</sup> [One of these was quoted by Freud in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* from the 1907 edition onwards. (Chapter XII (A), Example 3.)]

experiment. In the kind of experiment we have referred to so far, it was the person under examination who explained to us the origin of his reactions, and the experiments, if they are subject to this condition, will be of no interest from the point of view of judicial procedure. But how would it be if we were to make a change in our planning of the experiment? Might we not proceed as one does in solving an equation which involves several quantities, where one can take any one of them as the starting-point—by making *either* the *a* or the *b* into the *x* we are looking for? Up to now in our experiments it has been the *complex* that has been unknown to us. We have used stimulus-words selected at random, and the subject under examination has revealed to us the complex brought to expression by those stimulus-words. But let us now set about it differently. Let us take a complex that is *known* to us and ourselves react to it with stimulus-words deliberately chosen; and let us then transfer the *x* to the person who is reacting. Will it then be possible to decide, from the way in which he reacts, whether the complex we have chosen is also present in him? You can see that this way of planning the experiment corresponds exactly to the method adopted by an examining magistrate who is trying to find out whether something of which he is aware is also known to the accused as an agent. Wertheimer and Klein, two pupils of Hans Gross, the Professor of Criminal Law in Prague, seem to have been the first to adopt this change, which is of such importance for your purposes, in the planning of the experiment.<sup>1</sup>

You already know from your own experiments that in this question of the subject's reactions, several points are to be taken into account in deciding whether he possesses the complex to which *you* are reacting with your stimulus-words. I will enumerate these points for you one by one. (1) The *content* of the reaction may be unusual, which

Cf. Jung, 1906. [A further reference to this will be found in a footnote added in 1907 to Chapter XII, Section B of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901b).]

requires explanation. (2) The *reaction-time* may be prolonged; for it appears that stimulus-words which have touched the complex produce a reaction only after a considerable delay (a delay which may be several times as long as the ordinary reaction-time). (3) There may be a mistake in *reproducing* the reaction. You know the remarkable fact that is meant by this. If the subject has been given an association experiment consisting of a comparatively long list of stimulus-words, and if a short time after the end of the experiment the stimulus-words are once more presented to him, he will produce the same reactions as on the first occasion except when the stimulus-word has touched a complex, in which case he is very liable to replace his first reaction by another one. (4) The phenomenon of *perseveration* (or it might be better to use the term 'after-effect') may occur. When a complex is aroused by a stimulus-word which touches it—by a 'critical' stimulus-word—it often happens that the effects of this (for instance, a prolonging of the reaction-time) persist and alter the subject's reactions to the next, non-critical words as well. When all or several of these indications are present together, it proves that the complex which is known to us is present as a disturbing factor in the person who is being questioned. This disturbance is taken by you to mean that the complex in his mind is cathected with affect and is able to distract his attention from the task of reacting; thus you see in the disturbance a 'psychical self-betrayal'.

I know that you are at the moment concerned with the potentialities and difficulties of this procedure, whose aim is to lead the accused into an objective self-betrayal. I should therefore like to bring to your notice the fact that an exactly similar method of disclosing psychical material which is buried away or kept secret has been practised for more than a decade in another field. My purpose is to lay before you the resemblances and differences between conditions in the two fields.

The field I have in mind is indeed very different from yours. I am referring to the therapy employed for certain

'nervous diseases'—what are known as the psychoneuroses—of which hysteria and obsessional ideas may be taken as samples. The method is called 'psycho-analysis'; it was evolved by me from the 'cathartic' method of therapy first practised by Josef Breuer in Vienna.<sup>1</sup> To combat your surprise, I must draw an analogy between the criminal and the hysteric. In both we are concerned with a secret, with something hidden. But in order not to be paradoxical I must at once point out the difference. In the case of the criminal it is a secret which he knows and hides from you, whereas in the case of the hysteric it is a secret which he himself does not know either, which is hidden even from himself. How is this possible? Now we know, through laborious research, that all these illnesses are the result of the patient's having succeeded in repressing certain ideas and memories that are strongly cathected with affect, together with the wishes that arise from them, in such a way that they play no part in his thinking—do not enter into his consciousness—and thus remain unknown to him. But from this repressed psychical material (these 'complexes') are generated the somatic and psychical symptoms which plague the patient in just the same way as a guilty conscience does. In this one respect, therefore, the difference between the criminal and the hysteric is fundamental.

The task of the therapist, however, is the same as that of the examining magistrate. We have to uncover the hidden psychical material; and in order to do this we have invented a number of detective devices, some of which it seems that you gentlemen of the law are now about to copy from us.

It will interest you, from the point of view of your own profession, to hear how we doctors proceed in psycho-analysis. After the patient has given us a first account of his history, we ask him to give himself up to the thoughts that occur to him spontaneously and to say without any critical reserve whatever comes into his head. We start, as you see, on the assumption, which he does not share in the least,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Breuer and Freud, *Studies on Hysteria*, 1895.

that these spontaneous thoughts will not be arbitrarily chosen but will be determined by their relation to his secret—to his 'complex'—and may, as it were, be regarded as derivatives of that complex. You will note that this is the same assumption as the one with the help of which you were able to interpret the association experiments. But although we have instructed the patient to follow the rule of communicating all the thoughts that occur to him, he seems to be unable to do so. He soon begins to hold back first one thought and then another. He gives various reasons to account for this: either the thought was quite unimportant, or it was irrelevant or it was totally meaningless. We thereupon demand that he shall tell us the thought in spite of these objections and shall follow it up; for the very fact of his criticism proves to us that the thought belongs to the 'complex' which we are seeking to uncover. We recognize in this behaviour of the patient's a manifestation of the 'resistance' present in him, which we are never free from through the whole duration of the treatment. I will merely indicate briefly that this concept of resistance has acquired the highest importance for us in understanding the origin of an illness as well as the mechanism of its cure.

In your experiments you do not directly observe criticisms like these of his spontaneous ideas by the subject; while we, on the other hand, are able in our psycho-analyses to observe all the indications of a complex which come to your notice. When the patient no longer ventures to evade the rule which has been laid down for him, we nevertheless note that he stops or hesitates from time to time or makes pauses in the reproduction of his ideas. Every hesitation of this kind is, as we see it, an expression of his resistance and serves as an indication of a connection with the 'complex'. Indeed, we regard it as the most important sign of such a connection, just as is in your case the analogous prolongation of the *reaction-time*.<sup>1</sup> We are accustomed to interpret hesitation in this sense even when the content of the idea that is being held back does not seem

<sup>1</sup> [See point 2 on p. 107.]

to be at all objectionable and when the patient assures us he cannot imagine why he should hesitate to tell it to us. The pauses which occur in psycho-analysis are as a rule many times longer than the delays that you observe in the reaction experiments.

Another of your indications of a complex—the change in the *content* of the reaction<sup>1</sup>—also plays its part in the technique of psycho-analysis. We quite generally regard even slight deviations in our patients from the ordinary forms of expression as a sign of some hidden meaning, and we are quite willing to expose ourselves for a while to the patient's ridicule by making interpretations in that sense. Indeed, we are on the look-out for remarks which suggest any ambiguity and in which the hidden meaning glimmers through an innocent expression. Not only patients but medical colleagues who are ignorant of the technique of psycho-analysis and its special features are incredulous about this and accuse us of being too clever and playing with words; but we are nearly always in the right. After all, it is not difficult to understand that the only way in which a carefully guarded secret betrays itself is by subtle, or at most ambiguous, allusions. In the end the patient becomes accustomed to disclosing to us, by means of what is known as 'indirect representation', all that we require in order to uncover the complex.

The third of your indications of a complex (mistakes—that is, changes—in the *reproduction* [of the reaction])<sup>2</sup> is also employed, though in a more restricted field, in the technique of psycho-analysis. One task which often faces us is the interpretation of dreams—that is, the translation of the remembered content of a dream into its hidden meaning. It sometimes happens that we are uncertain at which point to set about the task, and in that case we may make use of a rule, discovered empirically, which recommends us to get the dreamer to tell us his dream once more. In doing so, he usually alters his modes of expression in some parts of it

<sup>1</sup> [Point 1 on p. 106.]

<sup>2</sup> [Point 3 on p. 107.]

while repeating the rest accurately. The points at which his reproduction is defective owing to changes, and often owing to omissions as well, are the points which we fasten upon, because the inaccuracy guarantees a connection with the complex and promises the best approach to the secret meaning of the dream.<sup>1</sup>

You must not get the impression that we have come to an end of the points of agreement which I have been following up, if I admit to you that no phenomenon similar to *perseveration*<sup>2</sup> is manifested in psycho-analysis. This apparent difference only arises from the special conditions of your experiments. For you do not allow the effect of the complex time to develop. Scarcely has it begun to act than you distract the subject's attention by a new and probably innocent stimulus-word; and then you may observe that he sometimes continues to be occupied with the complex in spite of your interference. In psycho-analysis, on the other hand, we avoid such interferences and keep the patient occupied with the complex. Since in our procedure *everything*, so to speak, is perseveration, we cannot observe that phenomenon as an isolated occurrence.

We may justly claim that, in principle, techniques of the kind I have described enable us to make the patient conscious of what is repressed in him—of his secret—, and thus to remove the psychological causation of the symptoms from which he is suffering. But before you draw any conclusions from these successful results as to the possibilities of your own work, we will examine some points of difference between the psychological situations in the two cases.

The chief difference has already been named. In the neurotic the secret is hidden from his own consciousness; in the criminal it is hidden only from you. In the former there is a genuine ignorance, though not an ignorance in every sense, while in the latter there is nothing but a pretence of ignorance. Connected with this is another difference, which

<sup>1</sup> See my *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a) [Standard Ed., 5, 515].

<sup>2</sup> [Point 4 on p. 107.]



is in practice of importance. In psycho-analysis the patient assists with his conscious efforts to combat his resistance, because he expects to gain something from the investigation, namely, his recovery. The criminal, on the other hand, does not work with you; if he did, he would be working against his whole ego. As though to make up for this, however, all you are endeavouring to arrive at in your investigation is an objective certainty on your part, whereas our therapy demands that the patient himself should also arrive at the same certainty. But it remains to be seen how far your procedure will be rendered more difficult or be altered by the lack of co-operation on the part of the subject of your examination. This is a situation which you can never create in your experiments in seminars, since the colleague who is playing the part of the accused man remains a fellow-worker after all, and assists you in spite of his conscious determination not to betray himself.

If you look more deeply into the comparison between the two situations it will become clear to you in general that psycho-analysis is concerned with a simpler, special, form of the task of uncovering what is hidden in the mind; whereas in your work the task is a more comprehensive one. That the case of the psychoneurotic is invariably concerned with a repressed sexual complex (in the widest sense) is a difference which you need not take into account. But there is something else that you must. The aim of psycho-analysis is absolutely uniform in every case: complexes have to be uncovered which have been repressed because of feelings of unpleasure and which produce signs of resistance if an attempt is made to bring them into consciousness. This resistance is as it were localized; it arises at the frontier between unconscious and conscious. In your cases what is concerned is a resistance which comes entirely from consciousness. You cannot dismiss this difference out of hand. You will first have to determine experimentally whether conscious resistance is betrayed by exactly the same indications as unconscious resistance. Further, you cannot yet be certain, in my opinion, whether

you may interpret your objective indications of a complex as a 'resistance', as we psycho-therapists do. It may happen with your experimental subjects—even though not very frequently with criminals—that the complex you touch on is pleasurably toned; and the question then arises whether such a complex will produce the same reaction as a complex that is unpleasurably toned.

I should also like to point out that your test may possibly be subject to a complication which does not, by its very nature, arise in psycho-analysis. In your examination you may be led astray by a neurotic who, although he is innocent, reacts as if he were guilty, because a lurking sense of guilt that already exists in him seizes upon the accusation made in the particular instance. You must not regard this possibility as an idle fiction; you have only to think of life in the nursery, where such events can often enough be observed. It sometimes happens that a child who has been accused of a misdeed strongly denies the charge but at the same time weeps like a detected sinner. You may perhaps think that the child is lying when he asserts his innocence; but this is not necessarily so. It can be that he has in fact not committed the particular crime with which you have charged him but that he has committed one of which you know nothing and of which you are not accusing him. He therefore quite truthfully denies being guilty of the one misdeed, while at the same time betraying his sense of guilt on account of the other.<sup>1</sup> In this respect—as in so many others—the adult neurotic behaves just like a child. Many people are like this, and it is still open to question whether your technique will succeed in distinguishing self-accusing individuals of this kind from those who are really guilty. Finally, one more point. You know that, according to the rules governing criminal proceedings, you may not subject the accused to any procedure which takes him by surprise. He will therefore have been made aware that in this experiment it is a matter

<sup>1</sup> [Freud approached this point again much later, in the course of his comments on the 'Expert Opinion in the Halsmann Case' (1931*d*).]

for him of not betraying himself. It must then be asked whether one can expect the same reactions when the subject's attention is directed towards the complex as when it is directed away from it, and how far the intention to conceal something may affect modes of reaction in different people.

It is precisely because the situations which underlie your investigation are so various that psychology takes a very lively interest in its results, and I should like to beg you not to despair of their practical utility too soon. Although my work is so far removed from the practical administration of justice, perhaps you will allow me to make one further suggestion. However indispensable experiments in seminars may be for preparatory purposes and for the formulation of problems, you will never be able to reproduce in them the same psychological situation as in the examination of a defendant in a criminal case. The experiments remain dummy exercises and they can never afford a basis for practical application in criminal trials. If we do not want to abandon such an application of them, the following expedient suggests itself. You might be allowed—indeed, it might be made your duty—to undertake such examinations over a number of years in every actual instance of a criminal prosecution, *without their results being allowed to influence the verdict of the Court*. It would, indeed, be best if the Court were never informed of the conclusion which you had drawn from your examination on the question of the defendant's guilt. After years of collecting and comparing the results so obtained, all doubts about the serviceability of this psychological method of investigation would surely be resolved. I know, of course, that the realization of a proposal such as this does not rest only with you and your valued teachers.

OBSESSIVE ACTIONS AND  
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES  
(1907)

## ZWANGSHANDLUNGEN UND RELIGIONSÜBUNGEN

### (a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1907 *Z. Religionspsychol.*, 1 (1) [April], 4–12.  
1909 *S.K.S.N.*, 2, 122–31. (1912, 2nd ed.; 1921, 3rd ed.)  
1924 *G.S.*, 10, 210–20.  
1941 *G.W.*, 7, 129–39.

### (b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

#### ‘Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices’

- 1924 *C.P.*, 2, 25–35. (Tr. R. C. McWatters.)

The present translation, with a slightly changed title, is a modified version of the one published in 1924.

This paper, written in February, 1907, for the first issue of a periodical directed by Bresler and Vorbrodt, was read by Freud on March 2 before the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society, at a meeting at which Jung was present for the first time. This was Freud's introductory incursion into the psychology of religion, and, as he points out in Section V of his ‘Short Account of Psycho-Analysis’ (1924*f*), it formed a definite step towards his much extended treatment of the subject five years later in *Totem and Taboo*. But besides this the paper is of great interest as being Freud's first discussion of obsessional neurosis since the Breuer period some ten years earlier. He here gives a sketch of the mechanism of obsessional symptoms which he was to elaborate in the case history of the ‘Rat Man’ (1909*d*), whose treatment, however, he had not begun when he wrote the present work.

## OBSESSIVE ACTIONS AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICES

I AM certainly not the first person to have been struck by the resemblance between what are called obsessive actions in sufferers from nervous affections and the observances by means of which believers give expression to their piety. The term 'ceremonial', which has been applied to some of these obsessive actions, is evidence of this. The resemblance, however, seems to me to be more than a superficial one, so that an insight into the origin of neurotic ceremonial may embolden us to draw inferences by analogy about the psychological processes of religious life.

People who carry out obsessive actions or ceremonials belong to the same class as those who suffer from obsessive thinking, obsessive ideas, obsessive impulses and the like. Taken together, these form a particular clinical entity, to which the name of 'obsessional neurosis' [*'Zwangsnervose'*] is customarily applied.<sup>1</sup> But one should not attempt to deduce the character of the illness from its name; for, strictly speaking, other kinds of morbid mental phenomena have an equal claim to possessing what are spoken of as 'obsessional' characteristics. In place of a definition we must for the time being be content with obtaining a detailed knowledge of these states, since we have not yet been able to arrive at a criterion of obsessional neuroses; it probably lies very deep, although we seem to sense its presence everywhere in the manifestations of the illness.

Neurotic ceremonials consist in making small adjustments

<sup>1</sup> See Löwenfeld (1904). [According to that author (*ibid.*, 8) the term '*Zwangsvorstellung*' ('obsessional idea' or simply 'obsession') was introduced by Krafft-Ebing in 1867. The concept (and the term) 'obsessional neurosis' originated (on the same authority, *ibid.*, 296 and 487) from Freud himself. His first published use of it was in his first paper on anxiety neurosis (1895b).]

to particular everyday actions, small additions or restrictions or arrangements, which have always to be carried out in the same, or in a methodically varied, manner. These activities give the impression of being mere formalities, and they seem quite meaningless to us. Nor do they appear otherwise to the patient himself; yet he is incapable of giving them up, for any deviation from the ceremonial is visited by intolerable anxiety, which obliges him at once to make his omission good. Just as trivial as the ceremonial actions themselves are the occasions and activities which are embellished, encumbered and in any case prolonged by the ceremonial—for instance, dressing and undressing, going to bed or satisfying bodily needs. The performance of a ceremonial can be described by replacing it, as it were, by a series of unwritten laws. For instance, to take the case of the bed ceremonial: the chair must stand in a particular place beside the bed; the clothes must lie upon it folded in a particular order; the blanket must be tucked in at the bottom and the sheet smoothed out; the pillows must be arranged in such and such a manner, and the subject's own body must lie in a precisely defined position. Only after all this may he go to sleep. Thus in slight cases the ceremonial seems to be no more than an exaggeration of an orderly procedure that is customary and justifiable; but the special conscientiousness with which it is carried out and the anxiety which follows upon its neglect stamp the ceremonial as a 'sacred act'. Any interruption of it is for the most part badly tolerated, and the presence of other people during its performance is almost always ruled out.

Any activities whatever may become obsessive actions in the wider sense of the term if they are elaborated by small additions or given a rhythmic character by means of pauses and repetitions. We shall not expect to find a sharp distinction between 'ceremonials' and 'obsessive actions'. As a rule obsessive actions have grown out of ceremonials. Besides these two, prohibitions and hindrances (*abulias*) make up the content of the disorder; these, in fact, only continue the work of the obsessive actions, inasmuch as some things are

completely forbidden to the patient and others only allowed subject to his following a prescribed ceremonial.

It is remarkable that both compulsions and prohibitions (having to do something and having *not* to do something) apply in the first instance only to the subject's solitary activities and for a long time leave his social behaviour unaffected. Sufferers from this illness are consequently able to treat their affliction as a private matter and keep it concealed for many years. And, indeed, many more people suffer from these forms of obsessional neurosis than doctors hear of. For many sufferers, too, concealment is made easier from the fact that they are quite well able to fulfil their social duties during a part of the day, once they have devoted a number of hours to their secret doings, hidden from view like *Mélusine*.<sup>1</sup>

It is easy to see where the resemblances lie between neurotic ceremonials and the sacred acts of religious ritual: in the qualms of conscience brought on by their neglect, in their complete isolation from all other actions (shown in the prohibition against interruption) and in the conscientiousness with which they are carried out in every detail. But the differences are equally obvious, and a few of them are so glaring that they make the comparison a sacrilege: the greater individual variability of [neurotic] ceremonial actions in contrast to the stereotyped character of rituals (prayer, turning to the East, etc.), their private nature as opposed to the public and communal character of religious observances, above all, however, the fact that, while the minutiae of religious ceremonial are full of significance and have a symbolic meaning, those of neurotics seem foolish and senseless. In this respect an obsessional neurosis presents a travesty, half comic and half tragic, of a private religion. But it is precisely this sharpest difference between neurotic and religious ceremonial which disappears when, with the help of the psycho-analytic technique of investigation, one penetrates

<sup>1</sup> [A beautiful woman in mediaeval legend, who led a secret existence as a water-nymph.]



to the true meaning of obsessive actions.<sup>1</sup> In the course of such an investigation the appearance which obsessive actions afford of being foolish and senseless is completely effaced, and the reason for their having that appearance is explained. It is found that the obsessive actions are perfectly significant in every detail, that they serve important interests of the personality and that they give expression to experiences that are still operative and to thoughts that are cathected with affect. They do this in two ways, either by direct or by symbolic representation; and they are consequently to be interpreted either historically or symbolically.

I must give a few examples to illustrate my point. Those who are familiar with the findings of psycho-analytic investigation into the psychoneuroses will not be surprised to learn that what is being represented in obsessive actions or in ceremonials is derived from the most intimate, and for the most part from the sexual, experiences of the patient.

(a) A girl whom I was able to observe was under a compulsion to rinse round her wash-basin several times after washing. The significance of this ceremonial action lay in the proverbial saying: 'Don't throw away dirty water till you have clean.' Her action was intended to give a warning to her sister, of whom she was very fond, and to restrain her from getting divorced from her unsatisfactory husband until she had established a relationship with a better man.

(b) A woman who was living apart from her husband was subject to a compulsion, whenever she ate anything, to leave what was the best of it behind: for example, she would only take the outside of a piece of roast meat. This renunciation was explained by the date of its origin. It appeared on the day after she had refused marital relations with her husband—that is to say, after she had given up what was the best.

(c) The same patient could only sit on one particular chair and could only get up from it with difficulty. In regard to certain details of her married life, the chair symbolized her

<sup>1</sup> See the collection of my shorter papers on the theory of the neuroses published in 1906 [*Standard Ed.* 3].

husband, to whom she remained faithful. She found an explanation of her compulsion in this sentence: 'It is so hard to part from anything (a husband, a chair) upon which one has once settled.'

(d) Over a period of time she used to repeat an especially noticeable and senseless obsessive action. She would run out of her room into another room in the middle of which there was a table. She would straighten the table-cloth on it in a particular manner and ring for the housemaid. The latter had to come up to the table, and the patient would then dismiss her on some indifferent errand. In the attempts to explain this compulsion, it occurred to her that at one place on the table-cloth there was a stain, and that she always arranged the cloth in such a way that the housemaid was bound to see the stain. The whole scene proved to be a reproduction of an experience in her married life which had later on given her thoughts a problem to solve. On the wedding-night her husband had met with a not unusual mishap. He found himself impotent, and 'many times in the course of the night he came hurrying from his room into hers' to try once more whether he could succeed. In the morning he said he would feel ashamed in front of the hotel housemaid who made the beds, and he took a bottle of red ink and poured its contents over the sheet; but he did it so clumsily that the red stain came in a place that was very unsuitable for his purpose. With her obsessive action, therefore, she was representing the wedding-night. 'Bed and board' <sup>1</sup> between them make up marriage.

(e) Another compulsion which she started—of writing down the number of every bank-note before parting with it—had also to be interpreted historically. At a time when she was still intending to leave her husband if she could find another more trustworthy man, she allowed herself to receive advances from a man whom she met at a watering-place, but she was in doubt as to whether his intentions were serious. One day,

<sup>1</sup> [In German '*Tisch und Bett*' ('table and bed'). Cf. a paper on fairy tales in dreams (1913d), *Standard Ed.*, 12, 282, footnote 3.]

being short of small change, she asked him to change a five-kronen<sup>1</sup> piece for her. He did so, pocketed the large coin and declared with a gallant air that he would never part with it, since it had passed through her hands. At their later meetings she was frequently tempted to challenge him to show her the five-kronen piece, as though she wanted to convince herself that she could believe in his intentions. But she refrained, for the good reason that it is impossible to distinguish between coins of the same value. Thus her doubt remained unresolved; and it left her with the compulsion to write down the number of each bank-note, by which it *can* be distinguished from all others of the same value.<sup>2</sup>

These few examples, selected from the great number I have met with, are merely intended to illustrate my assertion that in obsessive actions everything has its meaning and can be interpreted. The same is true of ceremonials in the strict sense, only that the evidence for this would require a more circumstantial presentation. I am quite aware of how far our explanations of obsessive actions are apparently taking us from the sphere of religious thought.

It is one of the conditions of the illness that the person who is obeying a compulsion carries it out without understanding its meaning—or at any rate its chief meaning. It is only thanks to the efforts of psycho-analytic treatment that he becomes conscious of the meaning of his obsessive action and, with it, of the motives that are impelling him to it. We express this important fact by saying that the obsessive action serves to express *unconscious* motives and ideas. In this, we seem to find a further departure from religious practices; but we must remember that as a rule the ordinary pious individual, too, performs a ceremonial without concerning himself with its significance, although priests and scientific investigators may be familiar with the—mostly symbolic—meaning of the ritual. In all believers, however, the motives which impel

<sup>1</sup> [Equivalent at that time to four shillings or a dollar.]

<sup>2</sup> [Freud discussed this case again at considerable length in Lecture XVII of his *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17).]

them to religious practices are unknown to them or are represented in consciousness by others which are advanced in their place.

Analysis of obsessive actions has already given us some sort of an insight into their causes and into the chain of motives which bring them into effect. We may say that the sufferer from compulsions and prohibitions behaves as if he were dominated by a sense of guilt, of which, however, he knows nothing, so that we must call it an unconscious sense of guilt, in spite of the apparent contradiction in terms.<sup>1</sup> This sense of guilt has its source in certain early mental events, but it is constantly being revived by renewed temptations which arise whenever there is a contemporary provocation. Moreover, it occasions a lurking sense of expectant anxiety, an expectation of misfortune, which is linked, through the idea of punishment, with the internal perception of the temptation. When the ceremonial is first being constructed, the patient is still conscious that he must do this or that lest some ill should befall, and as a rule the nature of the ill that is to be expected is still known to his consciousness. But what is already hidden from him is the connection—which is always demonstrable—between the occasion on which this expectant anxiety arises and the danger which it conjures up. Thus a ceremonial starts as an *action for defence* or *insurance*, a *protective measure*.

The sense of guilt of obsessional neurotics finds its counterpart in the protestations of pious people that they know that at heart they are miserable sinners; and the pious observances (such as prayers, invocations, etc.,) with which such people preface every daily act, and in especial every unusual

<sup>1</sup> [The German word used here for 'sense of guilt' is '*Schuldbewusstsein*', literally 'consciousness of guilt'.—This seems to be the earliest explicit appearance of the 'unconscious sense of guilt' which was to play such an important part in Freud's later writings—e.g. at the beginning of the last chapter of *The Ego and the Id* (1923*b*). The way had been prepared for the notion, however, very much earlier, in Section II of the first paper on 'The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence' (1894*a*).]

undertaking, seem to have the value of defensive or protective measures.

A deeper insight into the mechanism of obsessional neurosis is gained if we take into account the primary fact which lies at the bottom of it. This is always *the repression of an instinctual impulse*<sup>1</sup> (a component of the sexual instinct) which was present in the subject's constitution and which was allowed to find expression for a while during his childhood but later succumbed to suppression. In the course of the repression of this instinct a special *conscientiousness* is created which is directed against the instinct's aims; but this psychical reaction-formation feels insecure and constantly threatened by the instinct which is lurking in the unconscious. The influence of the repressed instinct is felt as a temptation, and during the process of repression itself anxiety is generated, which gains control over the future in the form of *expectant* anxiety. The process of repression which leads to obsessional neurosis must be considered as one which is only partly successful and which increasingly threatens to fail. It may thus be compared to an unending conflict; fresh psychical efforts are continually required to counterbalance the forward pressure of the instinct.<sup>2</sup> Thus the ceremonial and obsessive actions arise partly as a defence against the temptation and partly as a protection against the ill which is expected. Against the temptation the protective measures seem soon to become inadequate; then the prohibitions come into play, with the purpose of keeping at a distance situations that give rise to temptation. Prohibitions take the place of obsessive actions, it will be seen, just as a phobia is designed to avert a hysterical attack. Again, a ceremonial represents the sum of the conditions subject to which something that is not yet absolutely forbidden is permitted, just as the Church's

<sup>1</sup> [*'Triebregung.'* This appears to be Freud's first published use of what was to be one of his most used terms.]

<sup>2</sup> [This passage foreshadows the concept of 'anticathexis', which is developed at length in Section IV of the paper on 'The Unconscious' (1915e), *Standard Ed.*, 14, 180 ff.]

marriage ceremony signifies for the believer a sanctioning of sexual enjoyment which would otherwise be sinful. A further characteristic of obsessional neurosis, as of all similar affections, is that its manifestations (its symptoms, including the obsessive actions) fulfil the condition of being a compromise between the warring forces of the mind. They thus always reproduce something of the pleasure which they are designed to prevent; they serve the repressed instinct no less than the agencies which are repressing it. As the illness progresses, indeed, actions which were originally mostly concerned with maintaining the defence come to approximate more and more to the proscribed actions through which the instinct was able to find expression in childhood.

Some features of this state of affairs may be seen in the sphere of religious life as well. The formation of a religion, too, seems to be based on the suppression, the renunciation, of certain instinctual impulses. These impulses, however, are not, as in the neuroses, exclusively components of the sexual instinct; they are self-seeking, socially harmful instincts, though, even so, they are usually not without a sexual component. A sense of guilt following upon continual temptation and an expectant anxiety in the form of fear of divine punishment have, after all, been familiar to us in the field of religion longer than in that of neurosis. Perhaps because of the admixture of sexual components, perhaps because of some general characteristics of the instincts, the suppression of instinct proves to be an inadequate and interminable process in religious life also. Indeed, complete backslidings into sin are more common among pious people than among neurotics and these give rise to a new form of religious activity, namely acts of penance, which have their counterpart in obsessional neurosis.

We have noted as a curious and derogatory characteristic of obsessional neurosis that its ceremonials are concerned with the small actions of daily life and are expressed in foolish regulations and restrictions in connection with them. We cannot understand this remarkable feature of the clinical

picture until we have realized that the mechanism of psychological *displacement*, which was first discovered by me in the construction of dreams,<sup>1</sup> dominates the mental processes of obsessional neurosis. It is already clear from the few examples of obsessive actions given above that their symbolism and the detail of their execution are brought about by a displacement from the actual, important thing on to a small one which takes its place—for instance, from a husband on to a chair.<sup>2</sup> It is this tendency to displacement which progressively changes the clinical picture and eventually succeeds in turning what is apparently the most trivial matter into something of the utmost importance and urgency. It cannot be denied that in the religious field as well there is a similar tendency to a displacement of psychological values, and in the same direction, so that the petty ceremonials of religious practice gradually become the essential thing and push aside the underlying thoughts. That is why religions are subject to reforms which work retroactively and aim at a re-establishment of the original balance of values.

The character of compromise which obsessive actions possess in their capacity as neurotic symptoms is the character least easily detected in corresponding religious observances. Yet here, too, one is reminded of this feature of neuroses when one remembers how commonly all the acts which religion forbids—the expressions of the instincts it has suppressed—are committed precisely in the name of, and ostensibly for the sake of, religion.

In view of these similarities and analogies one might venture to regard obsessional neurosis as a pathological counterpart of the formation of a religion, and to describe that neurosis as an individual religiosity and religion as a

<sup>1</sup> See *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), Chapter VI, Section B [*Standard Ed.*, 4, 305 ff.].

<sup>2</sup> [Freud had already described this mechanism in his book on jokes (1905c), near the end of Section 11 of Chapter II. He often recurred to the point—for instance, in the 'Rat Man' analysis (1909d), *Standard Ed.*, 10, 241, and in the metapsychological paper on repression (1915d), *ibid.*, 14, 157.]

universal obsessional neurosis. The most essential similarity would reside in the underlying renunciation of the activation of instincts that are constitutionally present; and the chief difference would lie in the nature of those instincts, which in the neurosis are exclusively sexual in their origin, while in religion they spring from egoistic sources.

A progressive renunciation of constitutional instincts, whose activation might afford the ego primary pleasure, appears to be one of the foundations of the development of human civilization.<sup>1</sup> Some part of this instinctual repression is effected by its religions, in that they require the individual to sacrifice his instinctual pleasure to the Deity: 'Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord.' In the development of the ancient religions one seems to discern that many things which mankind had renounced as 'iniquities' had been surrendered to the Deity and were still permitted in his name, so that the handing over to him of bad and socially harmful instincts was the means by which man freed himself from their domination. For this reason, it is surely no accident that all the attributes of man, along with the misdeeds that follow from them, were to an unlimited amount ascribed to the ancient gods. Nor is it a contradiction of this that nevertheless man was not permitted to justify his own iniquities by appealing to divine example.

VIENNA, *February* 1907

<sup>1</sup> [This idea was expanded by Freud in the paper on sexual ethics written about a year later (1908*d*), p. 186 ff. below.]





THE SEXUAL ENLIGHTENMENT  
OF CHILDREN  
(AN OPEN LETTER TO DR. M. FÜRST)  
(1907)

## ZUR SEXUELLEN AUFKLÄRUNG DER KINDER

(OFFENER BRIEF AN DR. M. FÜRST)

(a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1907 *Soz. Med. Hyg.*, 2 (6) [June], 360-7.  
1909 *S.K.S.N.*, 2, 151-8. (1912, 2nd ed.; 1921, 3rd ed.)  
1924 *G.S.*, 5, 134-42.  
1931 *Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre*, 7-16.  
1941 *G.W.*, 7, 19-27.

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

'The Sexual Enlightenment of Children. An Open  
Letter to Dr. M. Fürst'

- 1924 *C.P.*, 2, 36-44. (Tr. E. B. M. Herford.)

The present translation is based on the one published in 1924.

This was written at the request of a Hamburg doctor, Dr. M. Fürst, for publication in a periodical devoted to social medicine and hygiene of which he was the editor. We learn from Ernest Jones (1955, 327-8) that Freud gave a much fuller account of his views on the subject in a discussion at the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society on May 12, 1909. Some thirty years later he returned to the topic of the 'sexual enlightenment' of children in the last paragraph of Section IV of his paper on 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1937c). He shows there that the question is a considerably less simple one than appears in the present discussion.

# THE SEXUAL ENLIGHTENMENT OF CHILDREN

(AN OPEN LETTER TO DR. M. FÜRST)

Dear Dr. Fürst,

When you ask me for an expression of opinion on 'the sexual enlightenment of children', I assume that what you want is not a regular, formal treatise on the subject which shall take into account the excessive mass of literature that has grown up around it, but the independent judgement of an individual doctor whose professional activities have offered him special opportunities for concerning himself with sexual problems. I know that you have followed my scientific efforts with interest and that, unlike many of our colleagues, you do not dismiss my ideas without examining them because I regard the psychosexual constitution and certain noxae of sexual life as the most important causes of the neurotic disorders that are so common. My *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* [1905*d*], too, where I have described the way in which the sexual instinct is compounded and the disturbances which may occur in its development into the function of sexuality, have recently had a friendly reception in your journal.

I am expected, therefore, to answer questions on the following points: whether children ought to be given any enlightenment at all about the facts of sexual life, at what age this ought to happen and in what manner it should be carried out. Let me admit to you at once that I find a discussion of the second and third points perfectly reasonable, but that to my mind it is quite incomprehensible how there could be a difference of opinion on the first point. What can be the purpose of withholding from children—or, let us say, from young people—enlightenment of this kind about the

sexual life of human beings? Is it from a fear of arousing their interest in these matters prematurely, before it awakens in them spontaneously? Is it from a hope that a concealment of this kind may retard the sexual instinct altogether until such time as it can find its way into the only channels open to it in our middle-class social order? Is it supposed that children would show no interest or understanding for the facts and riddles of sexual life if they were not prompted to do so by outside influences? Is it thought possible that the knowledge which is withheld from them will not reach them in other ways? Or is it genuinely and seriously intended that later on they should regard everything to do with sex as something degraded and detestable from which their parents and teachers wished to keep them away as long as possible?

I really do not know in which of these purposes to look for the motive for the concealment of what is sexual from children that is in fact carried out. I only know that they are all equally absurd and that I find it difficult to honour them with a serious refutation. I remember, however, that in the family letters of that great thinker and humanitarian Multatuli, I once found a few lines which are a more than adequate answer:

‘To my mind, certain things are in general too much wrapped in a veil. It is right to keep a child’s imagination pure, but this purity will not be preserved by ignorance. On the contrary, I think that concealment leads a boy or girl to suspect the truth more than ever. Curiosity leads us to pry into things which, if they had been told us without any great to do, would have aroused little or no interest in us. If this ignorance could be maintained even, I might become reconciled to it, but that is impossible. The child comes into contact with other children, books come his way which lead him to reflect, and the mystery-making with which his parents treat what he has nevertheless discovered actually increases his desire to know more. This desire, which is only partly satisfied and only in secret, excites his feeling and corrupts his imagination, so that the child already sins while

his parents still believe that he does not know what sin is.<sup>1</sup>

I do not know how the case could be better stated, but perhaps I may add a few remarks. It is undoubtedly nothing else but the customary prudishness and their own bad conscience over sexual matters that causes adults to adopt this attitude of 'mystery-making' in front of children; but possibly a part is also played by a piece of theoretical ignorance on their part, which we can counteract by giving the adults some enlightenment. It is commonly believed that the sexual instinct is absent in children and only begins to emerge in them at puberty when the sexual organs mature. This is a gross error, equally serious in its effects both on knowledge and on practice; and it is so easily corrected by observation that one wonders how it could ever have been made. As a matter of fact, the new-born baby brings sexuality with it into the world, certain sexual sensations accompany its development as a suckling and during early childhood, and only very few children would seem to escape sexual activities and sensations before puberty. Anyone who would like to find a detailed exposition of these statements can do so in my *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, to which I have referred above. There he will learn that the organs of reproduction proper are not the only parts of the body which provide sexual sensations of pleasure, and that nature has even so ordered matters that actual stimulations of the genitals are unavoidable during early childhood. This period of life, during which a certain quota of what is undoubtedly sexual pleasure is produced by the excitation of various parts of the skin (erotogenic zones), by the activity of certain biological instincts and as an accompanying excitation in many affective states, is called the period of *auto-erotism*, to use a term introduced by Havelock Ellis [1898]. All that puberty does is to give the genitals primacy among all the

<sup>1</sup> Multatuli, 1906, 1, 26. ['Multatuli' (Latin for 'I have borne much') was the pseudonym of a well-known Dutch writer E. D. Dekker (1820-87). Cf. below, p. 246.]

other zones and sources which produce pleasure, and thus to force erotism into the service of the function of reproduction. This process can naturally undergo certain inhibitions, and in many people (those who later become perverts and neurotics) it is only incompletely accomplished. On the other hand, the child is capable long before puberty of most of the psychical manifestations of love—tenderness, for example, devotion and jealousy. Often enough, too, an irruption of these mental states is associated with the physical sensations of sexual excitation, so that the child cannot remain in doubt as to the connection between the two. In short, except for his reproductive power, a child has a fully-developed capacity for love long before puberty; and it may be asserted that the 'mystery-making' merely prevents him from being able to gain an intellectual grasp of activities for which he is psychically prepared and physically adjusted.

A child's intellectual interest in the riddles of sex, his desire for sexual knowledge, shows itself accordingly at an unexpectedly early age. If it has not been possible to make observations such as I am now going to put before you more frequently, that can only be because parents are either afflicted with blindness in regard to this interest on the part of their children, or, because, if they cannot overlook it, they at once take steps to stifle it. I know a delightful little boy, now four years old, whose understanding parents abstain from forcibly suppressing one part of the child's development. Little Hans has certainly not been exposed to anything in the nature of seduction by a nurse, yet he has already for some time shown the liveliest interest in the part of the body which he calls his 'widdler'. When he was only three he asked his mother: 'Mummy, have you got a widdler too?' His mother answered: 'Of course. What did you think?' He also asked his father the same question repeatedly. At the same age he was taken to a cow-shed for the first time and saw a cow being milked. 'Oh look!' he said, in surprise, 'there's milk coming out of its widdler!' At the age of three and three quarters he was on the way to making an independent discovery of

correct categories by means of his observations. He saw some water being let out of an engine and said, 'Oh, look, the engine's widdling. Where's it got its widdler?' He added afterwards in reflective tones: 'A dog and a horse have widdlers; a table and a chair haven't.' Recently he was watching his seven-day-old little sister being given a bath. 'But her widdler's still quite small', he remarked; 'when she grows up it'll get bigger all right.' (I have been told of this same attitude towards the problem of sex distinction in other boys of similar age.) I should like to say explicitly that little Hans is not a sensual child or at all pathologically disposed. The fact is simply, I think, that, not having been intimidated or oppressed with a sense of guilt, he gives expression quite ingenuously to what he thinks.<sup>1</sup>

The second great problem which exercises a child's mind—only at a somewhat later age, no doubt<sup>2</sup>—is the question of the origin of babies. This is usually started by the unwelcome arrival of a small brother or sister. It is the oldest and most burning question that confronts immature humanity. Those who understand how to interpret myths and legends can detect it in the riddle which the Theban Sphinx set to Oedipus. The customary answers given to the

<sup>1</sup> [Footnote added 1924:] The history of little Hans's later illness and recovery is described in my 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy' (1909b) [where this material is repeated. When the present paper was first published the boy was given the name of 'little Herbert'; this was changed to 'little Hans' in the German editions from 1924 onwards, though not in the English translation of that year. At the time of the publication of this paper Hans's analysis was still in progress.]

<sup>2</sup> [In Freud's earlier writings he asserts as a rule that the problem of the origin of babies is the first one to engage a child's interest. See, for instance, the paper on the sexual theories of children (1908c), written not long after this one (p. 212 f. below), the case history of 'Little Hans' (1909b), *Standard Ed.*, 10, 133, and a passage added in 1915 to the *Three Essays* (1905d), *ibid.*, 7, 195. In the sentence in the text above, however, he appears to put it second to the problem of the distinction between the sexes; and this is the view to which he reverts, at all events as regards girls, in a footnote to his much later paper on this latter topic (1925j).]



child in the nursery damage his genuine instinct of research and as a rule deal the first blow, too, at his confidence in his parents. From that time on he usually begins to mistrust grown-up people, and to keep his most intimate interests secret from them. The following little document shows how tormenting this curiosity can become in older children. It is a letter written by a motherless girl of eleven and a half who had been speculating on the problem with her younger sister.

'Dear Aunt Mali,

'Will you please be so kind as to tell me how you got Christel and Paul. You must know because you are married. We were arguing about it yesterday evening and we want to know the truth. We have nobody else to ask. When are you coming to Salzburg? You know, Aunt Mali, we simply can't understand how the stork brings babies. Trudel thought the stork brings them in a shirt. Then we want to know as well if the stork gets them out of the pond and why one never sees babies in ponds. And will you please tell me, too, how one knows beforehand when one is going to have one. Write and tell me everything about it.

'With thousands of greetings and kisses from us all,

'Your inquisitive niece,

Lili.'

I do not believe that this touching letter brought the two sisters the enlightenment they wanted. Later on the writer of it fell ill of the neurosis that arises from unanswered unconscious questions—of obsessional brooding.<sup>1</sup>

There does not seem to me to be a single good reason for denying children the enlightenment which their thirst for knowledge demands. To be sure, if it is the purpose of educators to stifle the child's power of independent thought as early as possible, in favour of the 'goodness' which they think so much of, they cannot set about this better than by

<sup>1</sup> [*Footnote added 1924:*] After some years, however, her obsessional brooding gave way to a dementia praecox.—[Freud returns to the subject of unanswered questions on p. 218 f. below.]

deceiving him in sexual matters and intimidating him in matters of religion. The stronger natures will, it is true, withstand these influences and become rebels against the authority of their parents and later against every other authority. If children are not given the explanations for which they turn to their elders, they go on tormenting themselves with the problem in secret and produce attempts at solution in which the truth they have guessed is mingled in the most extraordinary way with grotesque untruths; or they whisper information to one another in which, because of the young enquirers' sense of guilt, everything sexual is stamped as being horrible and disgusting. These infantile sexual theories would be well worth collecting and examining.<sup>1</sup> From this time on, children usually lose the only proper attitude to sexual questions, and many of them never regain it.

It seems that the large majority of authors, both men and women, who have written about the sexual enlightenment of youth have concluded in favour of it. But the clumsiness of most of their proposals as to when and how this enlightenment is to take place tempts one to think that they have not found it easy to arrive at this conclusion. So far as my knowledge of the literature goes, a single outstanding exception is provided by the charming letter of explanation which a certain Frau Emma Eckstein quotes as having been written by her to her son when he was about ten years old.<sup>2</sup> The customary method is obviously not quite the right one: all sexual knowledge is kept from children as long as possible, and then on one single occasion a disclosure is made to them in solemn and turgid language, and even so is only half the truth and generally comes too late. Most of the answers to the question 'How am I to tell my children?' make such a miserable impression, on me at least, that I should prefer parents not to embark on the business of enlightenment

<sup>1</sup> [Freud himself carried out this suggestion soon afterwards. See below, p. 209 ff., the paper on these theories, in which much of the present argument is elaborated.]

<sup>2</sup> Emma Eckstein, 1904.


at all. What is really important is that children should never get the idea that one wants to make more of a secret of the facts of sexual life than of any other matter which is not yet accessible to their understanding; and to ensure this it is necessary that from the very first what has to do with sexuality should be treated like anything else that is worth knowing about. Above all, it is the duty of schools not to evade the mention of sexual matters. The main facts of reproduction and their significance should be included in lessons about the animal kingdom, and at the same time stress should be laid on the fact that man shares every essential in his organization with the higher animals. Then, provided that the child's home environment does not aim directly at frightening him off thinking, something that I once overheard in a nursery will probably happen more often. I heard a boy saying to his little sister: 'How can you think babies are brought by the stork! You know man's a mammal; d'you think storks bring other mammals their babies too?'

The child's curiosity will never reach a very high degree of intensity provided it finds appropriate satisfaction at each stage of his learning. Enlightenment about the specific facts of human sexuality and an indication of its social significance should, therefore, be given to the child at the end of his time at his elementary school [*Volksschule*] and before he enters his intermediate school [*Mittelschule*]<sup>—</sup>that is to say, before he is ten years old. The period of confirmation would be a more suitable time than any other at which to instruct the child, who will by that time have a full knowledge of all the physical facts, in the moral obligations which are attached to the actual satisfaction of the instinct. Enlightenment about sexual life carried out along such lines as this, proceeding step by step and without any real interruption, and in which the school takes the initiative, seems to me to be the only kind which takes into account the child's development and thus successfully avoids the dangers involved.

I consider it the most significant advance in child education that in France the State should have introduced, in place

of the catechism, a primer which gives the child his first instruction in his position as a citizen and in the ethical duties which will later devolve on him. But such elementary instruction is seriously deficient, so long as it does not include the field of sexuality. Here is the gap which educators and reformers should set about filling. In countries which have placed the education of children wholly or in part in the hands of the clergy, it will, of course, be impossible to ask for this. A priest will never admit that men and animals have the same nature, since he cannot do without the immortality of the soul, which he requires as the basis for moral precepts. Here, once again, we see the unwisdom of sewing a single silk patch on to a tattered coat—the impossibility of carrying out an isolated reform without altering the foundations of the whole system.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [Freud makes the same point, in connection with marriage, in his paper on 'civilized' sexual morality (1908*d*), p. 196 below.]



CREATIVE WRITERS AND  
DAY-DREAMING  
(1908 [1907])

## DER DICHTER UND DAS PHANTASIEREN

### (a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- (1907 December 6. Delivered as a lecture)  
1908 *Neue Revue*, 1 (10) [March], 716-24.  
1909 *S.K.S.N.*, 2, 197-206. (1912, 2nd ed.; 1921, 3rd ed.)  
1924 *G.S.*, 10, 229-239.  
1924 *Dichtung und Kunst*, 3-14.  
1941 *G.W.*, 7, 213-223.

### (b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

#### 'The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming'

- 1925 *C.P.*, 4, 172-183. (Tr. I. F. Grant Duff.)

The present translation is a modified version, with an altered title, of the one published in 1925.

This was originally delivered as a lecture on December 6, 1907, before an audience of 90, in the rooms of the Viennese publisher and bookseller Hugo Heller, who was himself a member of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society. A very accurate summary of the lecture appeared next day in the Viennese daily *Die Zeit*; but Freud's full version was first published early in 1908 in a newly established Berlin literary periodical.

Some of the problems of creative writing had been touched on shortly before in Freud's study on *Gradiva* (e.g. on p. 92 above); and a year or two earlier he had approached the question in an unpublished essay on 'Psychopathic Characters on the Stage' (1942a [1905]). The centre of interest in the present paper, however, as well as in the next one, written at about the same time, lies in its discussion of phantasies.

## CREATIVE WRITERS AND DAY-DREAMING

WE laymen have always been intensely curious to know—like the Cardinal who put a similar question to Ariosto<sup>1</sup>—from what sources that strange being, the creative writer, draws his material, and how he manages to make such an impression on us with it and to arouse in us emotions of which, perhaps, we had not even thought ourselves capable. Our interest is only heightened the more by the fact that, if we ask him, the writer himself gives us no explanation, or none that is satisfactory; and it is not at all weakened by our knowledge that not even the clearest insight into the determinants of his choice of material and into the nature of the art of creating imaginative form will ever help to make creative writers of *us*.

If we could at least discover in ourselves or in people like ourselves an activity which was in some way akin to creative writing! An examination of it would then give us a hope of obtaining the beginnings of an explanation of the creative work of writers. And, indeed, there is some prospect of this being possible. After all, creative writers themselves like to lessen the distance between their kind and the common run of humanity; they so often assure us that every man is a poet at heart and that the last poet will not perish till the last man does.

Should we not look for the first traces of imaginative activity as early as in childhood? The child's best-loved and most intense occupation is with his play or games. Might we not say that every child at play behaves like a creative writer, in that he creates a world of his own, or, rather, re-arranges

<sup>1</sup> [Cardinal Ippolito d'Este was Ariosto's first patron, to whom he dedicated the *Orlando Furioso*. The poet's only reward was the question: 'Where did you find so many stories, Lodovico?']



the things of his world in a new way which pleases him? It would be wrong to think he does not take that world seriously; on the contrary, he takes his play very seriously and he expends large amounts of emotion on it. The opposite of play is not what is serious but what is real. In spite of all the emotion with which he cathects his world of play, the child distinguishes it quite well from reality; and he likes to link his imagined objects and situations to the tangible and visible things of the real world. This linking is all that differentiates the child's 'play' from 'phantasying'.

The creative writer does the same as the child at play. He creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously—that is, which he invests with large amounts of emotion—while separating it sharply from reality. Language has preserved this relationship between children's play and poetic creation. It gives [in German] the name of '*Spiel*' ['play'] to those forms of imaginative writing which require to be linked to tangible objects and which are capable of representation. It speaks of a '*Lustspiel*' or '*Trauerspiel*' ['comedy' or 'tragedy': literally, 'pleasure play' or 'mourning play'] and describes those who carry out the representation as '*Schauspieler*' ['players': literally 'show-players']. The unreality of the writer's imaginative world, however, has very important consequences for the technique of his art; for many things which, if they were real, could give no enjoyment, can do so in the play of phantasy, and many excitements which, in themselves, are actually distressing, can become a source of pleasure for the hearers and spectators at the performance of a writer's work.

There is another consideration for the sake of which we will dwell a moment longer on this contrast between reality and play. When the child has grown up and has ceased to play, and after he has been labouring for decades to envisage the realities of life with proper seriousness, he may one day find himself in a mental situation which once more undoes the contrast between play and reality. As an adult he can look back on the intense seriousness with which he once

carried on his games in childhood; and, by equating his ostensibly serious occupations of to-day with his childhood games, he can throw off the too heavy burden imposed on him by life and win the high yield of pleasure afforded by *humour*.<sup>1</sup>

As people grow up, then, they cease to play, and they seem to give up the yield of pleasure which they gained from playing. But whoever understands the human mind knows that hardly anything is harder for a man than to give up a pleasure which he has once experienced. Actually, we can never give anything up; we only exchange one thing for another. What appears to be a renunciation is really the formation of a substitute or surrogate. In the same way, the growing child, when he stops playing, gives up nothing but the link with real objects; instead of *playing*, he now *phantasies*. He builds castles in the air and creates what are called *day-dreams*. I believe that most people construct phantasies at times in their lives. This is a fact which has long been overlooked and whose importance has therefore not been sufficiently appreciated.

People's phantasies are less easy to observe than the play of children. The child, it is true, plays by himself or forms a closed psychical system with other children for the purposes of a game; but even though he may not play his game in front of the grown-ups, he does not, on the other hand, conceal it from them. The adult, on the contrary, is ashamed of his phantasies and hides them from other people. He cherishes his phantasies as his most intimate possessions, and as a rule he would rather confess his misdeeds than tell anyone his phantasies. It may come about that for that reason he believes he is the only person who invents such phantasies and has no idea that creations of this kind are widespread among other people. This difference in the behaviour of a person who plays and a person who phantasies is accounted for by the motives of these two activities, which are nevertheless adjuncts to each other.

<sup>1</sup> [See Section 7 of Chapter VII of Freud's book on jokes (1905c).]

A child's play is determined by wishes: in point of fact by a single wish—one that helps in his upbringing—the wish to be big and grown up. He is always playing at being 'grown up', and in his games he imitates what he knows about the lives of his elders. He has no reason to conceal this wish. With the adult, the case is different. On the one hand, he knows that he is expected not to go on playing or phantasying any longer, but to act in the real world; on the other hand, some of the wishes which give rise to his phantasies are of a kind which it is essential to conceal. Thus he is ashamed of his phantasies as being childish and as being unpermissible.

But, you will ask, if people make such a mystery of their phantasying, how is it that we know such a lot about it? Well, there is a class of human beings upon whom, not a god, indeed, but a stern goddess—Necessity—has allotted the task of telling what they suffer and what things give them happiness.<sup>1</sup> These are the victims of nervous illness, who are obliged to tell their phantasies, among other things; to the doctor by whom they expect to be cured by mental treatment. This is our best source of knowledge, and we have since found good reason to suppose that our patients tell us nothing that we might not also hear from healthy people.

Let us now make ourselves acquainted with a few of the characteristics of phantasying. We may lay it down that a happy person never phantasies, only an unsatisfied one. The motive forces of phantasies are unsatisfied wishes, and every single phantasy is the fulfilment of a wish, a correction of unsatisfying reality. These motivating wishes vary according to the sex, character and circumstances of the person who is having the phantasy; but they fall naturally into two main

<sup>1</sup> [This is an allusion to some well-known lines spoken by the poet-hero in the final scene of Goethe's *Torquato Tasso*:

'Und wenn der Mensch in seiner Qual verstummt,  
Gab mir ein Gott, zu sagen, wie ich leide.'

And when mankind is dumb in its torment, a god granted me to tell how I suffer.']

groups. They are either ambitious wishes, which serve to elevate the subject's personality; or they are erotic ones. In young women the erotic wishes predominate almost exclusively, for their ambition is as a rule absorbed by erotic trends. In young men egoistic and ambitious wishes come to the fore clearly enough alongside of erotic ones. But we will not lay stress on the opposition between the two trends; we would rather emphasize the fact that they are often united. Just as, in many altar-pieces, the portrait of the donor is to be seen in a corner of the picture, so, in the majority of ambitious phantasies, we can discover in some corner or other the lady for whom the creator of the phantasy performs all his heroic deeds and at whose feet all his triumphs are laid. Here, as you see, there are strong enough motives for concealment; the well-brought-up young woman is only allowed a minimum of erotic desire, and the young man has to learn to suppress the excess of self-regard which he brings with him from the spoilt days of his childhood, so that he may find his place in a society which is full of other individuals making equally strong demands.

We must not suppose that the products of this imaginative activity—the various phantasies, castles in the air and day-dreams—are stereotyped or unalterable. On the contrary, they fit themselves in to the subject's shifting impressions of life, change with every change in his situation, and receive from every fresh active impression what might be called a 'date-mark'. The relation of a phantasy to time is in general very important. We may say that it hovers, as it were, between three times—the three moments of time which our ideation involves. Mental work is linked to some current impression, some provoking occasion in the present which has been able to arouse one of the subject's major wishes. From there it harks back to a memory of an earlier experience (usually an infantile one) in which this wish was fulfilled; and it now creates a situation relating to the future which represents a fulfilment of the wish. What it thus creates is a day-dream or phantasy, which carries about it traces of its origin from the

occasion which provoked it and from the memory. Thus past, present and future are strung together, as it were, on the thread of the wish that runs through them.

A very ordinary example may serve to make what I have said clear. Let us take the case of a poor orphan boy to whom you have given the address of some employer where he may perhaps find a job. On his way there he may indulge in a day-dream appropriate to the situation from which it arises. The content of his phantasy will perhaps be something like this. He is given a job, finds favour with his new employer, makes himself indispensable in the business, is taken into his employer's family, marries the charming young daughter of the house, and then himself becomes a director of the business, first as his employer's partner and then as his successor. In this phantasy, the dreamer has regained what he possessed in his happy childhood—the protecting house, the loving parents and the first objects of his affectionate feelings. You will see from this example the way in which the wish makes use of an occasion in the present to construct, on the pattern of the past, a picture of the future.

There is a great deal more that could be said about phantasies; but I will only allude as briefly as possible to certain points. If phantasies become over-luxuriant and over-powerful, the conditions are laid for an onset of neurosis or psychosis. Phantasies, moreover, are the immediate mental precursors of the distressing symptoms complained of by our patients. Here a broad by-path branches off into pathology.

I cannot pass over the relation of phantasies to dreams. Our dreams at night are nothing else than phantasies like these, as we can demonstrate from the interpretation of dreams.<sup>1</sup> Language, in its unrivalled wisdom, long ago decided the question of the essential nature of dreams by giving the name of 'day-dreams' to the airy creations of phantasy. If the meaning of our dreams usually remains obscure to us in spite of this pointer, it is because of the circumstance that at night there also arise in us wishes of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a).

which we are ashamed; these we must conceal from ourselves, and they have consequently been repressed, pushed into the unconscious. Repressed wishes of this sort and their derivatives are only allowed to come to expression in a very distorted form. When scientific work had succeeded in elucidating this factor of *dream-distortion*, it was no longer difficult to recognize that night-dreams are wish-fulfilments in just the same way as day-dreams—the phantasies which we all know so well.

So much for phantasies. And now for the creative writer. May we really attempt to compare the imaginative writer with the 'dreamer in broad daylight',<sup>1</sup> and his creations with day-dreams? Here we must begin by making an initial distinction. We must separate writers who, like the ancient authors of epics and tragedies, take over their material ready-made, from writers who seem to originate their own material. We will keep to the latter kind, and, for the purposes of our comparison, we will choose not the writers most highly esteemed by the critics, but the less pretentious authors of novels, romances and short stories, who nevertheless have the widest and most eager circle of readers of both sexes. One feature above all cannot fail to strike us about the creations of these story-writers: each of them has a hero who is the centre of interest, for whom the writer tries to win our sympathy by every possible means and whom he seems to place under the protection of a special Providence. If, at the end of one chapter of my story, I leave the hero unconscious and bleeding from severe wounds, I am sure to find him at the beginning of the next being carefully nursed and on the way to recovery; and if the first volume closes with the ship he is in going down in a storm at sea, I am certain, at the opening of the second volume, to read of his miraculous rescue—a rescue without which the story could not proceed. The feeling of security with which I follow the hero through his perilous adventures is the same as the feeling with which a hero in

<sup>1</sup> [*Der Träumer am helllichten Tag.*]

real life throws himself into the water to save a drowning man or exposes himself to the enemy's fire in order to storm a battery. It is the true heroic feeling, which one of our best writers has expressed in an inimitable phrase: 'Nothing can happen to *me*!' <sup>1</sup> It seems to me, however, that through this revealing characteristic of invulnerability we can immediately recognize His Majesty the Ego, the hero alike of every day-dream and of every story. <sup>2</sup>

Other typical features of these egocentric stories point to the same kinship. The fact that all the women in the novel invariably fall in love with the hero can hardly be looked on as a portrayal of reality, but it is easily understood as a necessary constituent of a day-dream. The same is true of the fact that the other characters in the story are sharply divided into good and bad, in defiance of the variety of human characters that are to be observed in real life. The 'good' ones are the helpers, while the 'bad' ones are the enemies and rivals, of the ego which has become the hero of the story.

We are perfectly aware that very many imaginative writings are far removed from the model of the naïve day-dream; and yet I cannot suppress the suspicion that even the most extreme deviations from that model could be linked with it through an uninterrupted series of transitional cases. It has struck me that in many of what are known as 'psychological' novels only one person—once again the hero—is described from within. The author sits inside his mind, as it were, and looks at the other characters from outside. The psychological novel in general no doubt owes its special nature to the inclination of the modern writer to split up his ego, by self-observation, into many part-egos, and, in consequence, to personify the conflicting currents of his own mental life in several heroes. Certain novels, which

<sup>1</sup> ['Es kann dir nix g'schehen!'] This phrase from Anzengruber, the Viennese dramatist, was a favourite one of Freud's. Cf. 'Thoughts on War and Death' (1915*b*), *Standard Ed.*, 14, 296.]

<sup>2</sup> [Cf. 'On Narcissism' (1914*c*), *Standard Ed.*, 14, 91.]

might be described as 'eccentric', seem to stand in quite special contrast to the type of the day-dream. In these, the person who is introduced as the hero plays only a very small active part; he sees the actions and sufferings of other people pass before him like a spectator. Many of Zola's later works belong to this category. But I must point out that the psychological analysis of individuals who are not creative writers, and who diverge in some respects from the so-called norm, has shown us analogous variations of the day-dream, in which the ego contents itself with the role of spectator.

If our comparison of the imaginative writer with the day-dreamer, and of poetical creation with the day-dream, is to be of any value, it must, above all, show itself in some way or other fruitful. Let us, for instance, try to apply to these authors' works the thesis we laid down earlier concerning the relation between phantasy and the three periods of time and the wish which runs through them; and, with its help, let us try to study the connections that exist between the life of the writer and his works. No one has known, as a rule, what expectations to frame in approaching this problem; and often the connection has been thought of in much too simple terms. In the light of the insight we have gained from phantasies, we ought to expect the following state of affairs. A strong experience in the present awakens in the creative writer a memory of an earlier experience (usually belonging to his childhood) from which there now proceeds a wish which finds its fulfilment in the creative work. The work itself exhibits elements of the recent provoking occasion as well as of the old memory.<sup>1</sup>

Do not be alarmed at the complexity of this formula. I suspect that in fact it will prove to be too exiguous a pattern. Nevertheless, it may contain a first approach to the true state of affairs; and, from some experiments I have made, I am inclined to think that this way of looking at creative writings

<sup>1</sup> [A similar view had already been suggested by Freud in a letter to Fliess of July 7, 1898, on the subject of one of C. F. Meyer's short stories (Freud, 1950a, Letter 92).]



may turn out not unfruitful. You will not forget that the stress it lays on childhood memories in the writer's life—a stress which may perhaps seem puzzling—is ultimately derived from the assumption that a piece of creative writing, like a day-dream, is a continuation of, and a substitute for, what was once the play of childhood.

We must not neglect, however, to go back to the kind of imaginative works which we have to recognize, not as original creations, but as the re-fashioning of ready-made and familiar material [p. 149]. Even here, the writer keeps a certain amount of independence, which can express itself in the choice of material and in changes in it which are often quite extensive. In so far as the material is already at hand, however, it is derived from the popular treasure-house of myths, legends and fairy tales. The study of constructions of folk-psychology such as these is far from being complete, but it is extremely probable that myths, for instance, are distorted vestiges of the wishful phantasies of whole nations, the *secular dreams* of youthful humanity.

You will say that, although I have put the creative writer first in the title of my paper, I have told you far less about him than about phantasies. I am aware of that, and I must try to excuse it by pointing to the present state of our knowledge. All I have been able to do is to throw out some encouragements and suggestions which, starting from the study of phantasies, lead on to the problem of the writer's choice of his literary material. As for the other problem—by what means the creative writer achieves the emotional effects in us that are aroused by his creations—we have as yet not touched on it at all. But I should like at least to point out to you the path that leads from our discussion of phantasies to the problems of poetical effects.

You will remember how I have said [p. 145 f.] that the day-dreamer carefully conceals his phantasies from other people because he feels he has reasons for being ashamed of them. I should now add that even if he were to communicate them

to us he could give us no pleasure by his disclosures. Such phantasies, when we learn them, repel us or at least leave us cold. But when a creative writer presents his plays to us or tells us what we are inclined to take to be his personal day-dreams, we experience a great pleasure, and one which probably arises from the confluence of many sources. How the writer accomplishes this is his innermost secret; the essential *ars poetica* lies in the technique of overcoming the feeling of repulsion in us which is undoubtedly connected with the barriers that rise between each single ego and the others. We can guess two of the methods used by this technique. The writer softens the character of his egoistic day-dreams by altering and disguising it, and he bribes us by the purely formal—that is, aesthetic—yield of pleasure which he offers us in the presentation of his phantasies. We give the name of an *incentive bonus*, or a *fore-pleasure*, to a yield of pleasure such as this, which is offered to us so as to make possible the release of still greater pleasure arising from deeper psychical sources.<sup>1</sup> In my opinion, all the aesthetic pleasure which a creative writer affords us has the character of a fore-pleasure of this kind, and our actual enjoyment of an imaginative work proceeds from a liberation of tensions in our minds. It may even be that not a little of this effect is due to the writer's enabling us thenceforward to enjoy our own day-dreams without self-reproach or shame. This brings us to the threshold of new, interesting and complicated enquiries; but also, at least for the moment, to the end of our discussion.

<sup>1</sup> [This theory of 'fore-pleasure' and the 'incentive bonus' had been applied by Freud to jokes in the last paragraphs of Chapter IV of his book on that subject (1905c). The nature of 'fore-pleasure' was also discussed in the *Three Essays* (1905d). See especially *Standard Ed.*, 7. 208 ff.]



HYSTERICAL PHANTASIES AND THEIR  
RELATION TO BISEXUALITY  
(1908)



## EDITOR'S NOTE

### HYSTERISCHE PHANTASIEN UND IHRE BEZIEHUNG ZUR BISEXUALITÄT

#### (a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1908 *Z. Sexualwiss.*, 1 (1) [January], 27-34.  
1909 *S.K.S.N.*, 2, 138-145. (1912, 2nd ed.; 1921, 3rd ed.)  
1924 *G.S.*, 5, 246-254.  
1941 *G.W.*, 7, 191-199.

#### (b) ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS:

- 'Hysterical Fancies and their Relation to Bisexuality'  
1909 *S.P.H.*, 194-200. (Tr. A. A. Brill.) (1912, 2nd ed.;  
1920, 3rd ed.)

- 'Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality'  
1924 *C.P.*, 2, 51-58. (Tr. D. Bryan.)

The present translation is a revision of the one published in 1924.

This paper was originally intended for Hirschfeld's *Jahrbuch für sexuelle Zwischenstufen*, but was transferred to a new periodical just started by the same editor. The importance of phantasies as the basis of hysterical symptoms had been first recognized by Freud in about the year 1897, in connection with his self-analysis. But though he communicated his findings privately to Fliess (see, for instance, his letters of July 7 and September 21, 1897: Freud, 1950a, Letters 66 and 69), he had only published them fully a couple of years before the present paper was written. (See Freud, 1906a, *Standard Ed.*, 7, 274-5.) The main part of this paper is a further discussion of the relation between phantasies and symptoms; and, in spite of its title, the subject of bisexuality

emerges almost as an afterthought. It may be remarked, incidentally, that the subject of phantasies seems to have been very much in Freud's mind at about the date of this paper. They are further discussed in the papers on 'The Sexual Theories of Children' (p. 209), on 'Family Romances' (p. 237), on 'Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming' (p. 143), and on 'Hysterical Attacks' (p. 229), as well as at many points in the study of *Gradiva* (e.g. pp. 49-52). Much of the material of the present paper had, of course, been anticipated. See, for instance, the 'Dora' analysis (1905e [1901]), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 47-52, and the *Three Essays* (1905d), *ibid.*, 165-6.

## HYSTERICAL PHANTASIES AND THEIR RELATION TO BISEXUALITY

WE are all familiar with the delusional imaginings of the paranoic, which are concerned with the greatness and the sufferings of his own self and which appear in forms that are quite typical and almost monotonous. We have also become acquainted, through numerous accounts, with the strange performances with which certain perverts stage their sexual satisfaction, whether in idea or reality. Nevertheless, it may be new to some readers to hear that quite analogous psychical structures are regularly present in all the psychoneuroses, particularly in hysteria, and that these latter—which are known as hysterical phantasies—can be seen to have important connections with the causation of the neurotic symptoms.

A common source and normal prototype of all these creations of phantasy is to be found in what are called the day-dreams of youth. These have already received some, though as yet insufficient, notice in the literature of the subject.<sup>1</sup> They occur with perhaps equal frequency in both sexes, though it seems that while in girls and women they are invariably of an erotic nature, in men they may be either erotic or ambitious. Nevertheless the importance of the erotic factor in men, too, should not be given a secondary rating; a closer investigation of a man's day-dreams generally shows that all his heroic exploits are carried out and all his successes achieved only in order to please a woman and to be preferred by her to other men.<sup>2</sup> These phantasies are satisfactions of wishes proceeding from deprivation and longing. They are justly called 'day-dreams', for they give us the key

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Breuer and Freud (1895), Pierre Janet (1898, 1), Havelock Ellis (1899), Freud (1900*a*), Pick (1896).

<sup>2</sup> Havelock Ellis (1899, [3rd ed., 1910, 185 ff.]) is of the same opinion.



to an understanding of night-dreams—in which the nucleus of the dream-formation consists of nothing else than complicated day-time phantasies of this kind that have been distorted and are misunderstood by the conscious psychical agency.<sup>1</sup>

These day-dreams are cathected with a large amount of interest; they are carefully cherished by the subject and usually concealed with a great deal of sensitivity, as though they were among the most intimate possessions of his personality. It is easy to recognize a person who is absorbed in day-dreaming in the street, however, by his sudden, as it were absent-minded, smile, his way of talking to himself, or by the hastening of his steps which marks the climax of the imagined situation. Every hysterical attack which I have been able to investigate up to the present has proved to be an involuntary irruption of day-dreams of this kind. For our observations no longer leave any room for doubt that such phantasies may be unconscious just as well as conscious; and as soon as the latter have become unconscious they may also become pathogenic—that is, they may express themselves in symptoms and attacks. In favourable circumstances, the subject can still capture an unconscious phantasy of this sort in consciousness. After I had drawn the attention of one of my patients to her phantasies, she told me that on one occasion she had suddenly found herself in tears in the street and that, rapidly considering what it was she was actually crying about, she had got hold of a phantasy to the following effect. In her imagination she had formed a tender attachment to a pianist who was well known in the town (though she was not personally acquainted with him); she had had a child by him (she was in fact childless); and he had then deserted her and her child and left them in poverty. It was at this point in her romance that she had burst into tears.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 491 ff.—[The contents of this paragraph had been stated more fully by Freud in his almost contemporary paper 'Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming' (1908e), p. 146 f. above.]

Unconscious phantasies have either been unconscious all along and have been formed in the unconscious; or—as is more often the case—they were once conscious phantasies, day-dreams, and have since been purposely forgotten and have become unconscious through ‘repression’. Their content may afterwards either have remained the same or have undergone alterations, so that the present unconscious phantasies are derivatives of the once conscious ones. Now an unconscious phantasy has a very important connection with the subject’s sexual life; for it is identical with the phantasy which served to give him sexual satisfaction during a period of masturbation. At that time the masturbatory act (in the widest sense of the term<sup>1</sup>) was compounded of two parts. One was the evocation of a phantasy and the other some active behaviour for obtaining self-gratification at the height of the phantasy. This compound, as we know, was itself merely soldered together.<sup>2</sup> Originally the action was a purely auto-erotic procedure for the purpose of obtaining pleasure from some particular part of the body, which could be described as erotogenic. Later, this action became merged with a wishful idea from the sphere of object-love and served as a partial realization of the situation in which the phantasy culminated. When, subsequently, the subject renounces this type of satisfaction, composed of masturbation and phantasy, the action is given up, while the phantasy, from being conscious, becomes unconscious. If no other mode of sexual satisfaction supervenes, the subject remains abstinent; and if he does not succeed in sublimating his libido—that is, in deflecting his sexual excitation to higher aims—the condition is now fulfilled for his unconscious phantasy to be revived and to proliferate, and, at least as regards some part of its content, to put itself into effect, with the whole force of his need for love, in the form of a pathological symptom.

In this way, unconscious phantasies are the immediate psychical precursors of a whole number of hysterical

<sup>1</sup> [I.e. not in its restricted literal sense of manual friction.]

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Freud, *Three Essays* (1905*d*) [*Standard Ed.* 7, 148].

symptoms. Hysterical symptoms are nothing other than unconscious phantasies brought into view through 'conversion'; and in so far as the symptoms are somatic ones, they are often enough taken from the circle of the same sexual sensations and motor innervations as those which had originally accompanied the phantasy when it was still conscious. In this way the giving up of the habit of masturbation is in fact undone, and the purpose of the whole pathological process, which is a restoration of the original, primary sexual satisfaction, is achieved—though never completely, it is true, but always in a sort of approximation.

Anyone who studies hysteria, therefore, soon finds his interest turned away from its symptoms to the phantasies from which they proceed. The technique of psycho-analysis enables us in the first place to infer from the symptoms what those unconscious phantasies are and then to make them conscious to the patient. By this means it has been found that the content of the hysteric's unconscious phantasies corresponds completely to the situations in which satisfaction is consciously obtained by perverts; and if anyone is at a loss for examples of such situations he has only to recall the world-famous performances of the Roman Emperors, the wild excesses of which were, of course, determined only by the enormous and unrestrained power possessed by the authors of the phantasies. The delusions of paranoids are phantasies of the same nature, though they are phantasies which have become directly conscious. They rest on the sado-masochistic components of the sexual instinct, and they, too, may find their complete counterpart in certain unconscious phantasies of hysterical subjects. We also know of cases—cases which have their practical importance as well—in which hysterics do not give expression to their phantasies in the form of symptoms but as conscious realizations, and in that way devise and stage assaults, attacks or acts of sexual aggression.

This method of psycho-analytic investigation, which leads from the conspicuous symptoms to the hidden unconscious phantasies, tells us everything that can be known about the

sexuality of psychoneurotics, including the fact which is to be the main subject-matter of this short preliminary publication.

Owing, probably, to the difficulties which the unconscious phantasies meet with in their endeavour to find expression, the relationship of the phantasies to the symptoms is not simple, but on the contrary, complicated in many ways.<sup>1</sup> As a rule—when, that is, the neurosis is fully developed and has persisted for some time—a particular symptom corresponds, not to a single unconscious phantasy, but to several such phantasies; and it does so not in an arbitrary manner but in accordance with a regular pattern. At the beginning of the illness these complications are, no doubt, not all fully developed.

For the sake of general interest I will at this point go outside the framework of this paper and interpolate a series of formulas which attempt to give a progressively fuller description of the nature of hysterical symptoms. These formulas do not contradict one another, but some represent an increasingly complete and precise approach to the facts, while others represent the application of different points of view:

(1) Hysterical symptoms are mnemonic symbols<sup>2</sup> of certain operative (traumatic) impressions and experiences.

(2) Hysterical symptoms are substitutes, produced by 'conversion', for the associative return of these traumatic experiences.

(3) Hysterical symptoms are—like other psychical structures—an expression of the fulfilment of a wish.

(4) Hysterical symptoms are the realization of an unconscious phantasy which serves the fulfilment of a wish.

(5) Hysterical symptoms serve the purpose of sexual

<sup>1</sup> The same is true of the relation between the 'latent' dream-thoughts and the elements of the 'manifest' content of a dream. See the section of my *Interpretation of Dreams* [Chapter VI] which deals with the 'dream-work'.

<sup>2</sup> [The term was used by Freud extensively in the *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d); it is explained at some length in the first of his *Five Lectures* (1910a), *Standard Ed.*, 11, 16–17.]

satisfaction and represent a portion of the subject's sexual life (a portion which corresponds to one of the constituents of his sexual instinct).

(6) Hysterical symptoms correspond to a return of a mode of sexual satisfaction which was a real one in infantile life and has since been repressed.

(7) Hysterical symptoms arise as a compromise between two opposite affective and instinctual impulses, of which one is attempting to bring to expression a component instinct or a constituent of the sexual constitution, and the other is attempting to suppress it.<sup>1</sup>

(8) Hysterical symptoms may take over the representation of various unconscious impulses which are not sexual, but they can never be without a sexual significance.

Among these various definitions the seventh brings out the nature of hysterical symptoms most completely as the realization of an unconscious phantasy; and the eighth recognizes the proper significance of the sexual factor. Some of the preceding formulas lead up to these two and are contained in them.

This connection between symptoms and phantasies makes it easy to arrive from a psycho-analysis of the former at a knowledge of the components of the sexual instincts which dominate the individual, as I have demonstrated in my *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* [1905d]. In some cases, however, investigation by this means yields an unexpected result. It shows that there are many symptoms where the uncovering of a sexual phantasy (or of a number of phantasies, one of which, the most significant and the earliest, is of a sexual nature) is not enough to bring about a resolution of the symptoms. To resolve it one has to have *two* sexual phantasies, of which one has a masculine and the other a feminine character. Thus one of these phantasies springs from a homosexual impulse. This new finding does not alter our seventh

<sup>1</sup> [This had already been expressed by Freud in the first edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 569, and earlier still in a letter to Fliess of May 30, 1896 (Freud, 1950a, Letter 46).]

formula. It remains true that a hysterical symptom must necessarily represent a compromise between a libidinal and a repressing impulse; but it may also represent a union of two libidinal phantasies of an opposite sexual character.

I shall refrain from giving examples in support of this thesis. I have found from experience that short analyses, condensed into extracts, can never have the convincing effect which they are designed to produce. And on the other hand, accounts of fully analysed cases must be left for another occasion.

I will therefore content myself with stating the following formula and explaining its significance:

(9) Hysterical symptoms are the expression on the one hand of a masculine unconscious sexual phantasy, and on the other hand of a feminine one.

I must expressly state that I cannot claim the same general validity for this formula as I have done for the others. As far as I can see, it applies neither to all the symptoms of a given case nor to all cases. On the contrary, it is not hard to adduce cases in which the impulses belonging to the opposite sexes have found separate symptomatic expression, so that the symptoms of heterosexuality and those of homosexuality can be as clearly distinguished from each other as the phantasies concealed behind them. Nevertheless, the condition of things stated in the ninth formula is common enough, and, when it occurs, important enough to deserve special emphasis. It seems to me to mark the highest degree of complexity to which the determination of a hysterical symptom can attain, and one may therefore only expect to find it in a neurosis which has persisted for a long time and within which a great deal of organization has taken place.<sup>1</sup>

The bisexual nature of hysterical symptoms, which can in any event be demonstrated in numerous cases, is an interesting confirmation of my view that the postulated existence of

<sup>1</sup> Sadger (1907) has recently discovered this formula independently in his own psycho-analyses. He, however, maintains that it has general validity.

an innate bisexual disposition in man is especially clearly visible in the analysis of psychoneurotics.<sup>1</sup> An exactly analogous state of affairs occurs in the same field when a person who is masturbating tries in his conscious phantasies to have the feelings both of the man and of the woman in the situation which he is picturing. Further counterparts are to be found in certain hysterical attacks in which the patient simultaneously plays both parts in the underlying sexual phantasy. In one case which I observed, for instance, the patient pressed her dress up against her body with one hand (as the woman), while she tried to tear it off with the other (as the man).<sup>2</sup> This simultaneity of contradictory actions serves to a large extent to obscure the situation, which is otherwise so plastically portrayed in the attack, and it is thus well suited to conceal the unconscious phantasy that is at work.

In psycho-analytic treatment it is very important to be prepared for a symptom's having a bisexual meaning. We need not then be surprised or misled if a symptom seems to persist undiminished although we have already resolved one of its sexual meanings; for it is still being maintained by the—perhaps unsuspected—one belonging to the opposite sex. In the treatment of such cases, moreover, one may observe how the patient avails himself, during the analysis of the one sexual meaning, of the convenient possibility of constantly switching his associations, as though on to an adjoining track, into the field of the contrary meaning.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. my *Three Essays* [e.g. in *Standard Ed.*, 7, 166 and 220].

<sup>2</sup> [This case is mentioned again in a later paper (p. 230 below).]

**CHARACTER AND ANAL EROTISM**  
**(1908)**



## CHARAKTER UND ANALEROTIK

### (a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1908 *Psychiat.-neurolog. Wschr.*, 9 (52) [March], 465–7.  
1909 *S.K.S.N.*, 2, 132–137. (1912, 2nd ed.; 1921, 3rd ed.)  
1924 *G.S.*, 5, 261–7.  
1931 *Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre*, 62–8.  
1941 *G.W.*, 7, 203–9.

### (b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

#### 'Character and Anal Erotism'

- 1924 *C.P.*, 2, 45–50. (Tr. R. C. McWatters.)

The present translation is a modified version of the one published in 1924.

The theme of this paper has now become so familiar that it is difficult to realize the astonishment and indignation which it aroused on its first publication. The three character-traits which are here associated with anal erotism, had, as we learn from Ernest Jones (1955, 331–2), already been mentioned by Freud in a letter to Jung of October 27, 1906. He had associated money and miserliness with faeces in a letter to Fliess of December 22, 1897, (Freud, 1950a, Letter 79). The paper was no doubt partly stimulated by the analysis of the 'Rat Man' (1909d), which had been concluded shortly before, though the special connection between anal erotism and obsessional neurosis was only brought out some years later, in 'The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis' (1913i). Another case history, that of the 'Wolf Man' (1918b [1914]), led to a further expansion of the topic which is dealt with here—the paper 'On Transformations of Instinct' (1917c).

## CHARACTER AND ANAL EROTISM

AMONG those whom we try to help by our psycho-analytic efforts we often come across a type of person who is marked by the possession of a certain set of character-traits, while at the same time our attention is drawn to the behaviour in his childhood of one of his bodily functions and the organ concerned in it. I cannot say at this date what particular occasions began to give me an impression that there was some organic connection between this type of character and this behaviour of an organ, but I can assure the reader that no theoretical expectation played any part in that impression.

Accumulated experience has so much strengthened my belief in the existence of such a connection that I am venturing to make it the subject of a communication.

The people I am about to describe are noteworthy for a regular combination of the three following characteristics. They are especially *orderly*, *parsimonious* and *obstinate*. Each of these words actually covers a small group or series of inter-related character-traits. 'Orderly'<sup>1</sup> covers the notion of bodily cleanliness, as well as of conscientiousness in carrying out small duties and trustworthiness. Its opposite would be 'untidy' and 'neglectful'. Parsimony may appear in the exaggerated form of avarice; and obstinacy can go over into defiance, to which rage and revengefulness are easily joined. The two latter qualities—parsimony and obstinacy—are linked with each other more closely than they are with the first—with orderliness. They are, also, the more constant element of the whole complex. Yet it seems to me incontestable that all three in some way belong together.

<sup>1</sup> [*Ördentlich* in German. The original meaning of the word is 'orderly'; but it has become greatly extended in use. It can be the equivalent of such English terms as 'correct', 'tidy', 'cleanly', 'trustworthy', as well as 'regular', 'decent' and 'proper', in the more colloquial senses of those words.]

It is easy to gather from these people's early childhood history that they took a comparatively long time to overcome their infantile *incontinentia alvi* [faecal incontinence], and that even in later childhood they suffered from isolated failures of this function. As infants, they seem to have belonged to the class who refuse to empty their bowels when they are put on the pot because they derive a subsidiary pleasure from defaecating;<sup>1</sup> for they tell us that even in somewhat later years they enjoyed holding back their stool, and they remember—though more readily about their brothers and sisters than about themselves—doing all sorts of unseemly things with the faeces that had been passed. From these indications we infer that such people are born with a sexual constitution in which the erotogenicity of the anal zone is exceptionally strong. But since none of these weaknesses and idiosyncracies are to be found in them once their childhood has been passed, we must conclude that the anal zone had lost its erotogenic significance in the course of development; and it is to be suspected that the regularity with which this triad of properties is present in their character may be brought into relation with the disappearance of their anal erotism.

I know that no one is prepared to believe in a state of things so long as it appears to be unintelligible and to offer no angle from which an explanation can be attempted. But we can at least bring the underlying factors nearer to our understanding by the help of the postulates I laid down in my *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* in 1905.<sup>2</sup> I there attempted to show that the sexual instinct of man is highly complex and is put together from contributions made by numerous constituents and component instincts. Important contributions to 'sexual excitation' are furnished by the peripheral excitations of certain specially designated parts of the body

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 186.

<sup>2</sup> [The material in the present paragraph is derived mainly from Section 5 of the first essay and Section 1 of the second (*Standard Ed.*, 7, 167 ff. and 176 ff.).]

(the genitals, mouth, anus, urethra), which therefore deserve to be described as 'erotogenic zones'. But the amounts of excitation coming in from these parts of the body do not all undergo the same vicissitudes, nor is the fate of all of them the same at every period of life. Generally speaking, only a part of them is made use of in sexual life; another part is deflected from sexual aims and directed towards others—a process which deserves the name of 'sublimation'. During the period of life which may be called the period of 'sexual latency'—i.e. from the completion of the fifth year<sup>1</sup> to the first manifestations of puberty (round about the eleventh year)—reaction-formations, or counter-forces, such as shame, disgust and morality, are created in the mind. They are actually formed at the expense of the excitations proceeding from the erotogenic zones, and they rise like dams to oppose the later activity of the sexual instincts. Now anal erotism is one of the components of the [sexual] instinct which, in the course of development and in accordance with the education demanded by our present civilization, have become unserviceable for sexual aims. It is therefore plausible to suppose that these character-traits of orderliness, parsimony and obstinacy, which are so often prominent in people who were formerly anal erotics, are to be regarded as the first and most constant results of the sublimation of anal erotism.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [In the German editions before 1924 this read 'from the completion of the fourth year'.]

<sup>2</sup> Since it is precisely the remarks in my *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* about the anal erotism of infants that have particularly scandalized uncomprehending readers, I venture at this point to interpolate an observation for which I have to thank a very intelligent patient. 'A friend of mine', he told me, 'who has read your *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, was talking about the book. He entirely agreed with it, but there was one passage, which—though of course he accepted and understood its meaning like that of the rest—struck him as so grotesque and comic that he sat down and laughed over it for a quarter of an hour. This passage ran: "One of the clearest signs of subsequent eccentricity or nervousness is to be seen when a baby obstinately refuses to empty his bowels when he is put on the pot—that is, when his nurse wants him to—and holds back that function till he himself chooses to exercise it. He is naturally not

The intrinsic necessity for this connection is not clear, of course, even to myself. But I can make some suggestions which may help towards an understanding of it. Cleanliness, orderliness and trustworthiness give exactly the impression of a reaction-formation against an interest in what is unclean and disturbing and should not be part of the body. ('Dirt is

---

concerned with dirtying the bed, he is only anxious not to miss the subsidiary pleasure attached to defaecating," [*Standard Ed.*, 7, 186]. The picture of this baby sitting on the pot and deliberating whether he would put up with a restriction of this kind upon his personal freedom of will, and feeling anxious, too, not to miss the pleasure attached to defaecating,—this caused my friend the most intense amusement. About twenty minutes afterwards, as we were having some cocoa, he suddenly remarked without any preliminary: "I say, seeing the cocoa in front of me has suddenly made me think of an idea that I always had when I was a child. I used always to pretend to myself that I was the cocoa-manufacturer Van Houten" (he pronounced the name Van "Hauten" [i.e. with the first syllable rhyming with the English word 'cow']) "and that I possessed a great secret for the manufacture of this cocoa. Everybody was trying to get hold of this secret that was a boon to humanity but I kept it carefully to myself. I don't know why I should have hit specially upon Van Houten. Probably his advertisements impressed me more than any others." Laughing, and without thinking at the time that my words had any deep meaning, I said: "Wann haut'n die Mutter?" ['When does mother smack?'] The first two words in the German phrase are pronounced exactly like 'Van Houten'.] It was only later that I realized that my pun in fact contained the key to the whole of my friend's sudden childhood recollection, and I then recognized it as a brilliant example of a screen-phantasy. My friend's phantasy, while keeping to the situation actually involved (the nutritional process) and making use of phonetic associations ("Kakao" ['cocoa'.—'Kaka' is the common German nursery word for 'faeces'—cf. a dream at the end of Section IX of Freud, 1923c] and "Wann haut'n"), pacified his sense of guilt by making a complete reversal in the content of his recollection: there was a displacement from the back of the body to the front, excreting food became taking food in, and something that was shameful and had to be concealed became a secret that was a boon to humanity. I was interested to see how, only a quarter of an hour after my friend had fended the phantasy off (though, it is true, in the comparatively mild form of raising an objection on formal grounds), he was, quite involuntarily, presented with the most convincing evidence by his own unconscious.'

matter in the wrong place.')<sup>1</sup> To relate obstinacy to an interest in defaecation would seem no easy task; but it should be remembered that even babies can show self-will about parting with their stool, as we have seen above [p. 170], and that it is a general practice in children's upbringing to administer painful stimuli to the skin of the buttocks—which is linked up with the erotogenic anal zone—in order to break their obstinacy and make them submissive. An invitation to a caress of the anal zone is still used to-day, as it was in ancient times, to express defiance or defiant scorn, and thus in reality signifies an act of tenderness that has been overtaken by repression. An exposure of the buttocks represents a softening down of this spoken invitation into a gesture; in Goethe's *Götz von Berlichingen* both words and gesture are introduced at the most appropriate point as an expression of defiance.<sup>2</sup>

The connections between the complexes of interest in money and of defaecation, which seem so dissimilar, appear to be the most extensive of all. Every doctor who has practised psycho-analysis knows that the most refractory and long-standing cases of what is described as habitual constipation in neurotics can be cured by that form of treatment. This is less surprising if we remember that that function has shown itself similarly amenable to hypnotic suggestion. But in psycho-analysis one only achieves this result if one deals with the patients' money complex and induces them to bring it into consciousness with all its connections. It might be supposed that the neurosis is here only following an indication of common usage in speech, which calls a person who keeps too careful a hold on his money 'dirty' or 'filthy'.<sup>3</sup> But

<sup>1</sup> [This sentence is in English in the original.]

<sup>2</sup> [The scene occurs in Act III, when Götz is summoned by a Herald to surrender. In the later acting version of the play the words are toned down.]

<sup>3</sup> [The English 'filthy' as well as the German 'filzig' appears in the original. Freud had already commented on the usage mentioned here, in a letter to Fliess of December 22, 1897 (Freud, 1950a, Letter 79) and, later, in the first edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 4, 200.]

this explanation would be far too superficial. In reality, wherever archaic modes of thought have predominated or persist—in the ancient civilizations, in myths, fairy tales and superstitions, in unconscious thinking, in dreams and in neuroses—money is brought into the most intimate relationship with dirt. We know that the gold which the devil gives his paramours turns into excrement after his departure, and the devil is certainly nothing else than the personification of the repressed unconscious instinctual life.<sup>1</sup> We also know about the superstition which connects the finding of treasure with defaecation,<sup>2</sup> and everyone is familiar with the figure of the 'shitter of ducats [*Dukatenscheisser*]'.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, even according to ancient Babylonian doctrine gold is 'the faeces of Hell' (Mammon = *ilu manman*<sup>4</sup>). Thus in following the usage of language, neurosis, here as elsewhere, is taking words in their original, significant sense, and where it appears to be using a word figuratively it is usually simply restoring its old meaning.<sup>5</sup>

It is possible that the contrast between the most precious substance known to men and the most worthless, which they reject as waste matter ('refuse'<sup>6</sup>), has led to this specific identification of gold with faeces.

Yet another circumstance facilitates this equation in

<sup>1</sup> Compare hysterical possession and demoniac epidemics. [Freud discussed this at considerable length in Part III of his paper 'A Seventeenth Century Demonological Neurosis' (1923*d*). The legendary transformation of witches' gold into faeces and the comparison with the '*Dukatenscheisser*' below had already been mentioned by Freud in a letter to Fliess of January 24, 1897 (1950*a*, Letter 57).]

<sup>2</sup> [Numerous examples of this derived from folklore are given in Freud and Oppenheim's paper on 'Dreams in Folklore' (1957*a* [1911]), *Standard Ed.*, 12, 187 ff.]

<sup>3</sup> [A term vulgarly used for a wealthy spendthrift.]

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Jeremias (1904, 115*n.*). 'Mamon' ("Mammon") is "Manman" in Babylonian and is another name for Nergal, the God of the Underworld. According to Oriental mythology, which has passed over into popular legends and fairy tales, gold is the excrement of Hell.

<sup>5</sup> [For the occurrence of this in dreams, see a passage added in 1909 to *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *Standard Ed.*, 5, 407.]

<sup>6</sup> [In English in the original.]

neurotic thought. The original erotic interest in defaecation is, as we know, destined to be extinguished in later years. In those years the interest in money makes its appearance as a new interest which had been absent in childhood. This makes it easier for the earlier impulsion, which is in process of losing its aim, to be carried over to the newly emerging aim.

If there is any basis in fact for the relation posited here between anal erotism and this triad of character-traits, one may expect to find no very marked degree of 'anal character' in people who have retained the anal zone's erotogenic character in adult life, as happens, for instance, with certain homosexuals. Unless I am much mistaken, the evidence of experience tallies quite well on the whole with this inference.

We ought in general to consider whether other character-complexes, too, do not exhibit a connection with the excitations of particular erotogenic zones. At present I only know of the intense 'burning' ambition of people who earlier suffered from enuresis.<sup>1</sup> We can at any rate lay down a formula for the way in which character in its final shape is formed out of the constituent instincts: the permanent character-traits are either unchanged prolongations of the original instincts, or sublimations of those instincts, or reaction-formations against them.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [The connection between urethral erotism and ambition seems to find its first mention here. Freud occasionally returned to the point, e.g. in a sentence added in 1914 to *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *Standard Ed.*, 4, 216 and in a footnote added in 1920 to the *Three Essays* (1905d), *ibid.*, 7, 239. In a long footnote to Section III of *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930a) he brought the present finding into connection with his two other main lines of thought concerning enuresis—its symbolic association with fire and its importance as an infantile equivalent of masturbation. See also the still later paper on 'The Acquisition and Control of Fire' (1932a).]

<sup>2</sup> [There are not many accounts by Freud of the nature of 'character' and the mechanism of its formation. Among them may be mentioned a passage near the end of the *Three Essays* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 238–9, some remarks in the paper on 'The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis' (1913i), *ibid.*, 12, 323–4, and especially a discussion in the first half of Chapter III of *The Ego and the Id* (1923b), the gist of which is repeated in Lecture XXXII of the *New Introductory Lectures* (1933a).]





**'CIVILIZED' SEXUAL MORALITY AND  
MODERN NERVOUS ILLNESS  
(1908)**



## EDITOR'S NOTE

### DIE 'KULTURELLE' SEXUALMORAL UND DIE MODERNE NERVOSITÄT

#### (a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1908 *Sexual-Probleme*, 4 (3) [March], 107-129.  
1909 *S.K.S.N.*, 2, 175-196. (1912, 2nd ed.; 1921, 3rd ed.)  
1924 *G.S.*, 5, 143-167.  
1931 *Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre*, 17-42.  
1941 *G.W.*, 7, 143-167.

#### (b) ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS:

'Modern Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness'

- 1915 *Amer. J. Urol.*, 11, 391-405. (Incomplete.)

'“Civilized” Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness'

- 1924 *C.P.*, 2, 76-99. (Tr. E. B. Herford and E. C. Mayne.)

A reprint of the 1915 translation appeared as a pamphlet (edited by W. J. Robinson) published by Eugenics Publications, New York, 1931. Both omit the first ten paragraphs. The present translation, with a modified title, is based on the one published in 1924.

*Sexual-Probleme*, the periodical in which this and the following paper (p. 207) appeared, was a continuation of the journal *Mutterschutz*, under which title it is sometimes catalogued. The numbering of the volumes continued unbroken in spite of the change of title.

Though this was the earliest of Freud's full-length discussions of the antagonism between civilization and instinctual life, his convictions on the subject went back much

further. For instance, in a memorandum sent to Fliess on May 31, 1897, he wrote that 'incest is anti-social and civilization consists in a progressive renunciation of it'. (Freud, 1950a, Draft N.) But, indeed, this antagonism was implied in his whole theory of the impact of the latency period on the development of human sexuality, and in the last pages of his *Three Essays* (1905d) he spoke of 'the inverse relation holding between civilization and the free development of sexuality' (*Standard Ed.*, 7, 242). Much of the present paper, it may be remarked, summarizes the findings of this last-mentioned work, which had first appeared only three years previously.

The sociological aspects of that antagonism form the main subject of the present paper, and Freud often recurred to it in the course of his later writings. Thus, leaving out of account the many passing allusions to it, we may mention the last two sections of the second of his papers on the psychology of love (1912d), *Standard Ed.*, 11, 184 ff., the opening pages of *The Future of an Illusion* (1927c) and the closing paragraphs of the open letter to Einstein 'Why War?' (1933b). But his longest and most elaborate discussion of the subject was, of course, in *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930a).

The ancient problem of whether the German word 'Kultur' is to be translated 'culture' or 'civilization' has been solved here by the choice sometimes of the one and sometimes of the other. The translators have, indeed, been given a free hand by a remark of Freud's in the third paragraph of *The Future of an Illusion*: 'I scorn to distinguish between culture and civilization.'

## 'CIVILIZED' SEXUAL MORALITY AND MODERN NERVOUS ILLNESS

IN his recently published book, *Sexual Ethics*, Von Ehrenfels<sup>1</sup> (1907) dwells on the difference between 'natural' and 'civilized' sexual morality. By natural sexual morality we are to understand, according to him, a sexual morality under whose dominance a human stock is able to remain in lasting possession of health and efficiency, while civilized sexual morality is a sexual morality obedience to which, on the other hand, spurs men on to intense and productive cultural activity. This contrast, he thinks, is best illustrated by comparing the innate character of a people with their cultural attainments. I may refer the reader to Von Ehrenfels's own work for a more extensive consideration of this significant line of thought, and I shall extract from it here only as much as I need as a starting-point for my own contribution to the subject.

It is not difficult to suppose that under the domination of a civilized sexual morality the health and efficiency of single individuals may be liable to impairment and that ultimately this injury to them, caused by the sacrifices imposed on them, may reach such a pitch that, by this indirect path, the cultural aim in view will be endangered as well. And Von Ehrenfels does in fact attribute a number of ill-effects to the sexual morality which dominates our Western society to-day, ill-effects for which he is obliged to make that morality responsible; and, although he fully acknowledges its high aptitude for the furtherance of civilization, he is led to convict it of standing in need of reform. In his view, what is characteristic of the civilized sexual morality that dominates us is that the demands made on women are carried over to the sexual life of men and that all sexual intercourse is prohibited except in monogamous marriage. Nevertheless,

<sup>1</sup> [See footnote, p. 204 below.]

consideration of the natural difference between the sexes makes it necessary to visit men's lapses with less severity and thus in fact to admit a *double* morality for them. But a society which accepts this double morality cannot carry 'the love of truth, honesty and humanity' (Von Ehrenfels, *ibid*, 32 ff.) beyond a definite and narrow limit, and is bound to induce in its members concealment of the truth, false optimism, self-deception and deception of others. And civilized sexual morality has still worse effects, for, by glorifying monogamy, it cripples the factor of *selection by virility*—the factor whose influence alone can bring about an improvement of the individual's innate constitution, since in civilized peoples *selection by vitality* has been reduced to a minimum by humanity and hygiene (*ibid.*, 35).

Among the damaging effects which are here laid at the door of civilized sexual morality, the physician will miss a particular one whose significance will be discussed in detail in the present paper. I refer to the increase traceable to it of modern nervous illness—of the nervous illness, that is, which is rapidly spreading in our present-day society. Occasionally a nervous patient will himself draw the doctor's attention to the part played in the causation of his complaint by the opposition between his constitution and the demands of civilization and will say: 'In our family we've all become neurotic because we wanted to be something better than what, with our origin, we are capable of being.' Often, too, the physician finds food for thought in observing that those who succumb to nervous illness are precisely the offspring of fathers who, having been born of rough but vigorous families, living in simple, healthy, country conditions, had successfully established themselves in the metropolis, and in a short space of time had brought their children to a high level of culture. But, above all, nerve specialists themselves have loudly proclaimed the connection between 'increasing nervous illness' and modern civilized life. The grounds to which they attribute this connection will be shown by a few extracts from statements that have been made by some eminent observers.

W. Erb (1893): 'The original question, then, is whether the causes of nervous illness that have been put before you are present in modern life to such a heightened degree as to account for a marked increase in that form of illness. The question can be answered without hesitation in the affirmative, as a cursory glance at our present-day existence and its features will show.

'This is already clearly demonstrated by a number of general facts. The extraordinary achievements of modern times, the discoveries and inventions in every sphere, the maintenance of progress in the face of increasing competition—these things have only been gained, and can only be held, by great mental effort. The demands made on the efficiency of the individual in the struggle for existence have greatly increased and it is only by putting out all his mental powers that he can meet them. At the same time, the individual's needs and his demands for the enjoyments of life have increased in all classes; unprecedented luxury has spread to strata of the population who were formerly quite untouched by it; irreligion, discontent and covetousness have grown up in wide social spheres. The immense extension of communications which has been brought about by the network of telegraphs and telephones that encircle the world has completely altered the conditions of trade and commerce. All is hurry and agitation; night is used for travel, day for business, even 'holiday trips' have become a strain on the nervous system. Important political, industrial and financial crises carry excitement into far wider circles of people than they used to do; political life is engaged in quite generally; political, religious and social struggles, party-politics, electioneering, and the enormous spread of trade-unionism inflame tempers, place an ever greater strain on the mind, and encroach upon the hours for recreation, sleep and rest. City life is constantly becoming more sophisticated and more restless. The exhausted nerves seek recuperation in increased stimulation and in highly-spiced pleasures, only to become more exhausted than before. Modern literature is predominantly



concerned with the most questionable problems which stir up all the passions, and which encourage sensuality and a craving for pleasure, and contempt for every fundamental ethical principle and every ideal. It brings before the reader's mind pathological figures and problems concerned with psychopathic sexuality, and revolutionary and other subjects. Our ears are excited and overstimulated by large doses of noisy and insistent music. The theatres captivate all our senses with their exciting performances. The plastic arts, too, turn by preference to what is repellent, ugly and suggestive, and do not hesitate to set before our eyes with revolting fidelity the most horrible sights that reality has to offer.

'This general description is already enough to indicate a number of dangers presented by the evolution of our modern civilization. Let me now fill in the picture with a few details.'

Binswanger (1896): 'Neurasthenia in particular has been described as an essentially modern disorder, and Beard, to whom we are indebted for a first comprehensive account of it,<sup>1</sup> believed that he had discovered a new nervous disease which had developed specifically on American soil. This supposition was of course a mistaken one; nevertheless, the fact that it was an *American* physician who was first able to grasp and describe the peculiar features of this illness, as the fruit of a wide experience, indicates, no doubt, the close connections which exist between it and modern life, with its unbridled pursuit of money and possessions, and its immense advances in the field of technology which have rendered illusory every obstacle, whether temporal or spatial, to our means of intercommunication.'

Von Krafft-Ebing (1895): 'The mode of life of countless civilized people exhibits nowadays an abundance of anti-hygienic factors which make it easy to understand the fateful

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. Beard, 1881 and 1884. G. M. Beard (1839-83) was an American neurologist. Freud mentioned his work in some of his earlier discussions of neurasthenia (Freud, 1895*b* and 1896*a*) and in a letter to Fliess of November 5, 1897 (Freud, 1950*a*, Letter 74).]

increase of nervous illness; for those injurious factors take effect first and foremost on the brain. In the course of the last decades changes have taken place in the political and social—and especially in the mercantile, industrial and agricultural—conditions of civilized nations which have brought about great changes in people's occupations, social position and property, and this at the cost of the nervous system, which is called upon to meet the increased social and economic demands by a greater expenditure of energy, often with quite inadequate opportunity for recuperation.'

The fault I have to find with these and many other similarly-worded opinions is not that they are mistaken but that they prove insufficient to explain the details in the picture of nervous disturbances and that they leave out of account precisely the most important of the aetiological factors involved. If we disregard the vaguer ways of being 'nervous' and consider the specific forms of nervous illness, we shall find that the injurious influence of civilization reduces itself in the main to the harmful suppression of the sexual life of civilized peoples (or classes) through the 'civilized' sexual morality prevalent in them.

I have tried to bring forward the evidence for this assertion in a number of technical papers.<sup>1</sup> I cannot repeat it here. I will, however, quote the most important of the arguments arising from my investigations.

Careful clinical observation allows us to distinguish two groups of nervous disorders: the *neuroses* proper and the *psychoneuroses*. In the former the disturbances (the symptoms), whether they show their effects in somatic or mental functioning, appear to be of a *toxic* nature. They behave exactly like the phenomena accompanying an excess or a deprivation of certain nerve poisons. These neuroses—which are commonly grouped together as 'neurasthenia'—can be induced by certain injurious influences in sexual life, without any hereditary taint being necessarily present; indeed, the form

<sup>1</sup> See my collection of short papers on the theory of the neuroses (1906) [*Standard Ed.*, 3].

taken by the disease corresponds to the nature of these noxae, so that often enough the particular sexual aetiology can at once be deduced from the clinical picture. There is a total absence, on the other hand, of any such regular correspondence between the form of a nervous illness and the other injurious influences of civilization which are blamed by the authorities. We may, therefore, regard the sexual factor as the essential one in the causation of the neuroses proper.

With the psychoneuroses, the influence of heredity is more marked and the causation less transparent. A peculiar method of investigation known as psycho-analysis has, however, enabled us to recognize that the symptoms of these disorders (hysteria, obsessional neurosis, etc.) are *psychogenic* and depend upon the operation of unconscious (repressed) ideational complexes. This same method has also taught us what those unconscious complexes are and has shown that, quite generally speaking, they have a sexual content. They spring from the sexual needs of people who are unsatisfied and represent for them a kind of substitutive satisfaction. We must therefore view all factors which impair sexual life, suppress its activity or distort its aims as being pathogenic factors in the psychoneuroses as well.

The value of a theoretical distinction between toxic and psychogenic neuroses is, of course, not diminished by the fact that, in most people suffering from nervous illness, disturbances arising from both sources are to be observed.

The reader who is prepared to agree with me in looking for the aetiology of nervous illness pre-eminently in influences which damage sexual life, will also be ready to follow the further discussion, which is intended to set the theme of increasing nervous illness in a wider context.

Generally speaking, our civilization is built up on the suppression of instincts. Each individual has surrendered some part of his possessions—some part of the sense of omnipotence or of the aggressive or vindictive inclinations in his personality. From these contributions has grown civilization's common possession of material and ideal property.

Besides the exigencies of life, no doubt it has been family feelings, derived from erotism, that have induced the separate individuals to make this renunciation. The renunciation has been a progressive one in the course of the evolution of civilization. The single steps in it were sanctioned by religion; the piece of instinctual satisfaction which each person had renounced was offered to the Deity as a sacrifice, and the communal property thus acquired was declared 'sacred'. The man who, in consequence of his unyielding constitution, cannot fall in with this suppression of instinct, becomes a 'criminal', an 'outlaw',<sup>1</sup> in the face of society—unless his social position or his exceptional capacities enable him to impose himself upon it as a great man, a 'hero'.

The sexual instinct—or, more correctly, the sexual instincts, for analytic investigation teaches us that the sexual instinct is made up of many separate constituents or component instincts—is probably more strongly developed in man than in most of the higher animals; it is certainly more constant, since it has almost entirely overcome the periodicity to which it is tied in animals. It places extraordinarily large amounts of force at the disposal of civilized activity, and it does this in virtue of its especially marked characteristic of being able to displace its aim without materially diminishing in intensity. This capacity to exchange its originally sexual aim for another one, which is no longer sexual but which is psychically related to the first aim, is called the capacity for *sublimation*. In contrast to this displaceability, in which its value for civilization lies, the sexual instinct may also exhibit a particularly obstinate fixation which renders it unserviceable and which sometimes causes it to degenerate into what are described as abnormalities. The original strength of the sexual instinct probably varies in each individual; certainly the proportion of it which is suitable for sublimation varies.

<sup>1</sup> [In English in the original.—The gist of this paragraph, including the definition of 'sacred' ('*heilig*'), will be found in a note to *Flies* of May 31, 1897 (Freud, 1950a, Draft N). The word is again discussed in Chap. III, Part II (D) of *Moses and Monotheism* (1939a).]

It seems to us that it is the innate constitution of each individual which decides in the first instance how large a part of his sexual instinct it will be possible to sublimate and make use of. In addition to this, the effects of experience and the intellectual influences upon his mental apparatus succeed in bringing about the sublimation of a further portion of it. To extend this process of displacement indefinitely is, however, certainly not possible, any more than is the case with the transformation of heat into mechanical energy in our machines. A certain amount of direct sexual satisfaction seems to be indispensable for most organizations, and a deficiency<sup>1</sup> in this amount, which varies from individual to individual, is visited by phenomena which, on account of their detrimental effects on functioning and their subjective quality of unpleasure, must be regarded as an illness.

Further prospects are opened up when we take into consideration the fact that in man the sexual instinct does not originally serve the purposes of reproduction at all, but has as its aim the gaining of particular kinds of pleasure.<sup>2</sup> It manifests itself in this way in human infancy, during which it attains its aim of gaining pleasure not only from the genitals but from other parts of the body (the erotogenic zones), and can therefore disregard any objects other than these convenient ones. We call this stage the stage of *auto-erotism*, and the child's upbringing has, in our view, the task of restricting it, because to linger in it would make the sexual instinct uncontrollable and unserviceable later on. The development of the sexual instinct then proceeds from auto-erotism to object-love and from the autonomy of the erotogenic zones to their subordination under the primacy of the genitals, which are put at the service of reproduction. During this

<sup>1</sup> [The German word here is '*Versagung*'. Freud later used this term, in a wider sense, to describe the principal factor in bringing about the onset of neurosis. In this sense it is rendered by the English 'frustration'. See the Editor's Note to the paper on 'Types of Onset of Neurosis' (1912c), *Standard Ed.*, 12, 229.]

<sup>2</sup> Cf. my *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905d) [*Standard Ed.*, 7, 197.].

development a part of the sexual excitation which is provided by the subject's own body is inhibited as being unserviceable for the reproductive function and in favourable cases is brought to sublimation. The forces that can be employed for cultural activities are thus to a great extent obtained through the suppression of what are known as the *perverse* elements of sexual excitation.

If this evolution of the sexual instinct is borne in mind, three stages of civilization can be distinguished: a first one, in which the sexual instinct may be freely exercised without regard to the aims of reproduction; a second, in which all of the sexual instinct is suppressed except what serves the aims of reproduction; and a third, in which only *legitimate* reproduction is allowed as a sexual aim. This third stage is reflected in our present-day 'civilized' sexual morality.

If we take the second of these stages as an average, we must point out that a number of people are, on account of their organization, not equal to meeting its demands. In whole classes of individuals the development of the sexual instinct, as we have described it above, from auto-erotism to object-love with its aim of uniting the genitals, has not been carried out correctly and sufficiently fully. As a result of these disturbances of development two kinds of harmful deviation from normal sexuality—that is, sexuality which is serviceable to civilization—come about; and the relation between these two is almost that of positive and negative.<sup>1</sup>

In the first place (disregarding people whose sexual instinct is altogether excessive and uninhabitable) there are the different varieties of *perverts*, in whom an infantile fixation to a preliminary sexual aim has prevented the primacy of the reproductive function from being established, and the *homosexuals* or *inverts*, in whom, in a manner that is not yet quite understood, the sexual aim has been deflected away from the opposite sex. If the injurious effects of these two kinds of developmental disturbance are less than might be expected, this mitigation can be ascribed precisely to the complex way

<sup>1</sup> [See below, p. 191.]

in which the sexual instinct is put together, which makes it possible for a person's sexual life to reach a serviceable final form even if one or more components of the instinct have been shut off from development. The constitution of people suffering from inversion—the homosexuals—is, indeed, often distinguished by their sexual instinct's possessing a special aptitude for cultural sublimation.

More pronounced forms of the perversions and of homosexuality, especially if they are exclusive, do, it is true, make those subject to them socially useless and unhappy, so that it must be recognized that the cultural requirements even of the second stage are a source of suffering for a certain proportion of mankind. The fate of these people who differ constitutionally from the rest varies, and depends on whether they have been born with a sexual instinct which by absolute standards is strong or comparatively weak. In the latter case—where the sexual instinct is in general weak—perverts succeed in totally suppressing the inclinations which bring them into conflict with the moral demands of their stage of civilization. But this, from the ideal point of view, is also the only thing they succeed in achieving; for, in order to effect this suppression of their sexual instinct, they use up the forces which they would otherwise employ in cultural activities. They are, as it were, inwardly inhibited and outwardly paralysed. What we shall be saying again later on about the abstinence demanded of men and women in the third stage of civilization applies to them too.

Where the sexual instinct is fairly intense, but perverse, there are two possible outcomes. The first, which we shall not discuss further, is that the person affected remains a pervert and has to put up with the consequences of his deviation from the standard of civilization. The second is far more interesting. It is that, under the influence of education and social demands, a suppression of the perverse instincts is indeed achieved, but it is a kind of suppression which is really no suppression at all. It can better be described as a suppression that has failed. The inhibited sexual instincts are,

it is true, no longer expressed as such—and this constitutes the success of the process—but they find expression in other ways, which are quite as injurious to the subject and make him quite as useless for society as satisfaction of the suppressed instincts in an unmodified form would have done. This constitutes the failure of the process, which in the long run more than counterbalances its success. The substitutive phenomena which emerge in consequence of the suppression of the instinct amount to what we call nervous illness, or, more precisely, the psychoneuroses.<sup>1</sup> Neurotics are the class of people who, since they possess a recalcitrant organization, only succeed, under the influence of cultural requirements, in achieving a suppression of their instincts which is *apparent* and which becomes increasingly unsuccessful. They therefore only carry on their collaboration with cultural activities by a great expenditure of force and at the cost of an internal impoverishment, or are obliged at times to interrupt it and fall ill. I have described the neuroses as the 'negative' of the perversions [p. 189 above] because in the neuroses the perverse impulses, after being repressed, manifest themselves from the unconscious part of the mind—because the neuroses contain the same tendencies, though in a state of 'repression', as do the positive perversions.<sup>2</sup>

Experience teaches us that for most people there is a limit beyond which their constitution cannot comply with the demands of civilization. All who wish to be more noble-minded than their constitution allows fall victims to neurosis; they would have been more healthy if it could have been possible for them to be less good. The discovery that perversions and neuroses stand in the relation of positive and negative is often unmistakably confirmed by observations made on the members of one generation of a family. Quite frequently a brother is a sexual pervert, while his sister, who,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. my introductory remarks above [p. 186].

<sup>2</sup> [Freud's first published statement to this effect occurs in the *Three Essays* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 165. As will be seen, however, from a footnote to that passage, the notion had been expressed by him many years earlier in his letters to Fliess.]



being a woman, possesses a weaker sexual instinct, is a neurotic whose symptoms express the same inclinations as the perversions of her sexually more active brother. And correspondingly, in many families the men are healthy, but from a social point of view immoral to an undesirable degree, while the women are high-minded and over-refined, but severely neurotic.

It is one of the obvious social injustices that the standard of civilization should demand from everyone the same conduct of sexual life—conduct which can be followed without any difficulty by some people, thanks to their organization, but which imposes the heaviest psychical sacrifices on others; though, indeed, the injustice is as a rule wiped out by disobedience to the injunctions of morality.

These considerations have been based so far on the requirement laid down by the second of the stages of civilization which we have postulated [p. 189], the requirement that every sexual activity of the kind described as perverse is prohibited, while what is called normal sexual intercourse is freely permitted. We have found that even when the line between sexual freedom and restriction is drawn at this point, a number of individuals are ruled out as perverts, and a number of others, who make efforts not to be perverts whilst constitutionally they should be so, are forced into nervous illness. It is easy to predict the result that will follow if sexual freedom is still further circumscribed and the requirements of civilization are raised to the level of the third stage, which bans all sexual activity outside legal marriage. The number of strong natures who openly oppose the demands of civilization will increase enormously, and so will the number of weaker ones who, faced with the conflict between the pressure of cultural influences and the resistance of their constitution, take flight into neurotic illness.<sup>1</sup>

Let us now try to answer three questions that arise here:

(1) What is the task that is set to the individual by the requirements of the third stage of civilization?

<sup>1</sup> [See footnote 1, p. 232 below.]

(2) Can the legitimate sexual satisfaction that is permissible offer acceptable compensation for the renunciation of all other satisfactions?

(3) In what relation do the possible injurious effects of this renunciation stand to its exploitation in the cultural field?

The answer to the first question touches on a problem which has often been discussed and cannot be exhaustively treated here—that of sexual abstinence. Our third stage of civilization demands of individuals of both sexes that they shall practise abstinence until they are married and that all who do not contract a legal marriage shall remain abstinent throughout their lives. The position, agreeable to all the authorities, that sexual abstinence is not harmful and not difficult to maintain, has also been widely supported by the medical profession. It may be asserted, however, that the task of mastering such a powerful impulse as that of the sexual instinct by any other means than satisfying it is one which can call for the whole of a man's forces. Mastering it by sublimation, by deflecting the sexual instinctual forces away from their sexual aim to higher cultural aims, can be achieved by a minority and then only intermittently, and least easily during the period of ardent and vigorous youth. Most of the rest become neurotic or are harmed in one way or another. Experience shows that the majority of the people who make up our society are constitutionally unfit to face the task of abstinence. Those who would have fallen ill under milder sexual restrictions fall ill all the more readily and more severely before the demands of our cultural sexual morality of to-day; for we know no better safeguard against the threat to normal sexual life offered by defective innate dispositions or disturbances of development than sexual satisfaction itself. The more a person is disposed to neurosis, the less can he tolerate abstinence; instincts which have been withdrawn from normal development, in the sense in which it has been described above, become at the same time all the more uninhabitable. But even those people who would have

retained their health under the requirements of the second stage of civilization will now succumb to neurosis in great numbers. For the psychical value of sexual satisfaction increases with its frustration. The dammed-up libido is now put in a position to detect one or other of the weaker spots which are seldom absent in the structure of sexual life, and there to break through and obtain substitutive satisfaction of a neurotic kind in the form of pathological symptoms. Anyone who is able to penetrate the determinants of nervous illness will soon become convinced that its increase in our society arises from the intensification of sexual restrictions.

This brings us to the question whether sexual intercourse in legal marriage can offer full compensation for the restrictions imposed before marriage. There is such an abundance of material supporting a reply in the negative that we can give only the briefest summary of it. It must above all be borne in mind that our cultural sexual morality restricts sexual intercourse even in marriage itself, since it imposes on married couples the necessity of contenting themselves, as a rule, with a very few procreative acts. As a consequence of this consideration, satisfying sexual intercourse in marriage takes place only for a few years; and we must subtract from this, of course, the intervals of abstention necessitated by regard for the wife's health. After these three, four or five years, the marriage becomes a failure in so far as it has promised the satisfaction of sexual needs. For all the devices hitherto invented for preventing conception impair sexual enjoyment, hurt the fine susceptibilities of both partners and even actually cause illness. Fear of the consequences of sexual intercourse first brings the married couple's physical affection to an end; and then, as a remoter result, it usually puts a stop as well to the mental sympathy between them, which should have been the successor to their original passionate love. The spiritual disillusionment and bodily deprivation to which most marriages are thus doomed puts both partners back in the state they were in before their

marriage, except for being the poorer by the loss of an illusion, and they must once more have recourse to their fortitude in mastering and deflecting their sexual instinct. We need not enquire how far men, by then in their maturer years, succeed in this task. Experience shows that they very frequently avail themselves of the degree of sexual freedom which is allowed them—although only with reluctance and under a veil of silence—by even the strictest sexual code. The 'double' sexual morality which is valid for men in our society is the plainest admission that society itself does not believe in the possibility of enforcing the precepts which it itself has laid down. But experience shows as well that women, who, as being the actual vehicle of the sexual interests of mankind, are only endowed in a small measure with the gift of sublimating their instincts, and who, though they may find a sufficient substitute for the sexual object in an infant at the breast, do not find one in a growing child—experience shows, I repeat, that women, when they are subjected to the disillusionments of marriage, fall ill of severe neuroses which permanently darken their lives. Under the cultural conditions of to-day, marriage has long ceased to be a panacea for the nervous troubles of women; and if we doctors still advise marriage in such cases, we are nevertheless aware that, on the contrary, a girl must be very healthy if she is to be able to tolerate it, and we urgently advise our male patients not to marry any girl who has had nervous trouble before marriage. On the contrary, the cure for nervous illness arising from marriage would be marital unfaithfulness. But the more strictly a woman has been brought up and the more sternly she has submitted to the demands of civilization, the more she is afraid of taking this way out; and in the conflict between her desires and her sense of duty, she once more seeks refuge in a neurosis. Nothing protects her virtue as securely as an illness. Thus the married state, which is held out as a consolation to the sexual instinct of the civilized person in his youth, proves to be inadequate even to the demands of the actual period of

life covered by it. There is no question of its being able to compensate for the deprivation which precedes it.

But even if the damage done by civilized sexual morality is admitted, it may be argued in reply to our third question [p. 193] that the cultural gain derived from such an extensive restriction of sexuality probably more than balances these sufferings, which, after all, only affect a minority in any severe form. I must confess that I am unable to balance gain against loss correctly on this point, but I could advance a great many more considerations on the side of the loss. Going back to the subject of abstinence, which I have already touched on, I must insist that it brings in its train other noxae besides those involved in the neuroses and that the importance of the neuroses has for the most part not been fully appreciated.

The retardation of sexual development and sexual activity at which our education and civilization aim is certainly not injurious to begin with. It is seen to be a necessity, when one considers the late age at which young people of the educated classes reach independence and are able to earn a living. (This reminds one, incidentally, of the intimate interconnection between all our cultural institutions and of the difficulty of altering any part of them without regard to the whole.)<sup>1</sup> But abstinence continued long after the age of twenty is no longer unobjectionable for a young man; and it leads to other damage even when it does not lead to neurosis. People say, to be sure, that the struggle against such a powerful instinct, and the strengthening of all the ethical and aesthetic forces which are necessary for this struggle, 'steel' the character; and this is true for a few specially favourably organized natures. It must also be admitted that the differentiation of individual character, which is so marked in our day, has only become possible with the existence of sexual restriction. But in the vast majority of cases the struggle against sexuality eats up the energy available in a character and this at the very time when a young man is in

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. above, p. 139.]

need of all his forces in order to win his share and place in society. The relationship between the amount of sublimation possible and the amount of sexual activity necessary naturally varies very much from person to person and even from one calling to another. An abstinent artist is hardly conceivable; but an abstinent young *savant* is certainly no rarity. The latter can, by his self-restraint, liberate forces for his studies; while the former probably finds his artistic achievements powerfully stimulated by his sexual experience. In general I have not gained the impression that sexual abstinence helps to bring about energetic and self-reliant men of action or original thinkers or bold emancipators and reformers. Far more often it goes to produce well-behaved weaklings who later become lost in the great mass of people that tends to follow, unwillingly, the leads given by strong individuals.

The fact that the sexual instinct behaves in general in a self-willed and inflexible fashion is also seen in the results produced by efforts at abstinence. Civilized education may only attempt to suppress the instinct temporarily, till marriage, intending to give it free rein afterwards with the idea of then making use of it. But extreme measures are more successful against it than attempts at moderating it; thus the suppression often goes too far, with the unwished-for result that when the instinct is set free it turns out to be permanently impaired. For this reason complete abstinence in youth is often not the best preparation for marriage for a young man. Women sense this, and prefer among their suitors those who have already proved their masculinity with other women. The harmful results which the strict demand for abstinence before marriage produces in women's natures are quite especially apparent. It is clear that education is far from underestimating the task of suppressing a girl's sensuality till her marriage, for it makes use of the most drastic measures. Not only does it forbid sexual intercourse and set a high premium on the preservation of female chastity, but it also protects the young woman from temptation

as she grows up, by keeping her ignorant of all the facts of the part she is to play and by not tolerating any impulse of love in her which cannot lead to marriage. The result is that when the girl's parental authorities suddenly allow her to fall in love, she is unequal to this psychical achievement and enters marriage uncertain of her own feelings. In consequence of this artificial retardation in her function of love, she has nothing but disappointments to offer the man who has saved up all his desire for her. In her mental feelings she is still attached to her parents, whose authority has brought about the suppression of her sexuality; and in her physical behaviour she shows herself frigid, which deprives the man of any high degree of sexual enjoyment. I do not know whether the anaesthetic type of woman exists apart from civilized education, though I consider it probable. But in any case such education actually breeds it, and these women who conceive without pleasure show little willingness afterwards to face the pains of frequent childbirth. In this way, the preparation for marriage frustrates the aims of marriage itself. When later on the retardation in the wife's development has been overcome and her capacity to love is awakened at the climax of her life as a woman, her relations to her husband have long since been ruined; and, as a reward for her previous docility, she is left with the choice between unappeased desire, unfaithfulness or a neurosis.

The sexual behaviour of a human being often *lays down the pattern* for all his other modes of reacting to life. If a man is energetic in winning the object of his love, we are confident that he will pursue his other aims with an equally unswerving energy; but if, for all sorts of reasons, he refrains from satisfying his strong sexual instincts, his behaviour will be conciliatory and resigned rather than vigorous in other spheres of life as well. A special application of this proposition that sexual life lays down the pattern for the exercise of other functions can easily be recognized in the female sex as a whole. Their upbringing forbids their concerning themselves

intellectually with sexual problems though they nevertheless feel extremely curious about them, and frightens them by condemning such curiosity as unwomanly and a sign of a sinful disposition. In this way they are scared away from *any* form of thinking, and knowledge loses its value for them. The prohibition of thought extends beyond the sexual field, partly through unavoidable association, partly automatically, like the prohibition of thought about religion among men, or the prohibition of thought about loyalty among faithful subjects. I do not believe that women's 'physiological feeble-mindedness' is to be explained by a biological opposition between intellectual work and sexual activity, as Moebius has asserted in a work<sup>1</sup> which has been widely disputed. I think that the undoubted intellectual inferiority of so many women can rather be traced back to the inhibition of thought necessitated by sexual suppression.

In considering the question of abstinence, the distinction is not nearly strictly enough made between two forms of it—namely abstention from any sexual activity whatever and abstention from sexual intercourse with the opposite sex. Many people who boast of succeeding in being abstinent have only been able to do so with the help of masturbation and similar satisfactions which are linked with the auto-erotic sexual activities of early childhood. But precisely because of this connection such substitutive means of sexual satisfaction are by no means harmless; they predispose to the numerous varieties of neuroses and psychoses which are conditional on an involution of sexual life to its infantile forms. Masturbation, moreover, is far from meeting the ideal demands of civilized sexual morality, and consequently drives young people into the same conflicts with the ideals of education which they hoped to escape by abstinence. Furthermore, it vitiates the character through *indulgence*, and this in more than one way. In the first place, it teaches people to achieve important aims without taking trouble and by easy paths instead of through an energetic exertion of force

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. Moebius, 1903.]



—that is, it follows the principle that *sexuality lays down the pattern* of behaviour [see above p. 198]; secondly, in the phantasies that accompany satisfaction the sexual object is raised to a degree of excellence which is not easily found again in reality. A witty writer (Karl Kraus in the Vienna paper *Die Fackel*<sup>1</sup>) once expressed this truth in reverse by cynically remarking: 'Copulation is no more than an unsatisfying substitute for masturbation.'<sup>2</sup>

The sternness of the demands of civilization and the difficulty of the task of abstinence have combined to make avoidance of the union of the genitals of the two opposite sexes into the central point of abstinence and to favour other kinds of sexual activity, which, it might be said, are equivalent to semi-obedience. Since normal intercourse has been so relentlessly persecuted by morality—and also, on account of the possibilities of infection, by hygiene—what are known as the perverse forms of intercourse between the two sexes, in which other parts of the body take over the role of the genitals, have undoubtedly increased in social importance. These activities cannot, however, be regarded as being as harmless as analogous extensions [of the sexual aim]<sup>3</sup> in love-relationships. They are ethically objectionable, for they degrade the relationships of love between two human beings from a serious matter to a convenient game, attended by no risk and no spiritual participation. A further consequence of the aggravation of the difficulties of normal sexual life is to be found in the spread of homosexual satisfaction; in addition to all those who are homosexuals in virtue of their organization, or who became so in their childhood, there must be reckoned the

<sup>1</sup> [Karl Kraus (1874–1936), the Austrian journalist and poet, was celebrated for his pugnacious and scathing wit. An anecdote about him is quoted by Freud in his book on jokes (1905c), Chapter II, Section 11, and is repeated in a footnote to the 'Rat Man' case history (1909d), *Standard Ed.*, 10, 227 n.]

<sup>2</sup> [In a much fuller discussion of masturbation some years later (1912f), Freud returned to the points mentioned in this paragraph. See *Standard Ed.*, 12, 251–2.]

<sup>3</sup> [See Freud's *Three Essays*, *Standard Ed.*, 7, 150 ff.]

great number of those in whom, in their maturer years, a blocking of the main stream of their libido has caused a widening in the side-channel of homosexuality.

All these unavoidable and unintended consequences of the requirement for abstinence converge in the one common result of completely ruining the preparation for marriage—marriage, which civilized sexual morality thinks should be the sole heir to the sexual impulses. Every man whose libido, as a result of masturbatory or perverse sexual practices, has become habituated to situations and conditions of satisfaction which are not normal, develops diminished potency in marriage. Women, too, who have been able to preserve their virginity with the help of similar measures, show themselves anaesthetic to normal intercourse in marriage. A marriage begun with a reduced capacity to love on both sides succumbs to the process of dissolution even more quickly than others. As a result of the man's weak potency, the woman is not satisfied, and she remains anaesthetic even in cases where her disposition to frigidity, derived from her education, could have been overcome by a powerful sexual experience. A couple like this finds more difficulties, too, in the prevention of children than a healthy one, since the husband's diminished potency tolerates the use of contraceptives badly. In this perplexity, sexual intercourse, as being the source of all their embarrassments, is soon given up, and with this the basis of married life is abandoned.

I ask any well-informed person to bear witness to the fact that I am not exaggerating but that I am describing a state of affairs of which equally bad instances can be observed over and over again. To the uninitiated it is hardly credible how seldom normal potency is to be found in a husband and how often a wife is frigid among married couples who live under the dominance of our civilized sexual morality, what a degree of renunciation, often on both sides, is entailed by marriage, and to what narrow limits married life—the happiness that is so ardently desired—is narrowed down. I have already explained that in these circumstances the most

obvious outcome is nervous illness; but I must further point out the way in which a marriage of this kind continues to exercise its influence on the few children, or the only child born of it. At a first glance, it seems to be a case of transmission by inheritance; but closer inspection shows that it is really a question of the effect of powerful infantile impressions. A neurotic wife who is unsatisfied by her husband is, as a mother, over-tender and over-anxious towards her child, on to whom she transfers her need for love; and she awakens it to sexual precocity. The bad relations between its parents, moreover, excite its emotional life and cause it to feel love and hatred to an intense degree while it is still at a very tender age. Its strict upbringing, which tolerates no activity of the sexual life that has been aroused so early, lends support to the suppressing force and this conflict at such an age contains everything necessary for bringing about lifelong nervous illness.

I return now to my earlier assertion [p. 196] that, in judging the neuroses, their full importance is not as a rule taken into account. I do not mean by this the undervaluation of these states shown in their frivolous dismissal by relatives and in the boasting assurances by doctors that a few weeks of cold water treatment or a few months of rest and convalescence will cure the condition. These are merely the opinions of quite ignorant doctors and laymen and are mostly no more than words intended to give the sufferer a short-lived consolation. It is, on the contrary, a well-known fact that a chronic neurosis, even if it does not totally put an end to the subject's capacity for existence, represents a severe handicap in his life, of the same order, perhaps, as tuberculosis or a cardiac defect. The situation would even be tolerable if neurotic illness were to exclude from civilized activities only a number of individuals who were in any case of the weaker sort, and allowed the rest to play their part in it at the cost of troubles that were merely subjective. But, far from this being so, I must insist upon the view that neuroses, whatever their extent and wherever they occur, always succeed in

frustrating the purposes of civilization, and in that way actually perform the work of the suppressed mental forces that are hostile to civilization. Thus, when society pays for obedience to its far-reaching regulations by an increase in nervous illness, it cannot claim to have purchased a gain at the price of sacrifices; it cannot claim a gain at all. Let us, for instance, consider the very common case of a woman who does not love her husband, because, owing to the conditions under which she entered marriage, she has no reason to love him, but who very much wants to love him, because that alone corresponds to the ideal of marriage to which she has been brought up. She will in that case suppress every impulse which would express the truth and contradict her endeavours to fulfil her ideal, and she will make special efforts to play the part of a loving, affectionate and attentive wife. The outcome of this self-suppression will be a neurotic illness; and this neurosis will in a short time have taken revenge on the unloved husband and have caused him just as much lack of satisfaction and worry as would have resulted from an acknowledgement of the true state of affairs. This example is completely typical of what a neurosis achieves. A similar failure to obtain compensation is to be seen after the suppression of impulses inimical to civilization which are not directly sexual. If a man, for example, has become over-kind as a result of a violent suppression of a constitutional inclination to harshness and cruelty, he often loses so much energy in doing this that he fails to carry out all that his compensatory impulses require, and he may, after all, do less good on the whole than he would have done without the suppression.

Let us add that a restriction of sexual activity in a community is quite generally accompanied by an increase of anxiety about life and of fear of death which interferes with the individual's capacity for enjoyment and does away with his readiness to face death for any purpose. A diminished inclination to beget children is the result, and the community or group of people in question is thus excluded from

any share in the future. In view of this, we may well raise the question whether our 'civilized' sexual morality is worth the sacrifice which it imposes on us, especially if we are still so much enslaved to hedonism as to include among the aims of our cultural development a certain amount of satisfaction of individual happiness. It is certainly not a physician's business to come forward with proposals for reform; but it seemed to me that I might support the urgency of such proposals if I were to amplify Von Ehrenfels's description of the injurious effects of our 'civilized' sexual morality<sup>1</sup> by pointing to the important bearing of that morality upon the spread of modern nervous illness.

<sup>1</sup> [Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932), Professor of Philosophy at Prague, had been praised by Freud for his courageous criticisms of the institution of marriage, in Section 3 of Chapter III of the book on jokes (1905c).]

ON THE SEXUAL THEORIES OF  
CHILDREN  
(1908)



## EDITOR'S NOTE

### ÜBER INFANTILE SEXUALTHEORIEN

#### (a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- 1908 *Sexual-Probleme*, 4 (12) [December], 763-779.  
1909 *S.K.S.N.*, 2, 159-174. (1912, 2nd ed.; 1921, 3rd ed.)  
1924 *G.S.*, 5, 168-185.  
1931 *Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre*, 43-61.  
1941 *G.W.*, 7, 171-188.

#### (b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

'On the Sexual Theories of Children'

- 1942 *C.P.*, 2, 59-75. (Tr. D. Bryan.)

The present translation is a modified version of the one published in 1924.

This paper was first published in a later issue of the same periodical as the preceding paper (p. 179). Though it made its appearance so unostentatiously, and though there may be little in it to surprise the modern reader, it in fact launched a quite remarkable quantity of new ideas for the first time on the world. The paradox becomes explicable when we realize that this paper was published some months before the 'Little Hans' case history (1909*b*) (though, as will be seen from footnote 2 on p. 218, that work was probably already in proof) and that the section of the *Three Essays* (1905*d*) on 'The Sexual Researches of Childhood' (*Standard Ed.*, 7, 194-7) was only added to that work in 1915, eight years after the publication of this paper, of which in fact that section is little more than an abstract. It is true that in an earlier paper on 'The Sexual Enlightenment of Children' (1907*c*), Freud quoted some of the material derived from 'Little Hans' (p. 134*f*. above)



and discussed very shortly the sexual curiosity of children. He even mentioned the existence of 'infantile sexual theories' (p. 137); but it was a bare mention without the least specification of their nature.

Here, then, the first readers of the present work were confronted, almost without previous warning, with the notions of fertilization through the mouth and of birth through the anus, of parental intercourse as something sadistic, and of the possession of a penis by members of both sexes. This last notion was the one with the most far-reaching implications, and they in turn find a first mention in these pages: the importance attached to the penis by children of both sexes, the results of the discovery that one sex is without it—the emergence in girls of 'envy for the penis' and in boys of the concept of 'the woman with a penis' and its bearing on one form of homosexuality. Finally, we have here the first explicit mention and discussion of the 'castration complex' itself, which had only been foreshadowed by a single obscure reference to a threat of castration in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a, *Standard Ed.*, 5, 619).

The peculiar wealth of material contained here is no doubt to be attributed largely to the findings in the 'Little Hans' analysis, the report upon which, recently completed, illustrated and expanded much of the content of the present paper.

## ON THE SEXUAL THEORIES OF CHILDREN

THE material on which the following synthesis is based is derived from several sources. Firstly, from the direct observation of what children say and do; secondly, from what adult neurotics consciously remember from their childhood and relate during psycho-analytic treatment; and thirdly, from the inferences and constructions, and from the unconscious memories translated into conscious material, which result from the psycho-analysis of neurotics.

That the first of these three sources has not by itself supplied all that is worth knowing on the subject is due to the attitude which the adult adopts towards the sexual life of children. He does not credit them with having any sexual activity and therefore takes no trouble to observe any such thing while, on the other hand, he suppresses any manifestation of such an activity which might claim his attention. Consequently the opportunity of obtaining information from this, the most unequivocal and fertile source of all, is a very restricted one. Whatever comes from the uninfluenced communications made by adults concerning their own conscious childhood memories is at the best subject to the objection that it may have been falsified in retrospect; but, in addition to this, it has to be viewed in the light of the fact that the informants have subsequently become neurotic. The material that comes from the third source is open to all the criticisms which it is the custom to marshal against the trustworthiness of psycho-analysis and the reliability of the conclusions that are drawn from it. Thus I cannot attempt to justify it here; I can only give an assurance that those who know and practise the psycho-analytic technique acquire an extensive confidence in its findings.

I cannot guarantee the completeness of my results, but I can answer for the care taken in arriving at them.

There remains a difficult question to decide. How far may one assume that what is here reported of children generally is true of all children—that is, of every particular child? Pressure of education and varying intensity of the sexual instinct certainly make great individual variations in the sexual behaviour of children possible, and, above all, influence the date at which a child's sexual interest appears. For this reason, I have not divided my presentation of the material according to the successive epochs of childhood, but have combined into a single account things that come into play in different children sometimes earlier and sometimes later. It is my conviction that no child—none, at least, who is mentally normal and still less one who is intellectually gifted—can avoid being occupied with the problems of sex in the years *before* puberty.

I do not think much of the objection that neurotics are a special class of people, marked by an innate disposition that is 'degenerate', from whose childhood life we must not be allowed to infer anything about the childhood of other people. Neurotics are people much like others. They cannot be sharply differentiated from normal people, and in their childhood they are not always easily distinguishable from those who remain healthy in later life. It is one of the most valuable results of our psycho-analytic investigations to have discovered that the neuroses of such people have no special mental content that is peculiar to them, but that, as Jung has expressed it, they fall ill of the same complexes against which we healthy people struggle as well. The only difference is that healthy people know how to overcome those complexes without any gross damage demonstrable in practical life, whereas in nervous cases the suppression of the complexes succeeds only at the price of costly substitutive formations—that is to say, from a practical point of view it is a failure. In childhood neurotic and normal people naturally approximate to each other much more closely than they do in later

life, so that I cannot regard it as a methodological error to make use of the communications of neurotics about their childhood for drawing conclusions by analogy about normal childhood life. But since those who later become neurotics very often have in their inborn constitution an especially strong sexual instinct and a tendency to precocity and to a premature expression of that instinct, they make it possible for us to recognize a great deal of infantile activity more sharply and clearly than our capacity for observation (which is in any case a blunted one) would enable us to do in other children. But we shall of course only be able to assess the true value of these communications made by neurotic adults when, following Havelock Ellis's example, we shall have thought it worth while to collect the childhood memories of *healthy* adults as well.<sup>1</sup>

In consequence of unfavourable circumstances, both of an external and an internal nature, the following observations apply chiefly to the sexual development of one sex only—that is, of males. The value of a compilation such as I am attempting here need not, however, be a purely descriptive one. A knowledge of infantile sexual theories in the shapes they assume in the thoughts of children can be of interest in various ways—even, surprisingly enough, for the elucidation of myths and fairy tales. They are indispensable, moreover, for an understanding of the neuroses themselves; for in them these childish theories are still operative and acquire a determining influence upon the form taken by the symptoms.

If we could divest ourselves of our corporeal existence, and could view the things of this earth with a fresh eye as purely thinking beings, from another planet for instance, nothing perhaps would strike our attention more forcibly than the fact of the existence of two sexes among human

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. Havelock Ellis, 1903, Appendix B. Freud had discussed these narratives in a footnote to the second of his *Three Essays* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 190–1.]

beings, who, though so much alike in other respects, yet mark the difference between them with such obvious external signs. But it does not seem that children choose this fundamental fact in the same way as the starting-point of their researches into sexual problems. Since they have known a father and mother as far back as they can remember in life, they accept their existence as a reality which needs no further enquiry, and a boy has the same attitude towards a little sister from whom he is separated by only a slight difference of age of one or two years. A child's desire for knowledge on this point does not in fact awaken spontaneously, prompted perhaps by some inborn need for established causes; it is aroused under the goad of the self-seeking instincts that dominate him, when—perhaps after the end of his second year—he is confronted with the arrival of a new baby. And a child whose own nursery has received no such addition is able, from observations made in other homes, to put himself in the same situation. The loss of his parents' care, which he actually experiences or justly fears, and the presentiment that from now on he must for evermore share all his possessions with the newcomer, have the effect of awakening his emotions and sharpening his capacities for thought. The elder child expresses unconcealed hostility towards his rival, which finds vent in unfriendly criticisms of it, in wishes that 'the stork should take it away again'<sup>1</sup> and occasionally even in small attacks upon the creature lying helpless in the cradle. A wider difference in age usually softens the expression of this primary hostility. In the same way, at a rather later age, if no small brother or sister has appeared, the child's wish for a playmate, such as he has seen in other families, may gain the upper hand.

At the instigation of these feelings and worries, the child now comes to be occupied with the first, grand problem of life and asks himself the question: '*Where do babies come from?*'<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [This anecdote appeared in the first edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard, Ed.*, 4, 251.]

<sup>2</sup> [See footnote above, p. 135.]

—a question which, there can be no doubt, first ran: 'Where did this particular, intruding baby come from?' We seem to hear the echoes of this first riddle in innumerable riddles of myth and legend. The question itself is, like all research, the product of a vital exigency,<sup>1</sup> as though thinking were entrusted with the task of preventing the recurrence of such dreaded events. Let us assume, however, that the child's thinking soon becomes independent of this instigation, and henceforward goes on operating as a self-sustained instinct for research. Where a child is not already too much intimidated, he sooner or later adopts the direct method of demanding an answer from his parents or those in charge of him, who are in his eyes the source of all knowledge. This method, however, fails. The child receives either evasive answers or a rebuke for his curiosity, or he is dismissed with the mythologically significant piece of information which, in German countries, runs: 'The stork brings the babies; it fetches them out of the water.' I have reason to believe that far more children than their parents suspect are dissatisfied with this solution and meet it with energetic doubts, which, however, they do not always openly admit. I know of a three-year-old boy who, after receiving this piece of enlightenment, disappeared—to the terror of his nurse. He was found at the edge of the big pond adjoining the country house, to which he had hurried in order to see the babies in the water. I also know of another boy who could only allow his disbelief to find expression in a hesitant remark that he knew better, that it was not a stork that brought babies but a heron. It seems to me to follow from a great deal of information I have received that children refuse to believe the stork theory and that from the time of this first deception and rebuff they nourish a distrust of adults and have a suspicion of there being something forbidden which is

<sup>1</sup> [The part played in mental development by the 'exigencies of life' was discussed by Freud in Chapter VII (C) of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *Standard Ed.*, 5, 565, and earlier in his 'Project' of 1895 (Section 1 of Part I), Freud, 1950a.]

being withheld from them by the 'grown-ups', and that they consequently hide their further researches under a cloak of secrecy. With this, however, the child also experiences the first occasion for a 'psychical conflict', in that views for which he feels an instinctual kind of preference, but which are not 'right' in the eyes of the grown-ups, come into opposition with other views, which are supported by the authority of the grown-ups without being acceptable to him himself. Such a psychical conflict may soon turn into a 'psychical dissociation'. The set of views which are bound up with being 'good', but also with a cessation of reflection, become the dominant and conscious views; while the other set, for which the child's work of research has meanwhile obtained fresh evidence, but which are not supposed to count, become the suppressed and 'unconscious' ones. The nuclear complex<sup>1</sup> of a neurosis is in this way brought into being.

Recently, the analysis of a five-year-old boy,<sup>2</sup> which his father undertook and which he has handed over to me for publication, has given me irrefutable proof of the correctness of a view towards which the psycho-analysis of adults had long been leading me. I now know that the change which takes place in the mother during pregnancy does not escape the child's sharp eyes and that he is very well able before long to establish the true connection between the increase in his mother's stoutness and the appearance of the baby. In the case just mentioned the boy was three and a half years old when his sister was born and four and three quarters when he showed his better knowledge by the most unmistakable allusions. This precocious discovery, however, is always kept secret, and later, in conformity with the further vicissitudes of the child's sexual researches, it is repressed and forgotten.

<sup>1</sup> [Soon after this, e.g. in the 'Rat Man' case history (1909*d*), *Standard Ed.*, 10, 208 *n*, Freud was using this term as equivalent to what a little later (1910*h*), *Standard Ed.*, 11, 171, he called the 'Oedipus complex'. In the present passage, where it first appears, the application is wider.]

<sup>2</sup> [The case history of 'Little Hans' (1909*b*), which was published shortly after the present paper.]

The 'stork fable', therefore, is not one of the sexual theories of children. On the contrary, it is the child's observation of animals, who hide so little of their sexual life and to whom he feels so closely akin, that strengthens his disbelief in it. With his knowledge, independently obtained, that babies grow inside the mother's body, he would be on the right road to solving the problem on which he first tries out his powers of thinking. But his further progress is inhibited by a piece of ignorance which cannot be made good [see below, p. 218f.] and by false theories which the state of his own sexuality imposes on him.

These false sexual theories, which I shall now discuss, all have one very curious characteristic. Although they go astray in a grotesque fashion, yet each one of them contains a fragment of real truth; and in this they are analogous to the attempts of adults, which are looked at as strokes of genius, at solving the problems of the universe which are too hard for human comprehension. What is correct and hits the mark in such theories is to be explained by their origin from the components of the sexual instinct which are already stirring in the childish organism. For it is not owing to any arbitrary mental act or to chance impressions that those notions arise, but to the necessities of the child's psycho-sexual constitution; and this is why we can speak of sexual theories in children as being typical, and why we find the same mistaken beliefs in every child whose sexual life is accessible to us.

The first of these theories starts out from the neglect of the differences between the sexes on which I laid stress at the beginning of this paper [p. 211f.] as being characteristic of children. It consists in *attributing to everyone, including females, the possession of a penis*, such as the boy knows from his own body. It is precisely in what we must regard as the 'normal' sexual constitution that already in childhood the penis is the leading erotogenic zone and the chief auto-erotic sexual object; and the boy's estimate of its value is logically reflected in his inability to imagine a person like himself who is



without this essential constituent. When a small boy sees his little sister's genitals, what he says shows that his prejudice is already strong enough to falsify his perception.<sup>1</sup> He does not comment on the absence of a penis, but *invariably* says, as though by way of consolation and to put things right: 'Her —'s still quite small. But when she gets bigger it'll grow all right.'<sup>2</sup> The idea of a woman with a penis returns in later life, in the dreams of adults: the dreamer, in a state of nocturnal sexual excitation, will throw a woman down, strip her and prepare for intercourse—and then, in place of the female genitals, he beholds a well-developed penis and breaks off the dream and the excitation. The numerous hermaphrodites of classical antiquity faithfully reproduce this idea, universally held in childhood; one may observe that to most normal people they cause no offence, while the real hermaphroditic formations of the genitals which are permitted to occur by Nature nearly always excite the greatest abhorrence.

If this idea of a woman with a penis becomes 'fixated' in an individual when he is a child, resisting all the influences of later life and making him as a man unable to do without a penis in his sexual object, then, although in other respects he may lead a normal sexual life, he is bound to become a homosexual, and will seek his sexual object among men who, owing to some other physical and mental characteristics, remind him of women.<sup>3</sup> Real women, when he comes to know them later, remain impossible as sexual objects for him, because they lack the essential sexual attraction; indeed, in connection with another impression of his childhood life,

<sup>1</sup> [This 'falsified perception', or, as Freud afterwards named it, this 'denial' or 'disavowal', was very much later to become the basis of important theoretical discussions. Cf. in particular the paper on 'Fetishism' (1927*e*) and Chapter VIII of the posthumous *Outline of Psycho-Analysis* (1940*a* [1938]).]

<sup>2</sup> [Cf. an almost identical remark by 'Little Hans', *Standard Ed.*, 10, 11.]

<sup>3</sup> [Freud returned to this in his case history of 'Little Hans' (1909*b*), *Standard Ed.*, 10, 109.]

they may even become abhorrent to him. The child, having been mainly dominated by excitations in the penis, will usually have obtained pleasure by stimulating it with his hand; he will have been detected in this by his parents or nurse and terrorized by the threat of having his penis cut off. The effect of this 'threat of castration' is proportionate to the value set upon that organ and is quite extraordinarily deep and persistent. Legends and myths testify to the upheaval in the child's emotional life and to the horror which is linked with the castration complex<sup>1</sup>—a complex which is subsequently remembered by consciousness with corresponding reluctance. The woman's genitalia, when seen later on, are regarded as a mutilated organ and recall this threat, and they therefore arouse horror instead of pleasure in the homosexual. This reaction cannot be altered in any way when the homosexual comes to learn from science that his childish assumption that women had a penis too was not so far wrong after all. Anatomy has recognized the clitoris within the female pudenda as being an organ that is homologous to the penis; and the physiology of the sexual processes has been able to add that this small penis which does not grow any bigger behaves in fact during childhood like a real and genuine penis—that it becomes the seat of excitations which lead to its being touched, that its excitability gives the little girl's sexual activity a masculine character and that a wave of repression in the years of puberty is needed in order for this masculine sexuality to be discarded and the woman to emerge. Since the sexual function of many women is crippled, whether by their obstinate clinging on to this excitability of the clitoris so that they remain anaesthetic in intercourse, or by such excessive repression occurring that its operation is partly replaced by hysterical compensatory formations—all

<sup>1</sup> [The first published appearance of the term is the present one, and not the passage in 'Little Hans', *Standard Ed.*, 10, 8, as is there wrongly suggested in a footnote. The idea of a threat of castration occurs in a single sentence in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *Standard Ed.*, 5, 619.]

this seems to show that there is some truth in the infantile sexual theory that women, like men, possess a penis.<sup>1</sup>

It is easy to observe that little girls fully share their brother's opinion of it. They develop a great interest in that part of the boy's body. But this interest promptly falls under the sway of envy. They feel themselves unfairly treated. They make attempts to micturate in the posture that is made possible for boys by their possessing a big penis; and when a girl declares that 'she would rather be a boy', we know what deficiency her wish is intended to put right.

If children could follow the hints given by the excitation of the penis they would get a little nearer to the solution of their problem. That the baby grows inside the mother's body is obviously not a sufficient explanation. How does it get inside? What starts its development? That the father has something to do with it seems likely; he says that the baby is *his* baby as well.<sup>2</sup> Again, the penis certainly has a share, too, in these mysterious happenings; the excitation in it which accompanies all these activities of the child's thoughts bears witness to this. Attached to this excitation are impulses which the child cannot account for—obscure urges to do something violent, to press in, to knock to pieces, to tear open a hole somewhere. But when the child thus seems to be well on the way to postulating the existence of the vagina and to concluding that an incursion of this kind by his father's penis into his mother is the act by means of which the baby is created in his mother's body—at this juncture his enquiry is broken off in helpless perplexity. For standing in its way is his theory that his mother possesses a penis just as a man does, and the existence of the cavity which receives the penis remains undiscovered by him. It is not hard to guess that the lack of success of his intellectual efforts makes it easier for

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *Three Essays* (1905d), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 220–1. A much earlier hint at some of this occurs in a letter to Fliess of November 14, 1897 (Freud, 1950a, Letter 75).]

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the 'Analysis of a Five-Year-Old Boy' (1909b) [*Standard Ed.*, 10, 133–4].

him to reject and forget them. This brooding and doubting, however, becomes the prototype of all later intellectual work directed towards the solution of problems, and the first failure has a crippling effect on the child's whole future.<sup>1</sup>

Their ignorance of the vagina also makes it possible for children to believe in the second of their sexual theories. If the baby grows in the mother's body and is then removed from it, this can only happen along the one possible pathway—the anal aperture. *The baby must be evacuated like a piece of excrement, like a stool.* When, in later childhood, the same question is the subject of solitary reflection or of a discussion between two children, the explanations probably arrived at are that the baby emerges from the navel, which comes open, or that the abdomen is slit up and the baby taken out—which was what happened to the wolf in the story of Little Red Riding-Hood. These theories are expressed aloud and also consciously remembered later on; they no longer contain anything objectionable. These same children have by then completely forgotten that in earlier years they believed in another theory of birth, which is now obstructed by the repression of the anal sexual components that has meanwhile occurred. At that time a motion was something which could be talked about in the nursery without shame. The child was still not so distant from his constitutional coprophilic inclinations. There was nothing degraded about coming into the world like a heap of faeces, which had not yet been condemned by feelings of disgust. The cloacal theory, which, after all, is valid for so many animals, was the most natural theory, and it alone could obtrude upon the child as being a probable one.

This being so, however, it was only logical that the child should refuse to grant women the painful prerogative of giving birth to children. If babies are born through the anus, then

<sup>1</sup> [Freud quoted this last sentence in a footnote to his study of Leonardo (1910c), *Standard Ed.*, 11, 79, where this same subject is discussed. The question had already been approached by Freud (see above, p. 136).]

a man can give birth just as well as a woman. It is therefore possible for a boy to imagine that he, too, has children of his own, without there being any need to accuse him on that account of having feminine inclinations.<sup>1</sup> He is merely giving evidence in this of the anal erotism which is still alive in him.

If the cloacal theory of birth is preserved in consciousness during later years of childhood, as occasionally happens, it is accompanied too by a solution—no longer, it is true, a primary one—of the problem of the origin of babies. Here it is like being in a fairy story; one eats some particular thing and gets a child from it. This infantile theory of birth is revived in cases of insanity. A manic woman, for instance, will lead the visiting doctor to a little heap of faeces which she has deposited in a corner of her cell, and say to him with a laugh: 'That's the baby I had to-day.'

The third of the typical sexual theories arises in children if, through some chance domestic occurrence, they become witnesses of sexual intercourse between their parents. Their perceptions of what is happening are bound, however, to be only very incomplete. Whatever detail it may be that comes under their observation—whether it is the relative positions of the two people, or the noises they make, or some accessory circumstance—children arrive in every case at the same conclusion. They adopt what may be called a *sadistic view of coition*. They see it as something that the stronger participant is forcibly inflicting on the weaker, and they (especially boys) compare it to the romping familiar to them from their childish experience—romping which, incidentally, is not without a dash of sexual excitation. I have not been able to ascertain that children recognize this behaviour which they have witnessed between their parents as the missing link needed for solving the problem of babies; it appears more

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. a similar remark in the case history of 'Little Hans', *Standard Ed.*, 10, 93 n. It was only later, especially in the 'Wolf Man' analysis (1918b), that Freud drew attention to the close connection that can exist between anal erotism and a feminine attitude. See, for instance, *Standard Ed.*, 17, 81.]

often that the connection is overlooked by them for the very reason that they have interpreted the act of love as an act of violence. But this view of it itself gives an impression of being a return of the obscure impulse towards cruel behaviour which became attached to the excitations of the child's penis when he first began to think about the problem of where babies came from [cf. above, p. 218]. The possibility, too, cannot be excluded that this premature sadistic impulse, which might so nearly have led to the discovery of coition, itself first emerged under the influence of extremely obscure memories of parental intercourse, for which the child had obtained the material—though at the time he made no use of it—while he was still in his first years and was sharing his parents' bedroom.<sup>1</sup>

The sadistic theory of coitus which, taken in isolation, is misleading where it might have provided confirmatory evidence, is, once again, the expression of one of the innate components of the sexual instinct, any of which may be strongly marked to a greater or lesser degree in each particular child. For this reason the theory is correct up to a certain point; it has in part divined the nature of the sexual act and the 'sex-battle' that precedes it. Not infrequently, too, the child is in a position to support this view by accidental observations which he understands in part correctly, but also in part incorrectly and indeed in a reversed sense. In many marriages the wife does in fact recoil from her husband's embraces, which bring her no pleasure, but the risk of a fresh pregnancy. And so the child who is believed to be asleep (or who is pretending to be asleep) may receive an impression from his mother which he can only interpret as meaning that she is defending herself against an act of violence. At other times the whole marriage offers an observant child the spectacle of

<sup>1</sup> Restif de la Bretonne, in his autobiographical work *Monsieur Nicolas* (1794), tells a story of an impression he received at the age of four, which confirms this sadistic misunderstanding of coitus.—[This question came up for lengthy discussion some ten years later, in Freud's 'Wolf Man' case history. (See in particular *Standard Ed.*, 17, 48 ff.)]

an unceasing quarrel, expressed in loud words and unfriendly gestures; so that he need not be surprised if the quarrel is carried on at night as well, and finally settled by the same method which he himself is accustomed to use in his relations with his brothers and sisters or playmates.

Moreover, if the child discovers spots of blood in his mother's bed or on her underclothes, he regards it as a confirmation of his view. It proves to him that his father has made another similar assault on his mother during the night (whereas we should rather take the fresh spots of blood to mean that there had been a temporary cessation of sexual intercourse). Much of the otherwise inexplicable 'horror of blood' shown by neurotics finds its explanation from this connection. Once again, however, the child's mistake contains a fragment of truth. For in certain familiar circumstances a trace of blood is in fact judged as a sign that sexual intercourse has been begun.

A question connected somewhat indirectly with the insoluble problem of where babies come from also engages the child—the question as to the nature and content of the state called 'being married'; and he answers the question differently according as his chance perceptions in relation to his parents have coincided with instincts of his own which are still pleurably coloured. All that these answers seem to have in common is that the child promises himself pleasurable satisfaction from being married and supposes that it involves a disregard of modesty. The notion I have most frequently met with is that *each of the married couple urinates in front of the other*. A variation of this, which sounds as if it was meant to indicate a greater knowledge symbolically, is that *the man urinates into the woman's chamber-pot*. In other instances the meaning of marriage is supposed to be that *the two people show their behinds to each other* (without being ashamed). In one case, in which education had succeeded in postponing sexual knowledge especially late, a fourteen-year-old girl, who had already begun to menstruate, arrived from the books she had read at the idea that being married consisted

in a 'mixing of blood'; and since her own sister had not yet started her periods, the lustful girl made an assault on a female visitor who had confessed that she was just then menstruating, so as to force her to take part in this 'blood-mixing'.

Childhood opinions about the nature of marriage, which are not seldom retained by conscious memory, have great significance for the symptomatology of later neurotic illness. At first they find expression in children's games in which each child does with another whatever it is that in his view constitutes being married; and then, later on, the wish to be married may choose the infantile form of expression and so make its appearance in a phobia which is at first sight unrecognizable, or in some corresponding symptom.<sup>1</sup>

These seem to be the most important of the typical sexual theories that children produce spontaneously in early childhood, under the sole influence of the components of the sexual instinct. I know that I have not succeeded in making my material complete or in establishing an unbroken connection between it and the rest of infantile life. But I may add one or two supplementary observations, whose absence would otherwise be noticed by any well-informed person. Thus, for instance, there is the significant theory that a baby is got by a kiss—a theory which obviously betrays the predominance of the erotogenic zone of the mouth. In my experience this theory is exclusively feminine and is sometimes found to be pathogenic in girls whose sexual researches have been subjected to exceedingly strong inhibitions in childhood. Again, through an accidental observation, one of my women patients happened upon the theory of the 'couvade', which, as is well known, is a general custom among some races and is probably intended to contradict the doubts as to paternity which can never be entirely overcome. A rather eccentric uncle of this patient's stayed at home for days after the birth of his

<sup>1</sup> The games that are most significant for subsequent neuroses are playing at 'doctor' and at 'father and mother'.



child and received visitors in his dressing-gown, from which she concluded that both parents took part in the birth of their children and had to go to bed.

In about their tenth or eleventh year, children get to hear about sexual matters. A child who has grown up in a comparatively uninhibited social atmosphere, or who has found better opportunities for observation, tells other children what he knows, because this makes him feel mature and superior. What children learn in this way is mostly correct—that is, the existence of the vagina and its purpose is revealed to them; but otherwise the explanations they get from one another are not infrequently mixed with false ideas and burdened with remains of the older infantile sexual theories. They are scarcely ever complete or sufficient to solve the primordial problem. Just as formerly it was ignorance of the vagina which prevented the whole process from being understood, so now is it ignorance of the semen. The child cannot guess that another substance besides urine is excreted from the male sexual organ, and occasionally an ‘innocent’ girl on her wedding night is still indignant at her husband ‘urinating into her’. This information acquired in the years of pre-puberty is followed by a new access of sexual researches by the child. But the theories which he now produces no longer have the typical and original stamp which was characteristic of the primary theories of early childhood as long as the infantile sexual components could find expression in theories in an uninhibited and unmodified fashion. The child’s later intellectual efforts at solving the puzzles of sex have not seemed to me worth collecting, nor can they have much claim to a pathogenic significance. Their multiplicity is of course mainly dependent on the nature of the enlightenment which a child receives; but their significance consists rather in the fact that they re-awaken the traces, which have since become unconscious, of his first period of sexual interest; so that it is not infrequent for masturbatory sexual activity and some degree of emotional detachment from his parents to be linked up with them. Hence the condemnatory

judgement of teachers that enlightenment of such a kind at this age 'corrupts' children.

Let me give a few examples to show what elements often enter into these late speculations by children about sexual life. A girl had heard from her schoolmates that the husband gives his wife an egg, which she hatches out in her body. A boy, who had also heard of the egg, identified it with the testicle, which [in German] is vulgarly called by the same word [*Ei*]; and he racked his brains to make out how the contents of the scrotum could be constantly renewed. The information given seldom goes far enough to prevent important uncertainties about sexual events. Thus a girl may arrive at an expectation that intercourse occurs on one occasion only, but that it lasts a very long time—twenty-four hours—and that all the successive babies come from this single occasion. One would suppose that this child had got her knowledge of the reproductive process from certain insects; but it turned out that this was not so and that the theory emerged as a spontaneous creation. Other girls are ignorant of the period of gestation, the life in the womb, and assume that the baby appears immediately after the first night of intercourse. Marcel Prévost has turned this girlhood mistake into an amusing story in one of his '*Lettres de femmes*'.<sup>1</sup> These later sexual researches of children, or of adolescents who have been retarded at the stage of childhood, offer an almost inexhaustible theme and one which is perhaps not uninteresting in general; but it is more remote from my present interest. I must only lay stress on the fact that in this field children produce many incorrect ideas in order to contradict older and better knowledge which has become unconscious and is repressed.

The way in which children react to the information they are given also has its significance. In some, sexual repression has gone so far that they will not listen to anything; and these succeed in remaining ignorant even in later life—*apparently* ignorant, at least—until, in the psycho-analysis of

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. Prévost, 'La nuit de Raymonde', *Nouvelles lettres de femmes*.]

neurotics, the knowledge that originated in early childhood comes to light. I also know of two boys between ten and thirteen years old who, though it is true that they listened to the sexual information, rejected it with the words: '*Your* father and other people may do something like that, but I know for certain *my* father never would.'<sup>1</sup> But however widely children's later reactions to the satisfaction of their sexual curiosity may vary, we may assume that in the first years of childhood their attitude was absolutely uniform, and we may feel certain that at that time all of them tried most eagerly to discover what it was that their parents did with each other so as to produce babies.

<sup>1</sup> [This anecdote was repeated by Freud in his somewhat later paper on a special type of object-choice (1910*h*), *Standard Ed.*, 11, 170, where some further remarks on the present subject will be found.]

SOME GENERAL REMARKS ON  
HYSTERICAL ATTACKS  
(1909 [1908])

## ALLGEMEINES ÜBER DEN HYSTERISCHEN ANFALL

### (a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- (1908 Probable date of composition.)  
1909 *Z. Psychother. med. Psychol.*, 1 (1) [January], 10–14.  
1909 *S.K.S.N.*, 2, 146–150. (1912, 2nd ed.; 1921, 3rd ed.)  
1924 *G.S.*, 5, 255–260.  
1941 *G.W.*, 7, 235–240.

### (b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

- ‘General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks’  
1924 *C.P.*, 2, 100–104. (Tr. D. Bryan.)

The present translation, with a slightly changed title, is a modified version of the one published in 1924.

This paper was contributed by Freud at the invitation of Albert Moll to the first number of a new periodical which he was founding. Some months earlier, on April 8, 1908, Freud had spoken on the same subject at a meeting of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society. His last discussion of it had been in Section IV of the Breuer and Freud ‘Preliminary Communication’ (1893*a*) to the *Studies on Hysteria*. The present paper is one of those highly condensed, almost schematic, works in which we can detect the seeds of later developments. (See especially Section B.) But Freud did not return again to the actual theme of hysterical attacks till twenty years later, in his discussion of Dostoevsky’s ‘epileptic’ attacks (1928*b*).

## SOME GENERAL REMARKS ON HYSTERICAL ATTACKS

### A

WHEN one carries out the psycho-analysis of a hysterical woman patient whose complaint is manifested in attacks, one soon becomes convinced that these attacks are nothing else but phantasies translated into the motor sphere, projected on to motility and portrayed in pantomime. It is true that the phantasies are unconscious; but apart from this they are of the same nature as the phantasies which can be observed directly in day-dreams or which can be elicited by interpretation from dreams at night. Often a dream takes the place of an attack,<sup>1</sup> and still more often it explains it, since the same phantasy finds a different expression in a dream and in an attack. We might expect then that by observing an attack we should be able to get to know the phantasy represented in it; but this is seldom possible. As a rule, owing to the influence of the censorship, the pantomimic portrayal of the phantasy has undergone distortions which are completely analogous to the hallucinatory distortions of a dream, so that both of them have, in the first resort, become unintelligible to the subject's own consciousness as well as to the observer's comprehension. A hysterical attack, therefore, needs to be subjected to the same interpretative revision as we employ for night-dreams. But not only are the forces from which the distortion proceeds and the purpose of the distortion the same as those we have come to know through the interpretation of dreams; the technique employed in the distortion is the same too.

(1) The attack becomes unintelligible through the fact that it represents several phantasies in the same material

<sup>1</sup> [A footnote to this effect was added in 1909 to *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Standard Ed., 5, 494.]

simultaneously—that is to say through *condensation*. The elements common to the two (or more) phantasies constitute the nucleus of the representation, as they do in dreams. The phantasies which are thus made to coincide are often of quite a different nature. They may, for instance, be a recent wish and the re-activation of an infantile impression. The same innervations are in that case made to serve both purposes, often in a most ingenious way. Hysterical patients who make a very extensive use of condensation may find a single form of attack sufficient; others express their numerous pathogenic phantasies by a multiplication of the forms of attack.

(2) The attack becomes obscured through the fact that the patient attempts to carry out the activities of both the figures who appear in the phantasy, that is to say, through *multiple identification*. Compare, for instance, the example I mentioned in my paper on 'Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality' (1908*a*), in which the patient tore off her dress with one hand (as the man) while she pressed it to her body with the other (as the woman).<sup>1</sup>

(3) A particularly extensive distortion is effected by an *antagonistic inversion of the innervations*. This is analogous to the transformation of an element into its opposite, which commonly happens in the dream-work.<sup>2</sup> For instance, an embrace may be represented in the attack by drawing back the arms convulsively till the hands meet over the spinal column. It is possible that the well-known *arc de cercle* which occurs during attacks in major hysteria is nothing else than an energetic repudiation like this, through antagonistic innervation, of a posture of the body that is suitable for sexual intercourse.

(4) Scarcely less confusing and misleading is a *reversal of the chronological order* within the phantasy that is portrayed, which once more has its complete counterpart in a number

<sup>1</sup> [See above, p. 166.]

<sup>2</sup> [Cf. a passage added to *The Interpretation of Dreams* in 1909, *Standard Ed.*, 4, 327 f.]

of dreams which begin with the end of the action and end with its beginning. Supposing, for instance, that a hysterical woman has a phantasy of seduction in which she is sitting reading in a park with her skirt slightly lifted so that her foot is visible; a gentleman approaches and speaks to her; they then go somewhere and make love to one another. This phantasy is acted out in the attack by her beginning with the convulsive stage, which corresponds to the coitus, by her then getting up, going into another room, sitting down and reading and presently answering an imaginary remark addressed to her.<sup>1</sup>

The two last-mentioned forms of distortion give us some idea of the intensity of the resistances which the repressed material must take into account even when it breaks through in a hysterical attack.

## B

The onset of hysterical attacks follows laws that are easily understandable. Since the repressed complex consists of a libidinal cathexis and an ideational content (the phantasy),<sup>2</sup> the attack can be evoked (1) *associatively*, when the content of the complex (if sufficiently cathected) is touched on by something connected with it in conscious life; (2) *organically*, when, for internal somatic reasons and as a result of psychical influences from outside, the libidinal cathexis rises above a certain degree; (3) in the service of the *primary purpose*—as an expression of a ‘flight into illness’, when reality becomes distressing or frightening—that is, as a *consolation*; (4) in the service of the *secondary purposes*, with which the illness allies itself, as soon as, by producing an attack, the patient can

<sup>1</sup> [A fuller and slightly different account of this example was added as a footnote to *The Interpretation of Dreams* in 1909, *Standard Ed.*, 4, 328.]

<sup>2</sup> [The distinction indicated here between ideational content and affective energy was to play an important part in Freud’s metapsychological account of repression (1915*d* and 1915*e*), *Standard Ed.*, 14, 152–7 and 182–5.]



achieve an aim that is useful to him.<sup>1</sup> In the last case the attack is directed at particular individuals; it can be put off till they are present, and it gives an impression of being consciously simulated.

### C

Investigation of the childhood history of hysterical patients shows that the hysterical attack is designed to take the place of an *auto-erotic* satisfaction previously practised and since given up. In a great number of cases this satisfaction (masturbation by contact or by pressure of the thighs, or, again, by movements of the tongue, and so on) recurs during the attack itself, while the subject's consciousness is deflected. Moreover, the onset of an attack that is due to an increase of libido and is in the service of the primary purpose—as a consolation—exactly repeats the conditions under which, at the earlier time, the patient had intentionally sought this auto-erotic satisfaction.<sup>2</sup> The anamnesis of the patient shows the following stages: (a) auto-erotic satisfaction, without ideational content; (b) the same satisfaction, connected with

<sup>1</sup> [This seems to be the first appearance of the actual term 'flight into illness', though the notion was an old one of Freud's, and the phrase 'flight into psychosis' occurs in Section III of the first of his papers on 'The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence' (1894a). (The phrase 'flight into neurotic illness' appears in the paper on 'civilized' sexual morality (1908d), p. 192 above.) The idea of a 'gain from illness' as an aetiological factor was also an old one. It appears, for instance, in a letter to Fliess of November 18, 1897 (Freud 1950a, Letter 76). But the distinction between a 'primary' and 'secondary' gain is first made clearly in the present passage. The specific term 'secondary gain from illness' was introduced in the technical paper 'On Beginning the Treatment' (1913c), *Standard Ed.*, 12, 133. The whole question was fully discussed in Lecture XXIV of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916-17) and again in a footnote added in 1923 to the 'Dora' case history (1905e), *Standard Ed.*, 7, 43, in which Freud corrects and clarifies his earlier views on the subject.]

<sup>2</sup> [In a passage in Lecture XXV of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916-17) Freud speaks of the hysterical attack as 'the precipitate of a reminiscence' and suggests that normal affects are constructed on the same pattern.]

a phantasy which leads to the act of satisfaction; (c) renunciation of the act, with retention of the phantasy; (d) repression of the phantasy, which then comes into effect as a hysterical attack, either in an unchanged form, or in a modified one and adapted to new environmental impressions. Furthermore, (e) the phantasy may even reinstate the act of satisfaction belonging to it which had ostensibly been given up. This is a typical cycle of infantile sexual activity: repression, failure of repression, and return of the repressed.

The involuntary passing of urine is certainly not to be regarded as incompatible with the diagnosis of a hysterical attack; it is merely repeating the infantile form of a violent pollution. Moreover, biting the tongue may also be met with in undoubted cases of hysteria. It is no more inconsistent with hysteria than it is with love-making. It occurs more readily in attacks if the patient's attention had been drawn by the doctor's questions to the difficulties of making a differential diagnosis. Self-injury may occur in hysterical attacks (more frequently in the case of men) where it repeats an accident in childhood—as, for instance, the result of a romp.

The loss of consciousness, the '*absence*',<sup>1</sup> in a hysterical attack is derived from the fleeting but unmistakable lapse of consciousness which is observable at the climax of every intense sexual satisfaction, including auto-erotic ones. This course of development can be traced with most certainty where hysterical *absences* arise from the onset of pollutions in young people of the female sex. The so-called 'hypnotic states'<sup>2</sup>—*absences* during day-dreaming—, which are so common in hysterical subjects, show the same origin. The mechanism of these *absences* is comparatively simple. All the subject's attention is concentrated to begin with on the course of the process of satisfaction; with the occurrence of the satisfaction, the whole of this cathexis of attention is suddenly

<sup>1</sup> [The French term.]

<sup>2</sup> [Breuer's term. See *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d), *Standard Ed.*, 2, xxii and xxv.]

removed, so that there ensues a momentary void in her consciousness. This gap in consciousness, which might be termed a *physiological* one, is then widened in the service of repression, till it can swallow up everything that the repressing agency rejects.

## D

What points the way for the motor discharge of the repressed libido in a hysterical attack is the reflex mechanism of the act of coition—a mechanism which is ready to hand in everybody, including women, and which we see coming into manifest operation when an unrestrained surrender is made to sexual activity. Already in ancient times coition was described as a 'minor epilepsy'. We might alter this and say that a convulsive hysterical attack is an equivalent of coition. The analogy with an epileptic fit helps us little, since its genesis is even less understood than that of hysterical attacks.<sup>1</sup>

Speaking as a whole, hysterical attacks, like hysteria in general, revive a piece of sexual activity in women which existed during their childhood and at that time revealed an essentially masculine character. It can often be observed that girls who have shown a boyish nature and inclinations up to the years before puberty are precisely those who become hysterical from puberty onwards. In a whole number of cases the hysterical neurosis merely represents an excessive accentuation of the typical wave of repression which, by doing away with her masculine sexuality, allows the woman to emerge.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. Freud's lengthy discussion of the 'epileptic reaction' and the relation between epilepsy and hysterical attacks in his paper on Dostoevsky (1928b).]

<sup>2</sup> Cf. my *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905d). [*Standard Ed.*, 7, 219–21.—See also above, p. 217.]

FAMILY ROMANCES  
(1909 [1908])

## DER FAMILIENROMAN DER NEUROTIKER

### (a) GERMAN EDITIONS:

- (1908 Probable date of composition.)  
1909 In O. Rank, *Der Mythos von der Geburt des Helden*, 64–8, Leipzig and Vienna: Deuticke. (1922, 2nd ed., 82–6.)  
1931 *Neurosenlehre und Technik*, 300–4.  
1934 *G.S.*, 12, 367–71.  
1934 *Psychoan. Päd.*, 8, 281–5.  
1941 *G.W.*, 7, 227–31.

### (b) ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS:

- 1913 In Rank, *Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, *J. Nerv. Ment. Dis.*, 40., 668, 718 (Tr. S. E. Jelliffe, F. Robbins.)  
1914 The same, in volume form, 63–8. New York: Nervous and Mental Diseases Publishing Co.  
‘Family Romances’  
1950 *C.P.*, 5, 74–8. (Tr. James Strachey.)

The present translation is a very slightly modified reprint of the one published in 1950.

When this first appeared, in Rank's book, it bore no heading of any kind and did not form a separate section. It was simply introduced into the course of Rank's argument with a few words of acknowledgement. The work was only given a title in German when it was first reprinted. Since the preface to Rank's book is dated 'Christmas, 1908', Freud's contribution was probably written in that year. The idea of these 'family romances', and even their name, had long been in his mind—though at first he attributed them specially to paranoics. See his letters to Fliess of January 24, and May 25, 1897 and June 20, 1898 (Freud, 1950a, Letter 57, Draft M, and Letter 91 where the term is first used).

## FAMILY ROMANCES

THE liberation of an individual, as he grows up, from the authority of his parents is one of the most necessary though one of the most painful results brought about by the course of his development. It is quite essential that that liberation should occur and it may be presumed that it has been to some extent achieved by everyone who has reached a normal state. Indeed, the whole progress of society rests upon the opposition between successive generations. On the other hand, there is a class of neurotics whose condition is recognizably determined by their having failed in this task.

For a small child his parents are at first the only authority and the source of all belief. The child's most intense and most momentous wish during these early years is to be like his parents (that is, the parent of his own sex) and to be big like his father and mother. But as intellectual growth increases, the child cannot help discovering by degrees the category to which his parents belong. He gets to know other parents and compares them with his own, and so acquires the right to doubt the incomparable and unique quality which he had attributed to them. Small events in the child's life which make him feel dissatisfied afford him provocation for beginning to criticize his parents, and for using, in order to support his critical attitude, the knowledge which he has acquired that other parents are in some respects preferable to them. The psychology of the neuroses teaches us that, among other factors, the most intense impulses of sexual rivalry contribute to this result. A feeling of being slighted is obviously what constitutes the subject-matter of such provocations. There are only too many occasions on which a child is slighted, or at least *feels* he has been slighted, on which he feels he is not receiving the whole of his parents' love, and, most of all, on which he feels regrets at having to share it with brothers

and sisters. His sense that his own affection is not being fully reciprocated then finds a vent in the idea, often consciously recollected later from early childhood, of being a step-child or an adopted child. People who have not developed neuroses very frequently remember such occasions, on which—usually as a result of something they have read—they interpreted and responded to their parent's hostile behaviour in this fashion. But here the influence of sex is already in evidence, for a boy is far more inclined to feel hostile impulses towards his father than towards his mother and has a far more intense desire to get free from *him* than from *her*. In this respect the imagination of girls is apt to show itself much weaker. These consciously remembered mental impulses of childhood embody the factor which enables us to understand the nature of myths.

The later stage in the development of the neurotic's estrangement from his parents, begun in this manner, might be described as 'the neurotic's family romance'. It is seldom remembered consciously but can almost always be revealed by psycho-analysis. For a quite peculiarly marked imaginative activity is one of the essential characteristics of neurotics and also of all comparatively highly gifted people. This activity emerges first in children's play, and then, starting roughly from the period before puberty, takes over the topic of family relations. A characteristic example of this peculiar imaginative activity is to be seen in the familiar day-dreaming<sup>1</sup> which persists far beyond puberty. If these day-dreams are carefully examined, they are found to serve as the fulfilment of wishes and as a correction of actual life. They have two principal aims, an erotic and an ambitious one—though an erotic aim is usually concealed behind the latter too. At about the period I have mentioned, then, the child's imagination becomes engaged in the task of getting free from the parents of whom he now has a low opinion and of replacing

<sup>1</sup> Cf. 'Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality' (1908a), where a reference will be found to the literature of the subject. [See above, p. 159.]

them by others, who, as a rule, are of higher social standing. He will make use in this connection of any opportune coincidences from his actual experience, such as his becoming acquainted with the Lord of the Manor or some landed proprietor if he lives in the country or with some member of the aristocracy if he lives in town. Chance occurrences of this kind arouse the child's envy, which finds expression in a phantasy in which both his parents are replaced by others of better birth. The technique used in developing phantasies like this (which are, of course, conscious at this period) depends upon the ingenuity and the material which the child has at his disposal. There is also the question of whether the phantasies are worked out with greater or less effort to obtain verisimilitude. This stage is reached at a time at which the child is still in ignorance of the sexual determinants of procreation.

When presently the child comes to know the difference in the parts played by fathers and mothers in their sexual relations, and realizes that '*pater semper incertus est*', while the mother is '*certissima*',<sup>1</sup> the family romance undergoes a curious curtailment: it contents itself with exalting the child's father, but no longer casts any doubts on his maternal origin, which is regarded as something unalterable. This second (sexual) stage of the family romance is actuated by another motive as well, which is absent in the first (asexual) stage. The child, having learnt about sexual processes, tends to picture to himself erotic situations and relations, the motive force behind this being his desire to bring his mother (who is the subject of the most intense sexual curiosity) into situations of secret infidelity and into secret love-affairs.<sup>2</sup> In this way the child's phantasies, which started by being, as it were, asexual, are brought up to the level of his later knowledge.

Moreover the motive of revenge and retaliation, which

<sup>1</sup> [An old legal tag: 'paternity is always uncertain, maternity is most certain.']

<sup>2</sup> [Freud returned to this in the first of his papers on the psychology of love (1910*h*), *Standard Ed.*, 11, 171-2.]



was in the foreground at the earlier stage, is also to be found at the later one. It is, as a rule, precisely these neurotic children who were punished by their parents for sexual naughtiness and who now revenge themselves on their parents by means of phantasies of this kind.

A younger child is very specially inclined to use imaginative stories such as these in order to rob those born before him of their prerogatives—in a way which reminds one of historical intrigues; and he often has no hesitation in attributing to his mother as many fictitious love-affairs as he himself has competitors. An interesting variant of the family romance may then appear, in which the hero and author returns to legitimacy himself while his brothers and sisters are eliminated by being bastardized. So too if there are any other particular interests at work they can direct the course to be taken by the family romance; for its many-sidedness and its great range of applicability enable it to meet every sort of requirement. In this way, for instance, the young phantasy-builder can get rid of his forbidden degree of kinship with one of his sisters if he finds himself sexually attracted by her.<sup>1</sup>

If anyone is inclined to turn away in horror from this depravity of the childish heart or feels tempted, indeed, to dispute the possibility of such things, he should observe that these works of fiction, which seem so full of hostility, are none of them really so badly intended, and that they still preserve, under a slight disguise, the child's original affection for his parents. The faithlessness and ingratitude are only apparent. If we examine in detail the commonest of these imaginative romances, the replacement of both parents or of the father alone by grander people, we find that these new and aristocratic parents are equipped with attributes that are derived entirely from real recollections of the actual and humble ones; so that in fact the child is not getting rid of his father but exalting him. Indeed the whole effort at replacing

<sup>1</sup> [This last point is found in Freud's letter to Fliess of June 20, 1898 (Freud, 1950a, Letter 91).]

the real father by a superior one is only an expression of the child's longing for the happy, vanished days when his father seemed to him the noblest and strongest of men and his mother the dearest and loveliest of women. He is turning away from the father whom he knows to-day to the father in whom he believed in the earlier years of his childhood; and his phantasy is no more than the expression of a regret that those happy days have gone. Thus in these phantasies the overvaluation that characterizes a child's earliest years comes into its own again. An interesting contribution to this subject is afforded by the study of dreams. We learn from their interpretation that even in later years, if the Emperor and Empress appear in dreams, those exalted personages stand for the dreamer's father and mother.<sup>1</sup> So that the child's overvaluation of his parents survives as well in the dreams of normal adults.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. my *Interpretation of Dreams*, 1900a, *Standard Ed.*, 5, 353.



SHORTER WRITINGS  
(1903-1909)



## CONTRIBUTION TO A QUESTIONNAIRE ON READING<sup>1</sup>

(1907)

You ask me to name 'ten good books' for you, and refrain from adding to this any word of explanation. Thus you leave to me not only the choice of the books but also the interpretation of your request. Accustomed to paying attention to small signs, I must then trust the wording in which you couch your enigmatical demand. You did not say: 'the ten most magnificent works (of world literature)', in which case I should have been obliged to reply, with so many others: Homer, the tragedies of Sophocles, Goethe's *Faust*, Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, *Macbeth*, etc. Nor did you say the 'ten most significant books', among which scientific achievements like those of Copernicus, of the old physician Johann Weier on the belief in witches, Darwin's *Descent of Man*, and others, would then have found a place. You did not even ask for 'favourite books', among which I should not have forgotten Milton's *Paradise Lost* and Heine's *Lazarus*. I think, therefore, that a particular stress falls on the 'good' in your phrase, and that with this predicate you intend to designate books

<sup>1</sup> [First published in *Vom Lesen und von guten Büchern, eine Rundfrage veranstaltet von der Redaktion der 'Neuen Blätter für Literatur und Kunst'*, Vienna, 1907, ix. Reprinted in *Jahrbuch deutscher Bibliophilen und Literaturfreunde*, ed. H. Feigl, Zurich and Leipzig, 16-17 (1931), 117-19. English translation by K. R. Eissler in Eissler, 'An Unknown Autobiographical Letter by Freud and a Short Comment', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 32 (1951), 319-20; reprinted in Jones, 1957, 452-4. The present translation is based on the one published in 1951.

Replies from thirty-two distinguished people to this questionnaire, instigated by the publisher Hugo Heller, appeared in the brochure of 1907. It was introduced by a letter from Hugo von Hoffmannsthal and included contributions from Peter Altenberg, Hermann Bahr, August Forel, Hermann Hesse, Ernst Mach, Thomas Masaryk, Arthur Schnitzler and Jakob Wassermann.]

to which one stands in rather the same relationship as to 'good' friends, to whom one owes a part of one's knowledge of life and view of the world—books which one has enjoyed oneself and gladly commends to others, but in connection with which the element of timid reverence, the feeling of one's own smallness in the face of their greatness, is not particularly prominent.

I will therefore name ten such 'good' books for you which have come to my mind without a great deal of reflection.

Multatuli, *Letters and Works*. [Cf. p. 133 n.]

Kipling, *Jungle Book*.

Anatole France, *Sur la pierre blanche*.

Zola, *Fécondité*.

Merezhkovsky, *Leonardo da Vinci*.

G. Keller, *Leute von Seldwyla*.

C. F. Meyer, *Huttens letzte Tage*.

Macaulay, *Essays*.

Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*.

Mark Twain, *Sketches*.

I do not know what you intend to do with this list. It seems a most peculiar one even to me; I really cannot let it go without comment. The problem of why precisely these and not other equally 'good' books I will not begin to tackle; I merely wish to throw light on the relation between the author and his work. The connection is not in every case as firm as it is, for instance, with Kipling's *Jungle Book*. For the most part I could just as well have singled out another work by the same author—for instance, in the case of Zola, *Docteur Pascal*—and the like. The same man who has given us one good book has often presented us with several good books. In the case of Multatuli I felt in two minds whether to reject the private letters in favour of the 'Love Letters' or the latter in favour of the former, and for that reason wrote: 'Letters and Works'. Genuinely creative writing of purely poetical value has been excluded from this list, probably because your charge—good books—did not seem exactly aimed at such;

for in the case of C. F. Meyer's *Hutten* I must set its 'goodness' far above its beauty: 'edification' above aesthetic enjoyment.

You have touched on something, with your request to name for you 'ten good books', on which an immeasurable amount could be said. And so I will conclude, in order not to become even more informative.

Yours sincerely,

FREUD.



# PROSPECTUS FOR *SCHRIFTEN ZUR ANGEWANDTEN SEELENKUNDE*<sup>1</sup>

(1907)

THE *Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde*, the first number of which is published herewith, are aimed at that wider circle of educated people who without actually being philosophers or medical men are nevertheless able to appreciate the science of the human mind for its significance in the understanding and deepening of our lives. The papers will appear in no prescribed order, but will present in each instance a single study, which will undertake the application of psychological knowledge to subjects in art and literature, in the history of civilizations and religions, and in analogous fields. These studies will sometimes bear the character of exact investigations, sometimes that of speculative efforts, attempting now to embrace a larger problem, now to penetrate into a more restricted one; but in every case they will be in the nature of original achievements and will avoid resembling mere reviews or compilations.

<sup>1</sup> ['Papers on Applied Mental Science.' In first edition only of *Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensens 'Gradiva'* (Freud, 1907a), Vienna, 82. English translation by H. A. Bunker, 'Introduction to *Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde*', in I. Bry, H. Bayne and M. Elbert, 'Ex Libris I. Early Monographic Series', *Bull. Am. Ps. Ass.*, 8 (1952), 214-15; reprinted *J. Am. Ps. Ass.*, 1 (1953), 519-20. The present translation is a modified version of that published in 1952.

Twenty books were published in the series of *Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde* between 1907 and 1925. The first volume was published by Hugo Heller and re-issued unchanged a year later by Franz Deuticke, who published all subsequent volumes. Apart from Freud's work on Jensen's '*Gradiva*' the series also included his study on Leonardo (1910c), as well as works by, among others, Riklin, Jung, Abraham, Rank, Sadger, Pfister, Ernest Jones and Storfer.]

The Editor feels himself in duty bound to vouch for the originality and general merit of the articles appearing in this series. For the rest, he does not wish either to interfere with the independence of his contributors or to be held answerable for what they express. The fact that the first numbers of the series take particular account of the theories which he himself has advocated in the sphere of science should not determine the view taken of this enterprise. On the contrary, the series is open to the exponents of divergent opinions and hopes to be able to give expression to the variety of points of view and principles in contemporary science.

THE PUBLISHER

THE EDITOR

PREFACE TO WILHELM STEKEL'S  
*NERVOUS ANXIETY-STATES AND  
THEIR TREATMENT*<sup>1</sup>

(1908)

My investigations into the aetiology and psychical mechanism of neurotic illnesses, which I have pursued since 1893, attracted little notice to begin with among my fellow specialists. At length, however, those investigations have met with recognition from a number of medical research workers and have also drawn attention to the psycho-analytic methods of examination and treatment to which I owe my findings. Dr. Wilhelm Stekel, who was one of the first of the colleagues to whom I was able to impart a knowledge of psycho-analysis, and who has himself become familiar with its technique through many years of practice in it, has now undertaken the task of working over one topic in the clinical aspect of these neuroses on the basis of my views and of presenting medical readers with the experiences he has obtained through the psycho-analytic method. If I am glad to take the responsibility for his work in the sense which I have just indicated, I think it is only right to declare explicitly that my direct influence upon the volume on nervous states of anxiety which lies before us has been a very slight one. The observations and all the detailed opinions and interpretations are the author's own. My share has been limited to proposing the use of the term 'anxiety hysteria'.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [First published in W. Stekel's *Nervöse Angstzustände und ihre Behandlung*, Berlin and Vienna, 1908, iii; 2nd ed., 1912, v; reprinted *G.S.*, 11 (1928), 239 and *G.W.*, 7 (1941), 467. Freud's preface was not included in the later editions of the work. The present translation is a new one by James Strachey.]

<sup>2</sup> [This was Freud's first published use of the term. He entered into the subject fully in his case history of 'Little Hans' (1909b), which was produced soon afterwards. Cf *Standard Ed.*, 10, 115-17.]

I will add that Dr. Stekel's work is founded upon rich experience and is calculated to stimulate other physicians into confirming by their own efforts our views on the aetiology of these conditions. His work reveals many unexpected glimpses of the realities of life, which so often lie concealed behind neurotic symptoms; and it may well convince our colleagues that the attitude they choose to adopt to the hints and explanations given in these pages cannot be a matter of indifference from the point of view either of their understanding or of their therapeutic efficiency.

VIENNA, *March* 1908

PREFACE TO SANDOR FERENCZI'S  
*PSYCHO-ANALYSIS: ESSAYS IN THE  
FIELD OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS*<sup>1</sup>

(1910 [1909])

PSYCHO-ANALYTIC research into the neuroses (the various forms of nervous illness with a mental causation) has endeavoured to trace their connection with instinctual life and the restrictions imposed on it by the claims of civilization, with the activities of the normal individual in phantasies and dreams, and with the creations of the popular mind in religion, myths and fairy tales. The psycho-analytic treatment of neurotic patients, based on this method of research, makes far higher demands on doctor and patient than the methods hitherto in common use, which operate through medicaments, diet, hydropathy and suggestion. But it brings the patients so much more relief and permanent strengthening in the face of life's problems, that there is no cause for surprise at the continual advances made by this therapeutic method in spite of violent opposition.

The author of the following essays, who is a close acquaintance of mine, and who is familiar, to an extent that few others are, with all the difficulties of psycho-analytic problems, is the first Hungarian to undertake the task of creating an interest in psycho-analysis among doctors and men of education in his own country through writings composed in their mother tongue. It is our cordial wish that this attempt of his may succeed and may result in gaining for this new field of work new workers from the body of his compatriots.

<sup>1</sup> [Date of manuscript: 1909. First published in a Hungarian translation in S. Ferenczi's *Lélekelemzés: értekezések a pszichoanalízis köréből*, Budapest, 1910, 3-4; 2nd. ed., 1914; 3rd ed., 1918. The German original was first published in *G.S.*, 11 (1928), 241; reprinted *G.W.*, 7 (1941), 469. The present translation, the first into English, is by James Strachey.]

# CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE *NEUE FREIE PRESSE*<sup>1</sup>

(1903-4)

## I

### REVIEW OF GEORG BIEDENKAPP'S *IM KAMPFE GEGEN HIRNBACILLEN*<sup>2</sup>

CONCEALED behind this somewhat unpromising title is the book of a brave man who succeeds in telling the reader much that is worthy of consideration. The sub-title of the work reveals more of its content: 'A Philosophy of Small Words'. The author is in fact fighting against those 'little words and arrangements of words which exclude or include too much' and which reveal, in people who have the habit of using them for preference, a tendency towards 'exclusive or superlative judgements'. It is self-evident—our author would contest even this phrase—that the fight is not concerned with these harmless words but with the tendency to become intoxicated by them and to forget, on account of the exaggerated representation thus achieved, the necessary limitations on our pronouncements and the inevitable relativity of our judgements. It really serves as a useful warning if one is shown how much that was described by people of an earlier

<sup>1</sup> [The six short contributions to the Viennese daily paper the *Neue Freie Presse*, which can be attributed with certainty to Freud, appeared between February, 1903 and August, 1905. They ought to have been included in Volume 7 of the *Standard Edition*, but their existence was not ascertained until after that volume was in print. Three of the contributions have been excluded from the present edition: they are very short and of very slight interest. The German text has never been reprinted. The translations appearing here, the first into English, are by Angela Richards.]

<sup>2</sup> [*Neue Freie Presse*, February 8, 1903, Morning Edition, p. 41. Biedenapp, *Im Kampfe gegen Hirnbacillen*, ('The Fight Against Brain Bacilli'), Berlin, 1902.]

generation as 'self-evident' or as 'nonsensical' ranks with us to-day conversely as nonsensical or self-evident; or if we observe, in a series of well-chosen examples, to what a narrowing of their mental horizon even important writers must plead guilty, as a result of their misuse of superlatives. The exhortation to moderation in judgement and expression actually serves our author only as a point of departure for further discussions on other 'errors of thought' of human beings—on the central delusion, faith, on atheistic morality, and the like. In all these observations is manifest the author's honest endeavour to take seriously the implications of the particular view of the world necessitated by the discoveries of modern science, in particular of the theory of evolution. A lot that is psychologically accurate is included, and many truths of the kind that have often been said before but cannot be often enough repeated. The author has set himself the thankless task 'of improving and converting people' by means of exerting a sober influence, without seeking to move them to laughter by humour or sweep them along with him by passion. Let us wish him all success.

## II

### REVIEW OF JOHN BIGELOW'S *THE MYSTERY OF SLEEP*<sup>1</sup>

SOLVING the mystery of sleep might well have been reserved to science; the pious author, however, operates with biblical arguments and teleological causes. For example: it would be an idea unworthy of divine providence to suppose that it would allow human beings to spend a full third of their life in spiritual inactivity. Sleep is rather that state in which divine influence penetrates most freely and most effectively into human mental life. But in spite of all objections to the

<sup>1</sup> [*Neue Freie Presse*, February 4, 1904, Morning Edition, p. 22. Bigelow, *The Mystery of Sleep*, London, 2nd ed., 1903 (1st ed., London, 1897). Bigelow (1817–1911) was an American journalist and diplomat.]

author's way of thinking we will not omit to emphasize the kernel of truth in his assertion. Scientific studies of the state of mental life during sleep, too, oblige us to relinquish as inadequate our previous assumption that sleep reduces the play of mental activity to a minimum. The important processes of unconscious mental and even intellectual activity continue—as the elucidation of dreams given by your reviewer demonstrates—even during profound sleep. This unconscious mental activity deserves to be called 'daemonic' but scarcely divine.

### III

#### OBITUARY OF PROFESSOR S. HAMMERSCHLAG<sup>1</sup>

S. HAMMERSCHLAG, who relinquished his activity as a Jewish religious teacher about thirty years ago, was one of those personalities who possess the gift of leaving ineradicable impressions on the development of their pupils. A spark from the same fire which animated the spirit of the great Jewish seers and prophets burned in him and was not extinguished until old age weakened his powers. But the passionate side of his nature was happily tempered by the ideal of humanism of our German classical period which governed him, and his method of education was based on the foundation of the philological and classical studies to which he had devoted his own youth. Religious instruction served him as a way of educating towards love of the humanities, and from the material of Jewish history he was able to find means of tapping the sources of enthusiasm hidden in the hearts of young people and of making it flow out far beyond the limitations of nationalism or dogma. Those of his pupils who were later allowed to seek him out in his own home gained a paternally solicitous friend in him and were able to perceive

<sup>1</sup> [*Neue Freie Presse*, November 11, 1904, Morning Edition, p. 8. —Freud had been a pupil of Hammerschlag's and always retained an affectionate regard for him. Cf. Jones, 1953, 175, 179 and 183.]



that sympathetic kindness was the fundamental characteristic of his nature. Feelings of gratitude towards a revered teacher—undiminished through the course of decades—received most dignified expression over his grave from Dr. Friedjung the historian.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY AND AUTHOR INDEX

[Titles of books and periodicals are in italics; titles of papers are in inverted commas. Abbreviations are in accordance with the *World List of Scientific Periodicals* (London, 1952). Further abbreviations used in this volume will be found in the List at the end of this bibliography. Numerals in thick type refer to volumes: ordinary numerals refer to pages. The figures in round brackets at the end of each entry indicate the page or pages of this volume on which the work in question is mentioned. In case of the Freud entries, the letters attached to the dates of publication are in accordance with the corresponding entries in the complete bibliography of Freud's writings to be included in the last volume of the *Standard Edition*.

For non-technical authors, and for technical authors where no specific work is mentioned, see the General Index.]

- ADLER, A. (1905) 'Drei Psycho-Analysen von Zahleneinfällen und obsedierenden Zahlen', *Psychiat.-neurol. Wschr.*, 7, 263. (105)
- BEARD, G. M. (1881) *American Nervousness, its Causes and Consequences*, New York. (184)
- (1884) *Sexual Neurasthenia (Nervous Exhaustion), its Hygiene, Causes, Symptoms and Treatment*, New York. (184)
- BINET, A. (1888) *Études de psychologie expérimentale: le fétichisme dans l'amour*, Paris. (47)
- BINSWANGER, L. (1896) *Die Pathologie und Therapie der Neurasthenie*, Jena. (184-5)
- BLEULER, E. (1906) *Affectivität, Suggestibilität, Paranoia*, Halle. (53)  
[Trans.: *Affectivity, Suggestibility, Paranoia*, New York. 1912.]
- BREUER, J., and FREUD, S. (1893) See FREUD, S. (1893a)
- (1895) See FREUD, S. (1895d)
- ECKSTEIN, E. (1904) *Die Sexualfrage in der Erziehung des Kindes*, Leipzig. (137)
- EHRENFELS, C. VON (1907) *Sexualethik (Grenzfragen des Nerven- und Seelenlebens)*, ed. L. Löwenfeld, 56, Wiesbaden. (181-2, 185, 204)
- ELLIS, HAVELOCK (1898) 'Auto-Erotism; a Psychological Study', *Alien. & Neurol.*, 19, 260. (133)
- (1899) *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. I: *The Evolution of Modesty; the Phenomena of Sexual Periodicity; and Auto-erotism*, 'Leipzig' [London]. (3rd ed., Philadelphia, 1910.) (159)
- (1903) *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. III: *Analysis of the Sexual Impulse; Love and Pain; the Sexual Impulse in Women*, Philadelphia. (2nd ed., Philadelphia, 1913.) (211)

- ERB, W. (1893) *Über die wachsende Nervosität unserer Zeit*, Heidelberg. (183-4, 185)
- FERENCZI, S. (1910) *Lélekelemzés: Értékezesek a pszichoanalízis köréből* [Papers on Psycho-Analysis], Budapest. (252)
- FREUD, S. (1893a) With BREUER, J., 'Über den psychischen Mechanismus hysterischer Phänomene: Vorläufige Mitteilung', *G.S.*, 1, 7; *G.W.*, 1, 81. (228)  
[Trans.: 'On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Communication', *C.P.*, 1, 24; *Standard Ed.*, 2, 3.]
- (1894a) 'Die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen', *G.S.*, 1, 290; *G.W.*, 1, 59. (123, 232)  
[Trans.: 'The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence', *C.P.*, 1, 59; *Standard Ed.*, 3.]
- (1895b) 'Über die Berechtigung, von der Neurasthenie einen bestimmten Symptomenkomplex als "Angstneurose" abzutrennen', *G.S.*, 1, 306; *G.W.*, 1, 315. (61, 117, 184)  
[Trans.: 'On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Description "Anxiety Neurosis"', *C.P.*, 1, 76; *Standard Ed.*, 3.]
- (1895d) With BREUER, J., *Studien über Hysterie*, Vienna. *G.S.*, 1, 3; *G.W.*, 1, 77 (omitting Breuer's contributions). (54, 101, 108, 159, 163, 228, 233)  
[Trans.: *Studies on Hysteria*, *Standard Ed.*, 2. Including Breuer's contributions.]
- (1896a) 'L'hérédité et l'étiologie des névroses' [in French], *G.S.*, 1, 388; *G.W.*, 1, 407. (184)  
[Trans.: 'Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses', *C.P.*, 1, 138; *Standard Ed.*, 3.]
- (1896b) 'Weitere Bemerkungen über die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen', *G.S.*, 1, 363; *G.W.*, 1, 379. (54)  
[Trans.: 'Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence', *C.P.*, 1, 155; *Standard Ed.*, 3.]
- (1900a) *Die Traumdeutung*, Vienna. *G.S.*, 2-3; *G.W.*, 2-3. (3, 4, 7-10, 34, 55, 56, 57, 61, 64, 73, 74, 82-3, 111, 126, 148-9, 159, 160, 163, 164, 173, 174, 175, 208, 212, 213, 217, 229, 230, 231, 241)  
[Trans.: *The Interpretation of Dreams*, London and New York, 1955; *Standard Ed.*, 4-5.]
- (1901a) *Über den Traum*, Wiesbaden. *G.S.*, 3, 189; *G.W.*, 2-3, 643. (34)  
[Trans.: *On Dreams*, London and New York, 1951; *Standard Ed.*, 5, 633.]
- (1901b) *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens*, Berlin, 1904. *G.S.*, 4, 3; *G.W.*, 4. (80, 101, 104, 105, 106)  
[Trans.: *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, *Standard Ed.*, 6.]

- 1903a) Review of Georg Biedenkapp's *Im Kampfe gegen Hirnbacillen*, *Neue Freie Presse*, Feb. 8, Morgenbl., 41.  
[Trans.: *Standard Ed.*, 9, 253.]
- (1904b) Review of John Bigelow's *The Mystery of Sleep*, *Neue Freie Presse*, Feb. 4, Morgenbl., 22.  
[Trans.: *Standard Ed.*, 9, 254.]
- (1904e) Obituary of Prof. S. Hammerschlag, *Neue Freie Presse*, Nov. 11, Morgenbl., 8.  
[Trans.: *Standard Ed.*, 9, 255.]
- (1905c) *Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten*, Vienna. G.S. 9, 5; G.W., 6. (126, 145, 153, 200, 204)  
[Trans.: *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious*, *Standard Ed.*, 8.]
- (1905d) *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, Vienna. G.S., 5, 3; G.W., 5, 29. (5, 47, 131, 133, 135, 153, 158, 161, 164, 166, 170-2, 175, 180, 188, 191, 200, 207, 211, 218, 234)  
[Trans.: *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, London, 1949; *Standard Ed.*, 7, 125.]
- (1905e [1901]) 'Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse', G.S., 8, 3; G.W., 5, 163. (5, 54, 158, 232)  
[Trans.: 'Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria', C.P., 3, 13; *Standard Ed.*, 7, 3.]
- (1906a) 'Meine Ansichten über die Rolle der Sexualität in der Ätiologie der Neurosen', G.S. 5, 123; G.W., 5, 149. (157)  
[Trans.: 'My Views on the Part played by Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses', C.P., 1, 272; *Standard Ed.*, 7, 271.]
- (1906c) 'Tatbestandsdiagnostik und Psychoanalyse', G.S., 10, 197; G.W., 7, 3.  
[Trans.: 'Psycho-Analysis and the Establishment of the Facts in Legal Proceedings', C.P., 2, 13; *Standard Ed.*, 9, 99.]
- (1907a) *Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensens 'Grädiva'*, Vienna. G.S., 9, 273; G.W., 7, 31. (158, 248)  
[Trans.: *Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's 'Grädiva'*, *Standard Ed.*, 9, 3.]
- (1907b) 'Zwangshandlungen und Religionsübung', G.S., 10, 210; G.W., 7, 129. (37, 114)  
[Trans.: 'Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices', C.P., 2, 25; *Standard Ed.*, 9, 116.]
- (1907c) 'Zur sexuellen Aufklärung der Kinder', G.S., 5, 134; G.W., 7, 19. (207-8, 219)  
[Trans.: 'The Sexual Enlightenment of Children', C.P., 2, 36; *Standard Ed.*, 9, 131.]
- (1907d) Antwort auf eine Rundfrage *Vom Lesen und von guten Büchern*, Vienna.  
[Trans.: Contribution to a Questionnaire on Reading, *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 32, 319; *Standard Ed.*, 9, 245.]

FREUD, S. (*cont.*)

- (1907*e*) Prospectus for *Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde*, in 1907*a* (1st ed. only), 82.  
[*Trans.: Bull. Am. Ps. Ass.*, 8 (1952), 214; *Standard Ed.*, 9, 248.]
- (1908*a*) 'Hysterische Phantasien und ihre Beziehung zur Bisexualität', *G.S.*, 5, 246; *G.W.*, 7, 191. (230, 238)  
[*Trans.: 'Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality'*, *C.P.*, 2, 51; *Standard Ed.*, 9, 157.]
- (1908*b*) 'Charakter und Analerotik', *G.S.*, 5, 261; *G.W.*, 7, 203.  
[*Trans.: 'Character and Anal Erotism'*, *C.P.*, 2, 45; *Standard Ed.*, 9, 169.]
- (1908*c*) 'Über infantile Sexualtheorien', *G.S.*, 5, 168; *G.W.*, 7, 171. (135, 137, 158)  
[*Trans.: 'On the Sexual Theories of Children'*, *C.P.*, 2, 59; *Standard Ed.*, 9, 207]
- (1908*d*) 'Die "kulturelle" Sexualmoral und die moderne Nervosität', *G.S.*, 5, 143; *G.W.*, 7, 143. (127, 139, 232)  
[*Trans.: "'Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness'*, *C.P.*, 2, 76; *Standard Ed.*, 9, 179.]
- (1908*e* [1907]) 'Der Dichter und das Phantasieren', *G.S.*, 10, 229; *G.W.*, 7, 213. (158, 160)  
[*Trans.: 'Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming'*, *C.P.*, 4, 173; *Standard Ed.*, 9, 143.]
- (1908*f*) Preface to Stekel's *Nervöse Angstzustände und ihre Behandlung*, *G.S.*, 11, 239; *G.W.*, 7, 467.  
[*Trans.: Standard Ed.*, 9, 250.]
- (1909*a*) 'Allgemeines über den hysterischen Anfall', *G.S.*, 5, 255; *G.W.*, 7, 235. (158, 166)  
[*Trans.: 'Some General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks'*, *C.P.*, 2, 100; *Standard Ed.*, 9, 229.]
- (1909*b*) 'Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben', *G.S.*, 8, 129; *G.W.*, 7, 243. (134-5, 207-8, 214, 216, 217, 218, 220, 250)  
[*Trans.: 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy'*, *C.P.*, 3, 149; *Standard Ed.*, 10, 3.]
- (1909*c*) 'Der Familienroman der Neurotiker', *G.S.*, 12, 367; *G.W.*, 7, 227. (158)  
[*Trans.: 'Family Romances'*, *C.P.*, 5, 74; *Standard Ed.*, 9, 237.]
- (1909*d*) 'Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose', *G.S.*, 8, 269; *G.W.*, 7, 381. (40, 116, 126, 168, 200, 214)  
[*Trans.: 'Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis'*, *C.P.*, 3, 293; *Standard Ed.*, 10, 155.]
- (1910*a* [1909]) *Über Psychoanalyse*, Vienna. *G.S.*, 4, 349; *G.W.*, 8, 3. (163)

- [Trans.: 'Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis', *Amer. J. Psychol.*, 21 (1910), 181; *Standard Ed.*, 11, 3.]
- (1910b [1909]) Preface to Ferenczi's *Lélekelemzés: Értekezések a pszichoanalízis köréből* [Papers on Psycho-Analysis], *G.S.*, 11, 241; *G.W.*, 7, 469.
- [Trans.: *Standard Ed.*, 9, 252.]
- (1910c) *Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci*, Vienna. *G.S.*, 9, 371; *G.W.*, 8, 128. (219, 248)
- [Trans.: *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood*, *Standard Ed.*, 11, 59.]
- (1910h) 'Über einen besonderen Typus der Objektwahl beim Manne', *G.S.*, 5, 186; *G.W.*, 8, 66. (214, 226, 239)
- [Trans.: 'A Special Type of Choice of Object made by Men', *C.P.*, 4, 192; *Standard Ed.*, 11, 165.]
- (1912c) 'Über neurotische Erkrankungstypen', *G.S.*, 5, 400; *G.W.*, 8, 322. (188)
- [Trans.: 'Types of Onset of Neurosis', *C.P.*, 2, 113; *Standard Ed.*, 12, 229.]
- (1912d) 'Über die allgemeinste Erniedrigung des Liebeslebens', *G.S.*, 5, 198; *G.W.*, 8, 78. (180)
- [Trans.: 'On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love', *C.P.* 4, 203; *Standard Ed.*, 11, 179.]
- (1912f) 'Zur Onanie-Diskussion', *G.S.*, 3, 324; *G.W.*, 8, 332. (200)
- [Trans.: 'Contributions to a Discussion on Masturbation', *Standard Ed.*, 12, 243.]
- (1912-13) *Totem und Tabu*, Vienna, 1913. *G.S.*, 10, 3; *G.W.*, 9, (116)
- [Trans.: *Totem and Taboo*, London, 1950; New York, 1952; *Standard Ed.*, 13, 1.]
- (1913c) 'Weitere Ratschläge zur Technik der Psychoanalyse: I, Zur Einleitung der Behandlung', *G.S.*, 6, 84; *G.W.*, 8, 454. (232)
- [Trans.: 'On Beginning the Treatment (Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psycho-Analysis, I)', *C.P.*, 2, 342; *Standard Ed.*, 12, 123.]
- (1913d) 'Märchenstoffe in Träumen', *G.S.*, 3, 259; *G.W.*, 10, 2. (121)
- [Trans.: 'The Occurrence in Dreams of Material from Fairy Tales', *C.P.*, 4, 236; *Standard Ed.*, 12, 281.]
- (1913f) 'Das Motiv der Kästchenwahl', *G.S.*, 10, 243; *G.W.*, 10, 244. (43)
- [Trans.: 'The Theme of the Three Caskets', *C.P.*, 4, 244; *Standard Ed.*, 12, 291.]
- (1913i) 'Die Disposition zur Zwangsneurose' *G.S.*, 5, 277; *G.W.*, 8, 442. (168, 175)

FREUD, S. (*cont.*)

- [*Trans.*: 'The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis', *C.P.*, 2, 122; *Standard Ed.*, 12, 313.]
- (1914c) 'Zur Einführung des Narzissmus', *G.S.*, 6, 155; *G.W.*, 10, 138. (150)  
[*Trans.*: 'On Narcissism: an Introduction', *C.P.*, 4, 30; *Standard Ed.*, 14, 69.]
- (1914d) 'Zur Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung', *G.S.*, 4, 411; *G.W.*, 10, 44. (100)  
[*Trans.*: 'On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement', *C.P.*, 1, 287; *Standard Ed.*, 14, 3.]
- (1915b) 'Zeitgemässes über Krieg und Tod', *G.S.*, 10, 315; *G.W.*, 10, 324. (150)  
[*Trans.*: 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death', *C.P.*, 4, 288; *Standard Ed.*, 14, 275.]
- (1915d) 'Die Verdrängung', *G.S.*, 5, 466; *G.W.*, 10, 248. (126, 231)  
[*Trans.*: 'Repression', *C.P.*, 4, 84; *Standard Ed.*, 14, 143.]
- (1915e) 'Das Unbewusste', *G.S.*, 5, 480; *G.W.*, 10, 264. (49, 124, 231)  
[*Trans.*: 'The Unconscious', *C.P.*, 4, 98; *Standard Ed.*, 14, 161.]
- (1916d) 'Einige Charaktertypen aus der psychoanalytischen Arbeit', *G.S.*, 10, 287; *G.W.*, 10, 364. (102)  
[*Trans.*: 'Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work', *C.P.*, 4, 318; *Standard Ed.*, 14, 311.]
- (1916-17) *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse*, Vienna. *G.S.*, 7; *G.W.*, 11. (122, 232)  
[*Trans.*: *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, revised ed., London, 1929 (*A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, New York, 1935); *Standard Ed.*, 15-16.]
- (1917c) 'Über Triebumsetzungen insbesondere der Analerotik', *G.S.*, 5, 268; *G.W.*, 10, 402. (168)  
[*Trans.*: 'On Transformations of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal Erotism', *C.P.*, 2, 164; *Standard Ed.*, 17, 127.]
- (1918b [1914]) 'Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose', *G.S.*, 8, 439; *G.W.*, 12, 29. (168, 220, 221)  
[*Trans.*: 'From the History of an Infantile Neurosis', *C.P.*, 3, 473; *Standard Ed.*, 17, 3.]
- (1923b) *Das Ich und das Es*, Vienna. *G.S.*, 6, 353; *G.W.*, 13, 237. (123, 175)  
[*Trans.*: *The Ego and the Id*, London, 1927; *Standard Ed.*, 19.]
- (1923c) 'Bemerkungen zur Theorie und Praxis der Traumdeutung', *G.S.*, 3, 305; *G.W.*, 13, 301. (172)  
[*Trans.*: 'Remarks on the Theory and Practice of Dream-Interpretation', *C.P.*, 5, 136; *Standard Ed.*, 19.]

- (1923d) 'Eine Teufelsneurose im siebzehnten Jahrhundert', *G.S.*, 10, 409; *G.W.*, 13, 317. (174)  
 [Trans.: 'A Seventeenth Century Demonological Neurosis', *C.P.*, 4, 436; *Standard Ed.*, 19.]
- (1924f) 'A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis' [published as 'Psychoanalysis: Exploring the Hidden Recesses of the Mind'], Chap. 73, Vol. 2 of *These Eventful Years*, London and New York; *Standard Ed.*, 19. (116)  
 [German Text: 'Kurzer Abriss der Psychoanalyse', *G.S.*, 11, 183; *G.W.*, 13, 405. German original first appeared in 1928.]
- (1925d [1924]) *Selbstdarstellung*, Vienna, 1934. *G.S.*, 11, 119; *G.W.*, 14, 33. (5)  
 [Trans.: *An Autobiographical Study*, London, 1935 (*Autobiography*, New York, 1935); *Standard Ed.*, 20, 3.]
- (1925j) 'Einige psychische Folgen des anatomischen Geschlechtsunterschieds', *G.S.*, 11, 8; *G.W.*, 14, 19. (135)  
 [Trans.: 'Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes', *C.P.*, 5, 186; *Standard Ed.*, 19.]
- (1926d) *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*, Vienna. *G.S.*, 11, 23; *G.W.*, 14, 113. (61)  
 [Trans.: *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, London, 1936 (*The Problem of Anxiety*, New York, 1936); *Standard Ed.*, 20, 77.]
- (1927c) *Die Zukunft einer Illusion*, Vienna. *G.S.*, 11, 411; *G.W.*, 14, 325. (180)  
 [Trans.: *The Future of an Illusion*, London and New York, 1928; *Standard Ed.*, 21.]
- (1927e) 'Fetischismus', *G.S.*, 11, 395; *G.W.*, 14, 311. (216)  
 [Trans.: 'Fetishism', *C.P.*, 5, 198; *Standard Ed.*, 21.]
- (1928b) 'Dostojewski und die Vätertötung', *G.S.*, 12, 7; *G.W.*, 14, 399. (228, 234)  
 [Trans.: 'Dostoevsky and Parricide', *C.P.*, 5, 222; *Standard Ed.*, 21.]
- (1930a) *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*, Vienna. *G.S.*, 12, 29; *G.W.*, 14, 421. (175, 180)  
 [Trans.: *Civilization and its Discontents*, London and New York, 1930; *Standard Ed.*, 21.]
- (1931d) 'Das Fakultätsgutachten im Prozess Halsmann', *G.S.*, 12, 412; *G.W.*, 14, 541. (102, 113)  
 [Trans.: 'Expert Opinion in the Halsmann Case', *Standard Ed.*, 21.]
- (1932a) 'Zur Gewinnung des Feuers', *G.S.*, 12, 141; *G.W.*, 16, 3. (175)  
 [Trans.: 'The Acquisition and Control of Fire', *C.P.*, 5, 288; *Standard Ed.*, 22.]
- (1933a) *Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse*, Vienna. *G.S.*, 12, 151; *G.W.*, 15, 207. (175)



FREUD, S. (*cont.*)

- [*Trans.*: *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, London and New York, 1933; *Standard Ed.*, 22.]
- (1933*b*) *Warum Krieg?*, *G.S.*, 12, 349; *G.W.*, 16, 13. (180)
- [*Trans.*: *Why War?*, *C.P.*, 5, 273; *Standard Ed.*, 22.]
- (1937*c*) 'Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse', *G.W.*, 16, 59. (130)
- [*Trans.*: 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable', *C.P.*, 5, 316; *Standard Ed.*, 23.]
- (1939*a* [1937-39]) *Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion*, *G.W.*, 16, 103. (80, 187)
- [*Trans.*: *Moses and Monotheism*, London and New York, 1939; *Standard Ed.*, 23.]
- (1940*a* [1938]) *Abriss der Psychoanalyse*, *G.W.*, 17, 67. (216)
- [*Trans.*: *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, London and New York, 1949; *Standard Ed.*, 23.]
- (1942*a* [1905-6]) 'Psychopathic Characters on the Stage', *Standard Ed.*, 7, 305. (44, 142)
- [*German Text* (unpublished): 'Psychopathische Personen auf der Bühne.']
- (1950*a* [1887-1902]) *Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse*, London. Includes 'Entwurf einer Psychologie' (1895). (3-4, 4, 101, 151, 157, 164, 168, 173, 174, 180, 184, 187, 213, 218, 232, 236, 240)
- [*Trans.*: *The Origins of Psycho-Analysis*, London and New York, 1954. (Partly, including 'A Project for a Scientific Psychology', in *Standard Ed.*, 1.)]
- (1957*a* [1911]) With OPPENHEIM, D. E., 'Träume im Folklore', *Dreams in Folklore*, New York, 1958, Part II. (174)
- [*Trans.*: *Dreams in Folklore*, New York, 1958, Part I; *Standard Ed.*, 12, 177.]
- HAUSER, F. (1903) 'Disiecta membra neuattischer Reliefs', *Jh. österr. archäol. Inst.*, 6, 79. (95)
- JANET, PIERRE (1898) *Névroses et idées fixes* (2 vols.), 2nd ed., Paris. (159)
- JENSEN, W. (1903) *Gradiva: ein pompejanisches Phantasiestück*, Dresden and Leipzig. (3-95 passim, 248)
- JEREMIAS, A. (1904) *Das alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients*, Leipzig. (174)
- JONES, E. (1953) *Sigmund Freud: Life and Work*, Vol. 1, London and New York. (Page references are to the English edition.) (255)
- (1955) *Sigmund Freud: Life and Work*, Vol. 2, London and New York. (Page references are to the English edition.) (4, 101, 130, 168)
- (1957) *Sigmund Freud: Life and Work*, Vol. 3, London and New York. (Page references are to the English edition.) (102, 245)

- JUNG, C. G. (1904) With RIKLIN, F., 'Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien, I Beitrag: Experimentelle Untersuchungen über Assoziationen Gesunder', *J. Psychol. Neurol.*, 3, 55, 145, 193, 283 and 4, 24, 109. [Included in Jung (1906, 1909) (ed.).] (100, 101)  
 (1906) *Die psychologische Diagnose des Tatbestandes*, Halle. (100, 104, 106)  
 (1906, 1909) (ed.) *Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien* (2 vols.), Leipzig. (53, 100)  
 [Trans.: *Studies in Word-Association*, London, 1918; New York, 1919.]
- KRAFFT-EBING, R. VON (1867) *Beiträge zur Erkennung und richtigen forensischen Beurteilung krankhafter Gemütszustände für Ärzte, Richter und Verteidiger*, Erlangen. (117)  
 (1895) *Nervosität und neurasthenische Zustände*, Vienna. (184-5)
- LÖWENFELD, L. (1904) *Die psychischen Zwangerscheinungen*, Wiesbaden. (117)
- MOEBIUS, P. J. (1903) *Über den physiologischen Schwachsinn des Weibes* (5th ed.), Halle. (199)
- 'MULTATULI' (E. D. DEKKER) (1906) *Multatuli-Briefe* (2 vols.), Frankfurt. (132-3)
- OPPENHEIM, D. E. and FREUD, S. (1957) See FREUD, S. (1957a [1911])
- PICK, A. (1896) 'Über pathologische Träumerei und ihre Beziehung zur Hysterie', *Jb. Psychiat. Neurol.*, 14, 280. (159)
- RANK, O. (1909) *Der Mythos von der Geburt des Helden*, Leipzig and Vienna. (236)  
 [Trans.: *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, New York, 1914.]
- RIKLIN, F., and JUNG, C. G. (1904) See JUNG, C. G. (1904)
- SADGER, I. (1907) 'Die Bedeutung der psychoanalytischen Methode nach Freud', *Zbl. Nervenheilk. Psychiat.*, N.F. 18, 41. (165)
- SANCTIS, SANTE DE (1899) *I sogni*, Turin. (55)  
 [German trans.: *Die Träume* (trans. O. Schmidt), Halle, 1901.]
- STEKEL, W. (1908) *Nervöse Angstzustände und ihre Behandlung*, Berlin and Vienna. (250-1)



## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- G.S.* = Freud, *Gesammelte Schriften* (12 vols.), Vienna, 1924-34  
*G.W.* = Freud, *Gesammelte Werke* (18 vols.), London, from 1940  
*C.P.* = Freud, *Collected Papers* (5 vols.), London, 1924-50  
*Standard Ed.* = Freud, *Standard Edition* (24 vols.), London, from 1953  
*S.K.S.N.* = Freud, *Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre* (5 vols.), Vienna, 1906-22  
*S.P.H.* = Freud, *Selected Papers on Hysteria and Other Psychoneuroses*, New York, 1909-20  
*Dichtung und Kunst* = Freud, *Psychoanalytische Studien an Werken der Dichtung und Kunst*, Vienna, 1924  
*Neurosenlehre und Technik* = Freud, *Schriften zur Neurosenlehre und zur psychoanalytischen Technik (1913-1926)*, Vienna, 1931  
*Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre* = Freud, *Kleine Schriften zur Sexualtheorie und zur Traumlehre*, Vienna, 1931



## GENERAL INDEX

This index includes the names of non-technical authors. It also includes the names of technical authors where no reference is made in the text to specific works. For reference to specific technical works, the Bibliography should be consulted.—The compilation of the index was undertaken by Mrs. R. S. Partridge.

- Abraham, K.*, 248 n.  
 'Absences', hysterical, 233-4  
 Absurdity of dreams and delusions, 70-1, 73, 82-3  
*Abulias*, 118-19, 123-4  
*Adler, A.* (*see also* Bibliography), 99 n., 105  
 Aesthetic pleasure, 153  
 Affect, 60, 107-8, 133, 164, 231 n. 2, 232 n. 2  
 Aggressiveness, 162, 186  
*Altenberg, P.*, 245 n.  
 Ambiguity  
   of delusions, 84-6  
   verbal, 81-6, 110  
 Ambition  
   and urethral erotism, 175 and n. 1  
   phantasies of, 147, 159, 238  
 Anal  
   erotism, 168-71, 173-5, 220 n.  
   theory of birth, 208, 219-20  
 Analogies  
   algebraical equation, 106  
   burial of Pompeii, 5, 40 and n., 51, 84-5  
   portrait of donor in altar-piece, 147  
   silk patch on tattered coat, 139  
 Animals, sexual life of, 138, 187, 215, 219, 225  
 Anticathexis, 124 n. 2  
 Anxiety (*see also* Fear; Phobia), 61 n., 250  
   expectant, 123-5  
   in obsessional neurosis, 118, 123-4  
   the result of repression, 60-1, 124, 203  
 Anxiety-dreams, 56, 60-1  
   fictitious, in *Gradiva*, 12-14, 16, 19-20, 57, 60, 93  
 Anxiety hysteria, 250  
*Anzengruber, L.*, 150 and n. 1  
*Apollo*, 68  
*Arc de cercle*, 230  
*Ariosto*, 143  
*Aschaffenburg, G.*, 100  
 Association of ideas (*see* Free association)  
 Attention, 107, 233-4  
 Auto-erotism (*see also* Masturbation), 133, 161, 188-9, 199, 215  
   and hysterical attacks, 232-3  
 Baby equated with faeces, 219-20  
 Babylon, 174 and n. 4  
*Bahr, H.*, 245 n.  
*Baudissin, Eva, Countess*, 95  
 Bed-wetting, 175 and n. 1  
 Berlin, 142  
*Bertgang, Prof. R.* (in *Gradiva*), 23, 27-8, 30-4, 38-9, 51, 73-7, 81-2  
*Bertgang, Zoe* (in *Gradiva*), 21-95  
   passim  
   in role of physician, 21-2, 29, 37, 69-70, 84-5, 87-90  
*Biedenkapp, G.*, 253-4  
*Bigelow, J.*, 254-5  
 Biological factors in sexuality, 133, 199  
 Birth, infantile theories of, 135-6, 138, 208, 212-15, 218-20, 223-5  
   anal, 208, 219-20  
 Bisexuality (*see also* Masculine and feminine), 157-8, 164-6, 230

- Bleuler, E.* (*see also* Bibliography), 100, 104
- Blood  
fear of, and menstruation, 222  
-mixing theory of 'being married', 222-3
- Boys'  
attitude to parents, 238  
attribution of penis to females, 213-18
- Bresler, J.*, 116
- Breuer, J.* (*see also* Bibliography), 54, 89, 108, 116, 233 n. 2
- Brooding, 136, 218-19
- Burghölzli Hospital, 100
- Burial as symbol of repression, 5, 40 n., 51, 83-5
- Buttocks, 173
- Capri, 15, 23, 39
- Case  
of bisexuality in hysterica attacks, 166, 230  
of 'Dora', 5, 101 n. 1, 105 n. 1, 232 n. 1  
of *Frau Emmy von N.*, 101  
of 'Little Hans', 134-5, 207-8, 214, 215 n. 2 and 3, 217 n., 218 n. 2, 220 n., 250 n. 2  
of obsessional girl rinsing a basin, 120  
of 'Rat Man', 40 n., 116, 126 n. 2, 168, 200 n. 1, 214 n. 1  
of 'Wolf Man', 168, 220 n., 221 n.  
of woman subject to compulsions, 120-2  
of young mathematician, 36
- Castration  
complex, 208, 216-17  
threat, 208, 217
- Cathartic therapy, 89, 108
- Censorship, 58-9, 229
- Ceres*, 11, 31
- Character  
and anal erotism, 169-73, 175  
effect of masturbation on, 199-200  
effect of sexual abstinence on, 196-7
- Charcot, J.-M.*, 54
- Chastity (*see* Sexual abstinence)
- Chiaromonti, Museo, 95
- Childhood impressions  
conscious, 209  
re-activated, 230  
repressed, 30-6, 38, 40, 46-52, 58-9, 209, 230
- Children (*see also* Infantile)  
and parents, 212-14, 224, 237-241  
capacity for love in, 134  
compared to neurotics, 113  
component instincts in, 215, 219, 221, 223-4  
play of, 103, 144-6, 152, 223, 238  
sexual enlightenment of, 131-9, 224-6  
sexual researches of, 132-8, 207-8, 210-26
- Chronological reversal  
in dreams, 230-1  
in hysterical attacks, 230-1
- Civilization  
conflict between instincts and, 127, 179-80, 185-203, 252  
increasing demands of, on individuals, 183-4  
purpose of, frustrated by neurosis, 202-3  
sexual morality imposed by, 180-2, 185-201, 204
- Classical antiquity  
and belief in ghosts, 16  
and hermaphrodites, 216  
and money, 174  
and religion, 127  
and understanding of dreams, 7-8
- Cleanliness, 169 n., 172-3
- Clitoris, 217
- Cloacal theory of birth, 208, 219-220
- Complex  
castration, 208, 217  
nuclear, of neurosis, 214  
Oedipus, 214 n. 1  
use of term, 100-2
- Complexes, theory of, 104-114, 186, 210, 231
- Component instincts, 79, 88, 124-5, 131, 162-4, 170-1, 175, 187, 190

- in children, 215, 219, 221, 223-4
- Compromise formations
  - phantasies as, 52, 58
  - speeches as, 85
  - symptoms as, 52-4, 58, 67, 75, 85-6, 90, 125-6, 164-5
- Compulsions (*see also* Obsessional acts), 119-23
- Condensation
  - in dreams, 76
  - in hysterical attacks, 229-30
- Conflict
  - between civilization and instincts, 127, 179-80, 185-203, 252
  - psychical, 52-4, 58, 66-7, 69, 124, 214
- Conscience, 119
- Conscientiousness, obsessional, 118-19, 124
- Consciousness
  - admissibility to, 80, 90, 160
  - ambiguity as a link between the unconscious and, 85-6
  - exclusion from, by repression, 47-8, 58, 79, 83, 101-2, 108
  - psycho-analysis brings repressed material into, 89, 173
- Constipation, 173
- Contraception, 194, 210
- Conversion, hysterical, 162-3
- Copernicus*, 245
- Coprophilia, 219
- Couvade, 223-4
- Creative writers, 9, 42-4, 46, 54, 91-2, 94, 142-5, 246
  - compared to children, 143-5
  - compared to day-dreamers, 149-153
  - dreams, as treated by, 7-9, 41, 62
- Crime, psychology of, 102, 108, 111-13
- Criminal and society, 187
- Criticism renounced by patient, in psycho-analysis, 108-9
- Darwin*, 245
- Day-dreams (*see also* Phantasies), 145, 148, 159-61, 229, 233
  - ambitious in males, erotic in females, 159, 258
  - creative writing compared to, 149-53
  - wish-fulfilment in, 147-9, 238
- Day's residues, 57, 73-4, 76-7, 93
- Death, fear of, 203
- Defaecation, pleasure in (*see also* Constipation; Faecal incontinence; Faeces), 170, 171 *n.* 2, 173-5
- Defence
  - obsessional acts as, 123-5
  - religious observances as, 123-4
- Degeneracy, 45, 210
- Dekker, E. D.* (*see also* *Multatuli*), 132-3, 133 *n.*, 246
- Delusions
  - absurdity of, 70-1
  - ambiguity of, 84-6
  - compared to dreams, 54-5, 58, 62, 83, 86
  - distortion in, 80
  - genesis and development of, 22, 44-7, 51-9, 61-2, 65-70, 76-81, 91
  - 'grain of truth' in all, 80-1
  - hysterical, 45 *n.*
  - paranoic, 45, 159, 162
  - symbolism of, 40
  - therapy of, 22, 37-9, 46, 51, 60, 85, 87-9, 92
- Dementia praecox, 136 *n.*
- Descent of Man* (by *Darwin*), 245
- Determinism, 104-5, 109
- Deuticke, F.*, 248 *n.*
- Devil, the, personifies repressed instinctual life, 174 and *n.*
- Disgust, 171
- Displacement
  - from back to front, 172 *n.*
  - in dreams, 58, 126
  - in obsessional symptoms, 126
  - of psychical values, in religion, 126
  - of sexual instinct, 187-8
- Distortion
  - in delusions, 80
  - in dreams, 58-9, 61, 73-4, 81, 149, 160, 229



- Distortion (*cont.*)  
 in hysterical attacks, 229  
 in phantasies, 50, 58  
*Docteur Pascal* (by *Zola*), 246  
 'Dora', case of, 5, 101 n. 1, 105  
 n. 1, 232 n. 1  
*Dostoevsky*, 228, 234 n. 1  
 Dream-content, manifest, 57-61,  
 67, 73, 76-7, 81-2, 110, 163  
 n. 1  
 Dream-interpretation, 7-8, 81-3,  
 148, 229, 241  
 technique of, 41, 59-62, 64,  
 73-4, 110-11, 229  
 Dreams (*see also* Anxiety-dreams)  
 absurdity of, 73, 82-3  
 altered in repetition, 110-11  
 and delusions, 54-5, 58, 62, 83,  
 86  
 and phantasies, 148-9, 159-60  
 and sensory stimuli, 8, 13,  
 55-6  
 and the unconscious, 252, 255  
 chronological reversal in, 230-1  
 condensation in, 76  
 displacement in, 58, 126  
 distortion in, 58-9, 61, 73-4, 81,  
 149, 160, 226  
*Freud's* of Villa Secerno, 4  
 n. 2  
 identification in, 74  
 in fiction, 7-9, 41, 62  
 mental disturbances and, 55  
*Norbert Hanold's* first, in *Gradiva*,  
 12-16, 19-20, 25, 41, 52-62,  
 66-8, 70, 79-80, 88, 93  
*Norbert Hanold's* second, in  
*Gradiva*, 25, 72-8, 81-3, 97  
 of 'woman with a penis', 216  
 sense of reality in, 57-9  
 speeches in, 74  
 understanding of, in classical  
 antiquity, 7-8  
 wish-fulfilment in, 5, 7-8, 61-2,  
 91-3, 149  
 Dream-symbols (*see* Symbols)  
 Dream-thoughts, latent, 59-61, 67,  
 73, 76, 82, 92-3, 110-11,  
 163 n. 1  
 Dream-work, 83, 163 n. 1, 230  
*Dukatenscheisser*, 174  
 Education (*see also* Sexual en-  
 lightenment of children), 171,  
 190, 196-9, 201, 210  
 Ego equated with hero in fiction,  
 150-1, 153  
 Ego-instincts, 127, 212  
*Ehrenfels*, C. von (*see also* Biblio-  
 graphy), 204  
*Eimer*, G. H. T., 23, 73, 76  
*Einstein*, A., 180  
*Emmy von N.*, *Frau*, case of, 101  
 Empathy, 45  
 Emperor and Empress as dream  
 symbols, 241  
 'Endopsychic' perception, 51  
 Enuresis, 175 and n. 1  
 Epilepsy, 228, 234  
 Erotogenic zones (*see also* Anal  
 erotism; Oral erotism), 133,  
 161, 170-1, 175, 188, 215  
 Error, 80-1  
*Este*, Cardinal *Ippolito d'*, 143 and n.  
  
*Fackel*, *Die*, 200  
 Faecal incontinence (*see also*  
 Defaecation), 170  
 Faeces, 168, 170, 171 n. 2, 174  
 and n. 1 and 4  
 equated with baby, 219-20  
 equated with money, 168, 173-4  
 Fairy tales, 152, 174 and n. 4, 211,  
 219-20, 252  
 Falsified perception, 216  
 'Family romance', 236-41  
 effect of sexual enlightenment  
 on, 239  
*Faust* (*Goethe*), 245  
 Fear (*see also* Anxiety, neurotic;  
 Phobias)  
 of blood, 222-3  
 of death, 203  
*Fécondité* (by *Zola*), 246  
 Feminine impulses (*see* Masculine  
 and feminine)  
*Ferenczi*, S. (*see also* Bibliography),  
 252  
 Fetishism, 45-7  
 foot-, 45-6  
 Fixation of sexual instinct, 187,  
 189, 216

- Fliess, Wilhelm*, 3-4, 101 n. 2, 151 n., 157, 164 n., 168, 173 n. 3, 174 n. 1, 180, 184 n., 187 n., 191 n. 2, 218 n. 1, 232 n. 1, 236, 240 n.
- Flight, 42, 67
- 'Flight into illness', 192, 231, 232 n. 1
- Florence, 95
- Foot-fetishism, 45-6
- Forel, A.*, 245 n.
- Fore-pleasure, 153 and n.
- Forgetting  
always has a reason, 22, 105  
and repression, 34, 38-9, 47
- France, Anatole*, 246
- Free association  
and children's games, 103  
experiments, 100, 103-7, 109-111, 113-14  
in psycho-analytic technique, 73, 89, 108-9
- Fremdlinge unter den Menschen* (by *W. Jensen*), 95
- Friedjung, Dr.*, 256
- Frigidity in women, 198, 201-2, 217
- Frustration, 188 n. 1, 194
- Fürst, Dr. M.*, 129-31
- Gain from illness, primary and secondary, 231-2, 232 n. 1
- Genitals (*see also* Castration; Clitoris; Penis; Vagina)  
primacy of, 133-4, 188-9  
stimulation of, in infancy, 133, 170-1, 188, 215, 217
- Ghosts, belief in, 16-19, 26, 30-1, 70-1
- Girls  
hysterical attacks in, 233-4  
penis envy in, 218  
sexual researches of, 198-9, 223
- God the Father, 127
- Goethe*, 146 n. 1, 173, 245
- Gomperz, T.*, 246
- Götz von Berlichingen* (*Goethe*), 173
- Gradiva* (by *W. Jensen*), 142, 248  
as a psychiatric study, 3-5, 41-62, 64-95
- Jung* and, 9-10, 91
- story summarized, 10-40
- Graves' disease, 71-2
- Griechische Denker* (by *Gomperz*), 246
- Gross, Hans*, 106
- Guilt, sense of 113, 125, 171 n. 2  
unconscious, 123 and n.
- Hallucination, negative, 67
- Hamburg, 130
- Hamlet*, 3, 8, 17, 245
- Hammerschlag, Prof. S.*, 255-6
- Hanold, Norbert* (in *Gradiva*), 10-93  
passim  
dreams of, 12-14, 16, 19-20, 25, 41, 52-62, 66-8, 70, 72-83, 88, 93
- '*Hans, Little*', case of, 134-5, 207-8, 214, 215 n. 2 and 3, 217 n., 218 n. 2, 220 n., 250 n. 2
- Hartleben, Gisa* (in *Gradiva*), 24-8, 38, 69, 74-5, 83-4
- Hedonism, 204
- Heine*, 245
- Heller, Hugo*, 142, 245 n., 248 n.
- Hereditary factors in neurosis, 45, 53, 185-6
- Hermaphrodites, 216
- Hero in fiction and day-dreams, 149-51, 153
- Hesitation an expression of resistance, 109-10
- Hesse, H.*, 245 n.
- Hirschfeld, M.*, 157
- Hoffmannsthal, Hugo von*, 245 n.
- Homer*, 245
- Homosexuality, 164-5, 175, 189-190, 200-1, 208, 216-17
- Honeymoon couples, horror of (in *Gradiva*), 15-16, 24-8, 39, 65, 67-8, 75, 88
- Horace*, 35
- House-flies, horror of (in *Gradiva*), 15-16, 65
- Humour, 145
- Huttens letzte Tage* (by *C. F. Meyer*), 246-7
- 'Hypnoid states', 233-4
- Hypnotic suggestion, 173
- Hysteria, 53-4, 186, 234, 250
- Hysterical  
'absences', 233-4

- Hysterical (*cont.*)  
 attacks, 124, 229-34  
 compensatory formations, 217-218  
 conversions, 162-3  
 delusions, 45 *n.*  
 phantasies, 157-66, 229-31  
 possession, 174 *n.* 1  
 symptoms, nature of, 163-5
- Identification  
 in dreams, 74  
 multiple, 230
- Im gotischen Hause* (by *W. Jensen*), 95
- Immortality of the soul, 139
- Incentive bonus, 153
- Incest, 180
- Incestuous impulses, 240
- 'Indirect representation', 110
- Infantile sexual theories, 134-8, 207-8, 211-26  
 of birth, 135-6, 138, 208, 212-15, 218-20, 223-5  
 of distinction between the sexes, 134-5, 135 *n.* 2, 208, 211-12, 215-18  
 of sexual intercourse, 136, 208, 218, 220-3, 225-6
- Infantile sexuality, 46-9, 124-5, 133-4, 164, 171 *n.* 2, 188, 199, 209-11, 215, 217, 233
- Instincts (*see also* Component instincts; Ego-instincts; Sexual instinct)  
 conflict between civilization and, 127, 179-80, 185-203, 252  
 repression of, 53-4, 89-90, 124
- Instinctual impulse, 124
- Intellectual curiosity and sexual researches of children, 199, 218-219, 224
- Intermediate ideas, 33-4, 34 *n.*
- Interpretation of dreams (*see* Dream-interpretation)
- Inversion (*see* Homosexuality)
- Jahrbuch für sexuelle Zwischenstufen*, 157
- Janet, Pierre* (*see also* Bibliography), 54
- Jealousy  
 of younger child, 212-13  
 sexual, 24-5, 38, 77, 79-80, 88, 134
- Jensen, W.*, author of *Gradiva* (*see also* Bibliography), 3-95  
 passim, 248 *n.*  
 correspondence with *Freud*, 4  
 other stories by, 94-5
- Jesus Christ*, 35
- Jokes, 145, 153 *n.*
- Jones, Ernest* (*see also* Bibliography), 248 *n.*
- Jung, C. G.* (*see also* Bibliography), 116, 210, 248 *n.*  
 and *Freud*, 4, 99-100, 168  
 and *Gradiva*, 4, 9-10, 91  
 and theory of complexes, 210  
 association experiments of, 100, 104
- Jungle Book, The* (by *Kipling*), 246
- Keller, G.*, 246
- King Lear*, 43
- Kipling, R.*, 246
- Kiss equated with sexual intercourse, 223
- Klein, J.*, 106
- Kräpelin, E.*, 100
- Kraus, Karl*, 200 and *n.*
- Latency period, 171, 180
- Lazarus* (by *Heine*), 245
- Legal evidence  
*Jung's* study of, 100  
 unreliability of, 103
- Legends, 135, 152, 174 *n.* 1 and 2, 213, 217
- Leonardo da Vinci* (by *Merezhkovsky*), 246
- Lettres de femmes* (by *Marcel Prévost*), 225
- Leute von Seldwyla* (by *G. Keller*), 246
- Libido (*see also* Sexual instinct)  
 discharged in form of symptoms, 165, 194, 231-2, 234  
 repression of, 60-1  
 sublimation of, 161
- Linguistic usage (*see also* Verbal), 144, 148, 173-4

- 'Little Hans' (see 'Hans, Little')
- Little Red Riding-Hood*, 219
- Lizard as dream-symbol, 72-3, 75-7, 83, 93
- Löffler, Professor, 99, 103
- Love (see also Object-love), 22, 90, 134  
and marriage, 194, 198, 200-3  
children's capacity for, 134
- Macaulay, T., 246
- Macbeth, 17, 245
- Mach, E., 245 n.
- Mammon, 174
- Mania, 220
- Marriage, 124-5, 181, 191-203, 221-3  
children's theories of, 221-3
- Masaryk, T., 245 n.
- Masculine and feminine (see also Boys; Girls; Men; Women), 79, 217, 220 and n., 234
- Masochism, 93, 162
- Masturbation (see also Auto-eroticism), 161-2, 199-201, 217, 224, 232  
effect of, on character, 199-200  
enuresis equated with, 175 n. 1  
phantasies, 161, 166, 200
- Mathematics and sexuality, 36
- Mélusine, 119
- Memories, repressed, 30-6, 38, 40, 46-52, 57-9, 88-9, 209, 230
- Memory-traces, 34
- Men (see also Boys; Masculine and feminine)  
and civilized marriage, 191-203  
and double morality, 182, 195  
phantasies of ambition in, 147, 159
- Menstruation, 222-3
- Merezhkovsky, D. S., 246
- Meyer, C. F., 3-4, 151 n., 246-7
- Micturition (see also Enuresis), 218, 222, 224  
involuntary, 233
- Milton, 245
- Miserliness and anal eroticism, 168-9, 171, 173, 175
- Mnemic symbols, hysterical symptoms as, 163
- Moll, Albert, 228
- Money  
equated with dirt, 173-4  
equated with faeces, 168, 173-4
- Monogamy, 181-2, 194-6, 201-3
- Morality  
atheistic, 254  
double, 182, 195  
in education of children, 136-9, 171, 214  
sexual, imposed by civilization, 180-2, 185-204
- Multatuli (alias E. D. Dekker; see also Bibliography), 132-3, 133 n., 246
- Multiple identification, 230
- Munich, 95
- Mutterschutz, 179
- Myths, 135, 152, 174 and n. 4, 211, 213, 217, 238, 252  
as phantasies of nations, 152
- Naples, 15, 17, 65
- Nergal, God of the Underworld, 174 n. 4
- Neue Freie Presse, 253-6
- Neurasthenia, 184-6
- Neuroses (see also Hysteria; Obsessional neurosis)  
and family romances, 237-40  
and the pressure of civilization, 182-5  
and unconscious mental processes, 54, 89-90  
as 'negative' of perversions, 189, 191  
frustrate the purpose of civilization, 202-3  
hereditary factors in, 45, 53, 185-6  
nuclear complex of, 214  
phantasies as precursors of, 148  
'proper' and psychoneuroses distinguished, 185-6  
sexual aetiology of, 5, 89-90, 131, 134, 136, 182, 185-6  
188-204, 250
- Neurotics  
compared to children, 113  
compared to normal persons, 210-11

- Neurotics (*cont.*)  
 psycho-analysis of, 107-13, 120, 146, 162-6, 173-5, 209-10, 225-6, 229, 252
- Nuclear complex of neurosis, 214
- Object-love, 161, 188-9
- Obsessional acts  
 apparent senselessness of, 118, 120-1, 125-6  
 as defence mechanisms, 123-5  
 compared to religious observances, 117-20, 122-7  
 displacement in, 126  
 sexual significance of, 120-2, 126-7
- Obsessional brooding, 136
- Obsessional neurosis, 53-4, 108, 116-27, 168, 186
- Obstinacy and anal erotism, 169, 171, 173, 175
- Oedipus complex, 214 *n.* 1
- Oedipus Rex*, 3, 135
- Omnipotence, sense of, 186
- Opposite, representation by, in hysterical attacks, 230-1
- Oral  
 erotism, 170-1, 223  
 theories of sexual intercourse, 208, 223
- Orderliness and anal erotism, 169, 171-2, 175
- Orlando Furioso*, 143 *n.*
- Overdetermination  
 in phantasies, 51-2  
 of symptoms, 85
- Overvaluation, 241
- Paradise Lost*, 245
- Paranoia, 45 and *n.*, 71, 159, 162, 236
- Parental intercourse, 208, 220-2
- Parents and children, 212-14, 224, 237-41
- Penis  
 attributed to both sexes, 208, 215-18  
 envy, 218  
 'woman with a', 208, 216-18
- Perception  
 'endopsychic', 51  
 falsified, 216
- Perversion, 134, 159, 162, 189-92, 200-1  
 as 'positive' of neurosis, 189, 191
- Pfister, O.*, 248 *n.*
- Phantasies (*see also* Day-dreams), 252  
 and dreams, 148-9, 159-60  
 as compromise-formations, 52, 58  
 as substitute for play, 144-6, 152  
 as wish-fulfilment, 146-8, 151-2, 159, 161, 230  
 distortion in, 50, 58  
 erotic, 147, 159, 231  
 hysterical, 157-66, 229-31  
 masturbatory, 161, 166, 200  
 of ambition, 147, 159, 238  
 of 'family romance', 239-41  
 precursors of delusions, 44-5, 58  
 precursors of neurosis, 148  
 repressed memories as source of, 31, 34-5, 40, 49-51, 57-9  
 screen-, 171 *n.* 2  
 temporal aspect of, 147-8, 151  
 unconscious, 160-6, 229
- Phobias (*see also* Fear), 124, 223
- Play of children, 103, 143-6, 152
- Pleasure  
 and sexual instinct, 188  
 religion demands renunciation of, 127
- Pompeii, 4-95 *passim*  
 repression symbolized by the burial of, 5, 40 and *n.*, 51, 84-5
- Prague, 106
- Prévost, Marcel*, 225
- Primal scene, 208, 220-2
- Primary process, 34 *n.*
- Psycho-analysis  
 compared to excavation of Pompeii, 5, 40  
 criticisms of, 209  
 of neurotics (*see* Neurotics)  
 therapeutic aspect of, 5, 89-91, 111-12, 122, 173, 251-2
- Psycho-analytic technique, 37-8, 85-6, 89-90, 107-12, 162, 209
- Psychoanalytische Bewegung, Die*, 4

- Psychoneuroses (*see* Neuroses)
- Psychoses (*see also* Dementia praecox; Mania; Paranoia), 148, 220
- Puberty, 133-4, 171, 210, 217, 234, 238
- Rank, O. (*see also* Bibliography), 248 n.
- 'Rat Man', case of, 40 n., 116, 126 n. 2, 168, 200 n. 1, 214 n. 1
- Reaction  
   change of content in, 106-7, 110  
   mistakes in reproducing, 107, 110-11  
   -formations, 171-2, 175  
   -time, 107, 109
- Reality  
   flight from, 231  
   phantasy and, 144, 146  
   play and, 144-5  
   sense of, in dreams, 57-9
- Religion  
   and supression of instinctual impulses, 125-7, 187, 252  
   displacement of psychical values in, 127  
   prohibition of thought about, 199  
   psychology of, 116-17  
   symbolism of, 119, 122, 124-5
- Religious observances compared to obessional acts, 117-20, 122-7
- Repressed  
   memories, 30-6, 38, 40, 46-52, 57-9, 88-9, 209, 230  
   motives, 52, 71, 122  
   return of the, 35-6, 90, 111, 233  
   sexual knowledge, 214, 218-19, 225  
   wish, 93, 108, 148-9
- Repression  
   and delusions, 80-1  
   and dreams, 62-3, 68, 93  
   and phantasies, 161, 233  
   and theory of complexes, 101-2, 186, 231  
   as exclusion from consciousness, 47-8, 58, 79, 93, 101-2 108
- compared to burial of Pompeii, 5, 40 and n., 51, 84-5  
   in saints and ascetics, 35  
   sexual, 36, 54, 60-1, 89-90, 112, 124-7, 164-5, 170-1, 180, 186, 191, 217  
   theory of, 35-6, 49 and n., 53-4, 90-1, 108, 233-4
- Reproductive function, 134, 188-9, 194, 203-4
- Resistance  
   conscious and unconscious, 112-113  
   to psycho-analysis, 109-10, 112  
   to the repressed, 58-9, 62-3
- Revenge, 240
- Reversal, in hysterical attacks, 230-1
- Richterlin, Die* (by C. F. Meyer), 3-4
- Riklin, F.* (*see also* Bibliography), 248 n.
- Ritual (*see* Religious observances)
- Roman Emperors, excesses of 162
- Rome, 10, 15, 17, 65, 95
- Rops, Félicien*, 35
- Rote Schirm, Der* (by W. Jensen), 94-5
- Rousseau, J.-J.*, 36
- Sacrifice, 187 and n.
- Sadger, I.* (*see also* Bibliography), 248 n.
- Sadism, 162, 218  
   of parental intercourse, 208, 220-2
- Schnitzler, A.*, 245 n.
- Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde*, 248-9
- Screen-phantasy, 171 n. 2
- 'Secular dreams', 152
- Semen, 224
- Sensory stimuli and dreams, 8, 13, 55-6
- Sexual abstinence, 190, 193-4, 196-7, 199-201
- Sexual aetiology of the neuroses, 5, 89-90, 131, 134, 136, 182, 185-6, 188-204, 250
- Sexual aim, 171, 175, 187, 189, 193, 200

- Sexual behaviour sets the pattern for other modes of reaction, 198-200
- Sexual development, retardation of, 196-8
- Sexual enlightenment of children age for, 131, 137-8, 224-5 by other children, 224 in school, 138-9 manner of, 131, 137-8, 224 necessity for, 131-7 reaction to, 225-6
- Sexual excitation, 133-4, 170-1, 188-91, 220
- Sexual frigidity in women, 198, 201-2, 217
- Sexual instincts (*see also* Libido), 131-2, 187-98 displacement of, 187-8 repression of (*see* Repression, sexual) varying intensity of, 210-11
- Sexual intercourse, 181, 189, 192-201, 230, 234 infantile theories of, 136, 208, 218, 220-3, 225-6 parental, 188, 220-2
- Sexual life of animals, 138, 187, 215, 219, 225
- Sexual researches of children, 132-138, 198-9, 207-8, 210-26 and intellectual curiosity, 199, 218-19, 224
- Sexual satisfaction, 161-4, 188, 193-4, 198-201, 233
- Sexual-Probleme*, 179, 207
- Shakespeare*, 3, 8, 17, 43, 245
- Shame, 171
- Sleep, 8-9, 62, 254
- Slips of the tongue, 105
- Sophocles*, 3, 245
- Speeches as compromise formations, 85 in dreams, 74
- Sphinx, riddle of the, 135
- Stekel, W.* (*see also* Bibliography), 250-1
- Stimuli (*see* Sensory stimuli)
- Storfer, A. J.*, 248 n.
- Stork fable of birth, 136, 138, 212, 213, 215
- Sublimation, 161, 171, 175, 187 190, 193, 195, 197
- Suckling and breast, 133, 195
- Suggestion, hypnotic, 173
- Superstition, 7-8, 174
- Sur la pierre blanche* (by *A. France*), 246
- Symbol burial as, 5, 40 n., 51, 83-5 Emperor and Empress as, 241 lizard as, 72-3, 75-7, 83, 93 the past as, 85
- Symbolism of delusions, 40 of hysterical symptoms, 163 of obsessional acts, 120-1, 126 of religious ceremonial, 119, 122
- Symptomatic actions, 105
- Symptoms and phantasies, 148, 157, 159-65 as compromise-formations, 52-4, 58, 67, 75, 85-6, 90, 125-6, 164-5 curability of, 111, 164 genesis of, 90, 108, 159-62, 194, 211, 223 wish-fulfilment in, 163
- Tongue-biting, hysterical, 233
- Torquato Tasso* (*Goethe*), 146 n. 1
- Toxic factors, 185
- Transference, 90
- Traumatic experience, 163
- Twain, Mark*, 246
- Ucs.* (*see* Unconscious, the)
- Unconscious, the, 53, 63, 85-6, 89-90, 92, 124, 149, 191 defined in terms of repression 48 frontier between consciousness and, 90, 112
- Unconscious mental processes, 47-9, 52-4, 60, 63, 66, 75-86, 101, 186, 209, 255 motives, 71, 122 sense of guilt, 123 and n. wish, 93, 108, 148-9
- Unpleasure, 112-13, 188
- Urethral erotism, 170-1, 175 n. 1

- Vagina, 218-19, 224  
*Van Houten's* cocoa, 171 *n.* 2  
*Venus*, 68  
 Verbal  
     ambiguity, 81-6, 110  
     bridges, 37, 42, 51, 89, 171 *n.* 2, 225  
 Vesuvius, 12, 20, 68, 71  
 Vienna, 99, 100, 108  
 Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society, 116, 130, 142, 228  
*Vorbrodt, Pastor G.*, 116  
  
 Waking life and dreams, 8-9, 62-3  
*Wassermann, J.*, 245 *n.*  
*Wertheimer, M.*, 106  
 Wish, repressed, 93, 108, 148-9  
 Wish-fulfilment  
     in day-dreams, 147-9, 238  
     in dreams, 5, 7-8, 61-2, 91-3, 149  
     in phantasies, 146-8, 151-2, 159, 161, 230  
     in symptoms, 163  
     '*Wolf Man*', case of, 168, 220 *n.*, 221 *n.*  
     '*Woman with a penis*', 208, 216-18  
 Women (*see also* Girls; Masculine and feminine)  
     and childbirth, 198  
     and marriage, 194-5, 197-8, 201-3  
     and motherhood, 202  
     frigidity in, 198, 201-2, 217  
     hysteria in, 159, 166, 234  
     'intellectual inferiority' of, 199  
     sexual instinct in, 147, 191-2, 195, 197-9  
*Wundt, W.*, 100, 103  
  
*Zeit, Die*, 95, 142  
*Ziehen, T.*, 101 and *n.*  
*Zola*, 151, 246  
 Zurich school, 100-1, 104